diff --git a/config.toml b/config.toml index 76fd6600..475b3c3f 100644 --- a/config.toml +++ b/config.toml @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ base_url = "https://aron.petau.net/" title = "Aron Petau" -description = "I am a graduate in Design & Computation at the Technische Universität Berlin and Universität der Künste Berlin. I am passionate about Cognitive Science, Software Engineering, 3D Modelling, Design and Technology Didactics. Here I display a selection of my past work, you are welcome to have a look around!" default_language = "en" output_dir = "public" @@ -9,7 +8,9 @@ generate_feeds = true generate_sitemap = true hard_link_static = true generate_robots_txt = true +feed_filenames = ["rss.xml", "atom.xml"] +theme = "duckquill" # Whether to automatically compile all Sass files in the sass directory @@ -20,24 +21,22 @@ build_search_index = true minify_html = true -taxonomies = [ - { name = "tags" } -] +taxonomies = [{ name = "tags", feed = true }] [search] -index_format = "elasticlunr_json" +index_format = "fuse_json" + include_title = true include_description = true include_date = true include_path = true include_content = true -truncate_content_length = 100 [markdown] -# Whether to do syntax highlighting -# Theme can be customised by setting the `highlight_theme` variable to a theme supported by Zola highlight_code = true highlight_theme = "css" + + render_emoji = false smart_punctuation = true definition_list = true @@ -49,10 +48,10 @@ paths_keep_dates = false [extra] author = "Aron Petau" -description = "Some description, if you somehow didn't set it in page / section settings" logo_src = "images/logo.png" # logo src avatar_src = "images/aron_avatar_square.jpg" # avatar src index_page="index" # name of the index page. Should be one of top_menu to make things work top_menu = ["index","features","notes"] # Menu items copyright_string = "Сreated by Aron Petau in 2024 – %YEAR%" -nonce = "${aron_allows_this}" # used for JavaScript src nonce + +description = "I am a graduate in Design & Computation at the Technische Universität Berlin and Universität der Künste Berlin. I am passionate about Cognitive Science, Software Engineering, 3D Modelling, Design and Technology Didactics. Here I display a selection of my past work, you are welcome to have a look around!" diff --git a/content/_index.md b/content/_index.md index f59a2a97..e4d9ec4b 100644 --- a/content/_index.md +++ b/content/_index.md @@ -1,70 +1,18 @@ +++ -title = "Homepage" - -description = "Page description" - -# Whether to sort pages by "date", "weight", or "none". More on that below -sort_by = "none" - -# Used by the parent section to order its subsections. -# Lower values have priority. -weight = 0 - -# Template to use to render this section page -template = "index.html" - -# Apply the given template to ALL pages below the section, recursively. -# If you have several nested sections each with a page_template set, the page -# will always use the closest to itself. -# However, a page own `template` variable will always have priority. -# Not set by default -#page_template = - -# How many pages to be displayed per paginated page. -# No pagination will happen if this isn't set or if the value is 0 -paginate_by = 10 - -# If set, will be the path used by paginated page and the page number will be appended after it. -# For example the default would be page/1 -paginate_path = "page" - -# Whether to insert a link for each header like the ones you can see in this site if you hover one -# The default template can be overridden by creating a `anchor-link.html` in the `templates` directory -# Options are "left", "right" and "none" -insert_anchor_links = "none" - -# Whether the section pages should be in the search index. This is only used if -# `build_search_index` is set to true in the config -in_search_index = true - -# Whether to render that section homepage or not. -# Useful when the section is only there to organize things but is not meant -# to be used directly -render = true - -# Whether to redirect when landing on that section. Defaults to not being set. -# Useful for the same reason as `render` but when you don't want a 404 when -# landing on the root section page. -# Example: redirect_to = "documentation/content/overview" -# redirect_to = "/notes/" - -# Whether the section should pass its pages on to the parent section. Defaults to `false`. -# Useful when the section shouldn't split up the parent section, like -# sections for each year under a posts section. -transparent = false - -# Use aliases if you are moving content but want to redirect previous URLs to the -# current one. This takes an array of path, not URLs. -aliases = [] - -# Your own data -[extra] -show_shares = false -index = true - +insert_anchor_links = "left" +title = "Home" +++ -Welcome to the online presence of Aron Petau. + + +# Welcome + +to the online presence of Aron Petau. This site is a collection of my thoughts and experiences. I hope you find something interesting here. -If you feel like reading about some of my past projects, check out the [notes](@/notes/_index.md) section. +This Page is currently under construction. +broken links are to be expected. + +
diff --git a/content/blog/2020-07-14-critical-epistemologies.md b/content/blog/2020-07-14-critical-epistemologies.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..3e9184b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/content/blog/2020-07-14-critical-epistemologies.md @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ ++++ +title = "Critical Epistemology" +date = 2020-07-14 +author = "Aron Petau" +description = "Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies" +draft = false + +[taxonomies] +tags = ["alison jaggar", "elizabeth anderson", "epistemology", "ethics", "feminism", "francois ewald", "judith butler", "josé medina", "normativity", "phenomenology", "philosophy", "philosophy of emotions", "postphenomenology", "private", "university of osnabrück", "values in science"] + +[extra] +show_copyright = true +show_shares = true +keywords = "cloud,infrastructure,security,management,migration" ++++ + +## Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies + +### On Anderson: Institutions + +{% alert(note=true) %} +Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions +Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173, +DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 [Publication](https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211) +{% end %} + +The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour. +But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice? +Well, maybe, assuming that: + +1. Everyone realizes their privilege, +2. Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal, +3. Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach. + +I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed. +Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance. +The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices. +Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved. +Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice. + +I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality? + +{% alert(note=true) %} +created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45 +{% end %} + +### On Medina, the informant and the inquirer + +{% alert(note=true) %} +Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214 +[Publication](https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf) +{% end %} + +My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment, +Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another. +Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations. +Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately. +Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker. +Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy: + + "When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility" + +Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me. + +{% alert(note=true) %} +created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25 +{% end %} + +### On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society + +{% alert(note=true) %} +Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185 +[Publication](https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185) +{% end %} + +I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me. +On outlaw emotions: +First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it. +Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change. +Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner. +When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic. +“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.” +To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms. +The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest. +Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do: +“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests” +til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are. +Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one? +But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men." +This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm +not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena +without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here. + +{% alert(note=true) %} +created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52 +{% end %} diff --git a/content/blog/2021-03-01-philosophy copy.md b/content/blog/2021-03-01-philosophy copy.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..ceccc77c --- /dev/null +++ b/content/blog/2021-03-01-philosophy copy.md @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ ++++ +title = "Philosophy" +date = 2021-03-01 +author = "Aron Petau" +description = "A selection of my weekly commentaries from philosophical seminars at the University of Osnabrück" +draft = false + +[taxonomies] +tags = ["alison jaggar", "elizabeth anderson", "elsa dorlin", "epistemology", "ethics", "feminism", "francois ewald", "judith butler", "josé medina", "michael foucault", "miranda fricker", "normativity", "phenomenology", "philosophy", "philosophy of emotions", "postphenomenology", "private", "university of osnabrück", "values in science"] + +[extra] +show_copyright = true +show_shares = true ++++ + +## Critical considerations during my studies + +I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments. +Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there. +I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers. +The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest. + + +## Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies + +### On Anderson: Institutions + +{% alert(note=true) %} +Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions +Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173, +DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 [Publication](https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211) +{% end %} + +The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour. +But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice? +Well, maybe, assuming that: + +1. Everyone realizes their privilege, +2. Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal, +3. Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach. + +I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed. +Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance. +The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices. +Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved. +Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice. + +I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality? + +{% alert(note=true) %} +created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45 +{% end %} + +### On Medina, the informant and the inquirer + +{% alert(note=true) %} +Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214 +[Publication](https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf) +{% end %} + +My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment, +Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another. +Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations. +Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately. +Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker. +Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy: + + "When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility" + +Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me. + +{% alert(note=true) %} +created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25 +{% end %} + +### On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society + +{% alert(note=true) %} +Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185 +[Publication](https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185) +{% end %} + +I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me. +On outlaw emotions: +First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it. +Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change. +Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner. +When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic. +“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.” +To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms. +The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest. +Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do: +“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests” +til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are. +Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one? +But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men." +This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm +not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena +without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here. + +{% alert(note=true) %} +created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52 +{% end %} + +## Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault + +### On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence + +{% alert(note=true) %} +Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge.