+
diff --git a/drafts/2018-07-05-cad.md b/content/blog/2018-07-05-cad.md
similarity index 82%
rename from drafts/2018-07-05-cad.md
rename to content/blog/2018-07-05-cad.md
index a206e7b0..2f4e8d8a 100644
--- a/drafts/2018-07-05-cad.md
+++ b/content/blog/2018-07-05-cad.md
@@ -1,41 +1,28 @@
+++
-title: 3D Modeling and CAD
-date : 2022-03-01 14:39:27 +0100
-author: Aron Petau
-header:
- teaser: /assets/images/render_bike_holder.png
- overlay_image : assets/images/render_bike_holder.png
- overlay_filter : 0.2
- credit : Aron Petau
+title = "3D Modeling and CAD"
+date = 2018-07-05
+authors = ["Aron Petau"]
+banner = "/images/render_bike_holder.png"
-excerpt: Modelling and Scanning in 3D using Fusion360, Sketchfab, and Photogrammetry
+description = "Modelling and Scanning in 3D using Fusion360, Sketchfab, and Photogrammetry"
-gallery:
- - url: /assets/images/breast_candle.jpg
- image_path: /assets/images/breast_candle.jpg
- alt: "breast-candle"
- title: "A candle made of a 3D scan, found on https://hiddenbeauty.ch/"
- - url: /assets/images/vulva_candle.jpg
- image_path: /assets/images/vulva_candle.jpg
- alt: " vulva_candle"
- title: "A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"
-tags:
- - sketchfab
- - fusion360
- - functional design
- - design for printing
- - private
- - photogrammetry
- - scaniverse
- - virtual reality
- - 3D printing
- - polycam
- - parametric modelling
- - university of osnabrück
- - work
+[taxonomies]
+tags = [
+ "3D printing",
+ "design for printing",
+ "functional design",
+ "fusion360",
+ "parametric modelling",
+ "photogrammetry",
+ "polycam",
+ "private",
+ "scaniverse",
+ "sketchfab",
+ "university of osnabrück",
+ "virtual reality",
+ "work",
+]
-created: 2023-07-26T23:59:12+02:00
-last_modified_at: 2023-10-01T20:14:46+02:00
+++
## 3D Modeling and CAD
@@ -64,12 +51,15 @@ I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is someth
-{% include gallery caption="Here are some of my models in the real world" %}
+{{ image(url="/images/breast_candle.jpg", alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on ", pixels=true, start=true) }}
Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community
-[My Printables profile](https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models
-){: .btn .btn--large}
+
+
+{{ image(url="/images/vulva_candle.jpg", alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360", pixels=true, start=true) }}
## 3D Scanning and Photogrammetry
@@ -112,7 +102,9 @@ For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more experti
## Software that I have used and like
-[AliceVision Meshroom](https://alicevision.org/#meshroom){: .btn .btn--large}
-[Scaniverse](https://scaniverse.com/){: .btn .btn--large}
-[My Sketchfab Profile](https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe){: .btn .btn--large}
-[3D Live Scanner for Android](https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US){: .btn .btn--large}
+
diff --git a/content/pages/cv.md b/content/pages/cv.md
index 9ad448a4..1bc41c00 100644
--- a/content/pages/cv.md
+++ b/content/pages/cv.md
@@ -1,133 +1,154 @@
----
-layout: single
-permalink: /cv/
-title: "Curriculum vitae"
-excerpt: "Aron writes about their past experience"
-toc: true
-author: "Aron Petau"
----
++++
+title = "Curriculum vitae"
+description = "Aron writes about their past experience"
+authors = ["Aron Petau"]
++++
## Who am I?
-Below you will find a chronological list of my education, my work experience and a rough overview of different softwares and machines I am familiar with. For a less formal self description, please see the [About](/about) page.
+Below you will find a chronological list of my education, my work experience and a rough overview of different softwares and machines I am familiar with. For a less formal self-description, please see the [About](/about) page.
Contact me via [Email](mailto:aron@petau.net) for further questions.
### Education
+{% timeline() %}
+[
+ {
+ "title": "Abitur",
+ "body": "In school, I majored in Philosophy, German, Maths, and English.",
+ "from": "Aug ‘11",
+ "to": "Jun ‘15",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "Stadtgymnasium Detmold"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "BSc. Cognitive Science",
+ "body": "Within a diverse program, I focused on Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Informatics, and Linguistics.",
+ "from": "Oct ‘16",
+ "to": "Feb ‘22",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "Universität Osnabrück",
+ "link": "https://www.uni-osnabrueck.de/en/prospective-students/studiengaenge-a-z/cognitive-science-bachelor-of-science/"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "RISE Internship",
+ "body": "In the context of a DAAD RISE Stipend, I researched the possibilities of a decentralized electricity grid in remote regions of the Himalayas. I conducted field research, evaluation, and product simulation.",
+ "from": "Sep ‘18",
+ "to": "Jan ‘19",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "IIT Kharagpur, India"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Erasmus Semester",
+ "body": "I took courses in the Philosophy department and Masters’ program for Cognitive Science. I also attended the Cognitive Science Summer School.",
+ "from": "Feb ‘19",
+ "to": "Jul ‘19",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "New Bulgarian University, Sofia",
+ "link": "https://cogsci.nbu.bg/en/"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "M.A. Design & Computation",
+ "body": "I am currently in the fourth semester of transdisciplinary cooperation between UdK and TU Berlin with a focus on critical artistic engagement with technology.",
+ "from": "Oct ‘22",
+ "to": "now",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "Universität der Künste, Berlin",
+ "link": "https://www.design-computation.berlin"
+ }
+]
+{% end %}
-| **Abitur** | |
-| :----------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| Stadtgymnasium Detmold | | | | | | | | | | | | Aug '11 - Jun ‘15 |
-
-|In school, I majored in Philosophy, German, Maths and English.||
-{: .display}
-
-| **BSc. Cognitive Science** | |
-| :---------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| Universität Osnabrück | | | | | | | | | | | | | Oct ‘16 – Feb '22 |
-
-|Within a diverse program, I focused on Philosophy, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Informatics, and Linguistics.||
-[Program description](https://www.uni-osnabrueck.de/en/prospective-students/studiengaenge-a-z/cognitive-science-bachelor-of-science/)||
-{: .display}
-
-| **RISE Internship** | |
-| :--------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| IIT Kharagpur, India | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Sep ’18 – Jan ’19 |
-
-| In the context of a DAAD RISE Stipend, I researched the possibilities of a decentralized electricity grid in remote regions of the Himalayas. I conducted field research, evaluation, and product simulation.|
-{: .display}
-
-| **Erasmus Semester** |
-| :-------------------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| New Bulgarian University, Sofia | | | | | | | | | | Feb. ’19 – Jul ’19 |
-
-| I took courses in the Philosophy department and Masters’ program for Cognitive Science. I also attended the Cognitive Science Summer School.|
-[The Department Website](https://cogsci.nbu.bg/en/)|
-[More on the Summer School](https://cogsci.nbu.bg/en/international-summer-school-in-cognitive-science)|
-{: .display}
-
-| **M.A. Design & Computation** |
-| :------------------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| Universität der Künste, Berlin | | | | | | | | | | | | Oct. '22 – now |
-
-| I am currently in the fourth semester of transdisciplinary cooperation between UdK and TU Berlin with a focus on critical artistic engagement with technology.|
-[Program description](https://www.design-computation.berlin)|
-[The New Practice Page](https://www.newpractice.net/)|
-{: .display}
### Work Experience
-| **Weltwärts** |
-| :--------------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| Lecheria de la Solidaridad | | | | | | | | | | | | Sep '16 – Aug ‘15 |
+{% timeline() %}
+[
+ {
+ "title": "Weltwärts",
+ "body": "I worked in a social project in northern Buenos Aires, Argentina. I helped cooking for 150 youths daily, assisted with their homework, organized sports programmes, maintained the building and organized events.",
+ "from": "Sep '15",
+ "to": "Aug '16",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "Lecheria de la Solidaridad",
+ "link": "https://lecheria.org.ar/"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Teamer / SportsTeamer",
+ "body": "I mentored and supervised groups of 12-18 year olds on their summer holiday trips. I organized entertainment, sports activities and excursions. I did two seasons of a few weeks each in Spain and one in Croatia.",
+ "from": "Jun '17",
+ "to": "Sep '19",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "GO-Jugendreisen @ Spain, Croatia",
+ "link": "https://www.go-jugendreisen.de"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Barkeeper / Brewing assistant",
+ "body": "I worked in a restaurant with an in-house brewery, both on the customer-facing side and assisting in the brewery.",
+ "from": "Oct '18",
+ "to": "Mar '20",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "Brauerei Rampendahl",
+ "link": "http://www.rampendahl.de"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Social Worker",
+ "body": "I worked in a stationary care center for hearing impaired and deaf people with cognitive impairments, including autism.",
+ "from": "Sep '20",
+ "to": "Sep '21",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "Heilpädagogische Hilfe Osnabrück",
+ "link": "https://os-hho.de/standorte/haus-10"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Working Student",
+ "body": "I was part of the uos.dll program, a funded project to reform digital teaching practices at the University. My responsibility is the building and maintaining of the DigiLab, a FabLab/Makerspace accessible to the entire University. It features 3D printers, Laser Cutter, CNC Routers, Stitching Robots, VR, XR, Video/Audio Toolsets, and many more.",
+ "from": "Oct '21",
+ "to": "May '22",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "Virtuos at Universität Osnabrück",
+ "link": "https://digitale-lehre.virtuos.uni-osnabrueck.de/uos-digilab/"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Software Engineer",
+ "body": "I was part of a team researching and developing an inclusive chatbot, respecting diversity and accessibility needs. I was responsible for the entire back-end functionality.",
+ "from": "Feb '22",
+ "to": "Jun '23",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "Sommerblut Kulturverein Festival",
+ "link": "https://chatbot.sommerblut.de"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Working Student",
+ "body": "InKüLe stands for 'Innovation in der künstlerischen Lehre'. The work revolves around investigating concepts for innovation and digitalization in the practice of artistic teaching. Personally, I work mostly with workshops teaching sculpting in VR and live-streaming events.",
+ "from": "Mar '23",
+ "to": "now",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "InKüLe @ UdK Berlin",
+ "link": "https://www.inkuele.de/landing"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Freelance Mentor, Educator",
+ "body": "The Junge Tüftler*Innen is an NGO focused on educative workshops around 'making'. They offer workshops for children, young adults and also offer Workshops for adults and teachers. I am a Mentor, meaning I supervise and conduct the workshops in a team of two.",
+ "from": "Jun '24",
+ "to": "now",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "Junge Tüftler*Innen, Berlin",
+ "link": "https://junge-tueftler.de"
+ },
+ {
+ "title": "Freelance Technology Educator",
+ "body": "I build and curate a Makerspace at a Berlin Secondary School. We have courses and projects surrounding many digital fabrication techniques and learn about the basics of electronics and programming. We offer laser cutting, 3D printing, Textile modding, microcontrollers, robotics and more.",
+ "from": "Aug '24",
+ "to": "now",
+ "icon": "fas fa-building",
+ "location": "SOCIUS - Die Bildungspartner, Berlin",
+ "link": "https://socius.diebildungspartner.de"
+ }
+]
+{% end %}
-|I worked in a social project in northern Buenos Aires, Argentina. I helped cooking for 150 youths daily, assisted with their homework, organized sports programmes, maintained the building and organized events. |
-[La Lecheria](https://lecheria.org.ar/)|
-{: .display}
-| **Teamer / SportsTeamer** |
-| :--------------------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| GO-Jugendreisen @ Spain, Croatia | | | | | | | | | Jun ‘17 – Sep '19 |
-
-|I mentored and supervised groups of 12-18 year olds on their summer holiday trips. I organized entertainment, sports activities and excursions. I did two seasons of a few weeks each in Spain and one in Croatia.
-[GO-Jugendreisen](https://www.go-jugendreisen.de)|
-{: .display}
-
-| **Barkeeper / Brewing assistant** |
-| :-------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| Brauerei Rampendahl | | | | | | | | | | | Oct '18 – Mar '20 |
-
-|I worked in a a restaurant with in-house brewery, both on the customer-facing side and assisting in the brewery.
-[Die Hausbrauerei](http://www.rampendahl.de) |
-{: .display}
-
-| **Social Worker** |
-| :--------------------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| Heilpädagogische Hilfe Osnabrück | | | | | | | | | Sep ’20 – Sep ’21 |
-
-|I worked in a stationary care center for hearing impaired and deaf people with cognitive impairments, including autism.
-[Das Wohnheim](https://os-hho.de/standorte/haus-10) |
-{: .display}
-
-| **Working Student** |
-| :--------------------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| Virtuos at Universität Osnabrück | | | | | | | | | | Oc '21 – May '22 |
-
-|I was part of the uos.dll program, a funded project to reform digital teaching practices at the University. My responsibility is the building and maintaining of the DigiLab, a FabLab/Makerspace accessible to the entire University. It features 3D printers, Laser Cutter, CNC Routers, Stitching Robots, VR, XR, Video/Audio Toolsets, and many more.
-[DigiLab Osnabrück](https://digitale-lehre.virtuos.uni-osnabrueck.de/uos-digilab/)|
-{: .display}
-
-| **Software Engineer** |
-| :--------------------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| Sommerblut Kulturverein Festival | | | | | | | | | | Feb '22 – Jun '23 |
-
-| I was part of a team researching and developing an inclusive chatbot, respecting diversity and accessibility needs. I was responsible for the entire back-end functionality.
-[Chatbot Ällei @ Sommerblut](https://chatbot.sommerblut.de)|
-{: .display}
-
-| **Working Student** |
-| :-------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| InKüLe @ UdK Berlin | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Mar '23 – now |
-
-| InKüLe stands for 'Innovation in der künstlerischen Lehre'. The work revolves around investigating concepts for innovation and digitalization in the practice of artistic teaching. Personally, I work mostly with workshops teaching sculpting in VR and live-streaming events.
-[The InKüLe Web Presence](https://www.inkuele.de/landing)|
-{: .display}
-
-| **Freelance Mentor, Educator** |
-| :---------------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| Junge Tüftler*Innen, Berlin | | | | | | | | | | | | | Jun '24 – now |
-
-| The Junge Tüftler*Innen is an NGO focused on educative workshops around "making". They offer workshops for children, young adults and also offer Workshops for adults and teachers. I am a Mentor, meaning I supervise and conduct the workshops in a team of two.
-[Junge Tüftler*Innen](https://junge-tueftler.de)|
-{: .display}
-
-| **Freelance Technology Educator** |
-| :---------------------------------------------------------- | ---: |
-| SOCIUS - Die Bildungspartner, Berlin | | | | | | | | | | | | Aug '24 – now |
-
-|[Das studio einszwovier at GvB Berlin](https://www.gvb-berlin.de/unterricht-plus/arbeitsgemeinschaften/maker-space-studio-einszwovier/) I build and curate a Makerspace at a Berlin Secondary School. We have courses and projects surrounding many digital fabrication techniques and learn about the basics of electronics and programming. We offer laser cutting, 3D printing, Textile modding, microcontrollers, robotics and more.
- [SOCIUS - Die Bildungspartner](https://socius.diebildungspartner.de)|
-{: .display}
### Software Skills
diff --git a/content/pages/portfolio.md b/content/pages/portfolio.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f58e10b2..00000000
--- a/content/pages/portfolio.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,118 +0,0 @@
----
-layout: archive
-classes: wide
-title: "Portfolio"
-permalink: /portfolio/
-author: "Aron Petau"
-author_profile: false
-sidebar:
- title: "Topics"
- nav: "portfolio-sidebar"
-philosophy:
- - image_path: assets/images/grass_blur.jpg
- alt: "philosophy"
- title: "Philosophy"
- excerpt: "Find out about considerations relating to ethics, emotions, philosophy of science and feminist theory"
- url: "/philosophy/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-printing:
- - image_path: assets/images/lithophane.jpg
- alt: "printing"
- title: "3D Printing"
- excerpt: "See an array of printing projects I did here. I also explain how the industry could have a transformative effect on society, both good and bad"
- url: "/printing/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-cad:
- - image_path: assets/images/render_bike_holder.png
- title: "Computer aided Design"
- excerpt: "Follow along here for my exploration of sketching and parametric design in Fusion360 and related projects. I demonstrate some things that alrerady made it into the real world and some that still di not."
- url: "/cad/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-beacon:
- - image_path: assets/images/india_key_monastery.jpg
- alt: "beacon"
- title: "Beacon"
- excerpt: "Here you can see parts of a research project I conducted 2018 in India. It looks at regional problems of inaccessibility to electricity and sketches a solution in the form of a radical rethinking of how electricity works and how it is distributed."
- url: "/beacon/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-plastic-recycling:
- - image_path: /assets/images/recycling_graphic.jpg
- alt: "plastic-recycling"
- title: "Plastic Recycling"
- excerpt: "I examine the reasons failed 3D prints never get recycled and propose a decentralized solution for a system not involving sending our trash around the world."
- url: "/plastic-recycling/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-ballpark:
- - image_path: assets/images/ballpark_menu.png
- alt: "ballpark"
- title: "Ballpark: Exploring collaborative gameplay in 3D Environments"
- excerpt: "Have a look at a novel game Idea I sketched out while learning the basics of Unity and C#. It features two players attached to the same body, forcing them to collaborate and traverse the hostile surroundings"
- url: "/ballpark/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-coding:
- - image_path: assets/images/sample_cos_sim.png
- title: "Computervision and Neural Networks"
- excerpt: "Some examples of explorations into machine learning and AI using Python I did during the Bachelor's in Osnabrück. "
- url: "/coding/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-homebrew:
- - image_path: assets/images/beer_tap.jpg
- alt: "homebrew"
- title: "Beer at Home"
- excerpt: "I am discovering the world of Homebrewing. Come see how I brew beer and ferment."
- url: "/homebrew/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-chatbot:
- - image_path: https://cloud.google.com/dialogflow/es/docs/images/fulfillment-flow.svg
- alt: "chatbot"
- title: "Guru to Go: a Chatbot"
- excerpt: "A speech interface for your hands-free meditation and journalling needs. I also sketch how my studies translate into my current work."
- url: "/chatbot/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-thesis:
- - image_path: assets/images/acc_sj_by_cond_distort.png
- alt: "thesis"
- title: "Bachelors thesis: audio-visual speech processing and the effects of multisensory integration"
- excerpt: "Find out more about a study I coded, conducted and evaluated looking at auditory and visual delay and how it affects human speech perception. It can potentially help people with sensory hypersensitivity navigate a calmer world and concentrate on the things that matter."
- url: "/thesis/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-iron-smelting:
- - image_path: assets/images/burning_furnace.jpg
- alt: "iron-smelting"
- title: "Smelting: Making iron the prehistoric way"
- excerpt: "See some impressions from the ISD 2021 where iron-ore is burned under exclusion of oxygen to reduce it and produce real iron. A group of archeology-fanatics is experimentally trying to find out about the mysterious prehistoric efficiency of smelting iron, highly localized knowledge that is largely lost."
- url: "/iron-smelting/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
-allei:
- - image_path: assets/images/allei_screenshot.png
- alt: "allei"
- title: "Ällei: Exploration of inclusivity and accessibility online"
- excerpt: "My first shipped software project: Read about a Google Dialogflow backend and try it out yourself"
- url: "/allei/"
- btn_label: "More"
- btn_class: "btn--primary"
----
-
-{% include feature_row id="philosophy" type="right" %}
-{% include feature_row id="printing" type="left" %}
-{% include feature_row id="beacon" type="right" %}
-{% include feature_row id="cad" type="left" %}
-{% include feature_row id="plastic-recycling" type="right" %}
-{% include feature_row id="ballpark" type="left" %}
-{% include feature_row id="coding" type="right" %}
-{% include feature_row id="chatbot" type="left" %}
-{% include feature_row id="thesis" type="right" %}
-{% include feature_row id="iron-smelting" type="left" %}
-{% include feature_row id="homebrew" type="right" %}
-{% include feature_row id="allei" type="left" %}
diff --git a/content/pages/privacy.md b/content/pages/privacy.md
index 03d2608c..ad7c490f 100644
--- a/content/pages/privacy.md
+++ b/content/pages/privacy.md
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
----
-permalink: /privacy/
-#layout: default
-title: "Terms and Privacy Statement"
-last_modified_at: 2022-03-02T12:42:38-04:00
-toc: true
-author: "Aron Petau"
----
++++
+title = "Terms and Privacy Statement"
+date = 2025-05-01
+authors = ["Aron Petau"]
++++
My website address is: .
## Location
-This page is hosted on [GitHub](https://github.com) through GitHub-pages.
-It is protected by [Cloudflare](https://www.cloudflare.com/en-gb/).
+~~This page is hosted on [GitHub](https://github.com) through GitHub-pages.~~
+Not anymore! It is now proudly self-hosted from under my sofa, sometimes using solar energy. I consider you being able to read this already a win.
+
+It is protected by [Cloudflare](https://www.cloudflare.com/en-gb/). Not so proud of that one, but you gotta be secure, no?
+I do not proxy anything and I try using my best knowledge and consciousness to minimize my and other peoples efforts of tracking.
I do not collect any data.
This is a static website, which means there is no database attached and nothing can be tracked by me.
diff --git a/content/pages/2024-03-25-aethercomms.md b/drafts/2024-03-25-aethercomms.md
similarity index 96%
rename from content/pages/2024-03-25-aethercomms.md
rename to drafts/2024-03-25-aethercomms.md
index 68aa04ac..7ce7638a 100644
--- a/content/pages/2024-03-25-aethercomms.md
+++ b/drafts/2024-03-25-aethercomms.md
@@ -1,16 +1,7 @@
----
-permalink: /aethercomms/
-title: aethercomms
-layout: single
-classes: wide
-
-authors:
- - Joel Tenenberg
- - Aron Petau
-
-excerpt: Aethercomms is a project that aims to create a speculative decentralized communication network for the future.
-
-related: false
++++
+title = "aethercomms"
+authors = ["Aron Petau", "Joel Tenenberg"]
+description = "Aethercomms is a project that aims to create a speculative decentralized communication network for the future."
header:
teaser: assets/images/aethercomms/aethercomms_lineart.jpg
@@ -18,32 +9,31 @@ header:
overlay_filter : 0.2
credit : Joel Tenenberg
-toc: false
-toc_label: Content
-toc_icon: book
-toc_sticky: false
-tags:
- - local AI
- - radio
- - studio
- - speculative design
- - disaster fiction
- - infrastructure
- - network
- - power relations
- - narrative
- - University of the Arts Berlin
- - LoRa
- - SDR
- - chatbot
- - edge computing
- - francis hunger
- - geert lovink
- - evgeny morozov
- - lisa parks
- - sound installation
- - audiovisual
+[taxonomies]
+tags = [
+ "LoRa",
+ "SDR",
+ "audiovisual",
+ "chatbot",
+ "disaster fiction",
+ "edge computing",
+ "evgeny morozov",
+ "francis hunger",
+ "geert lovink",
+ "infrastructure",
+ "lisa parks",
+ "local AI",
+ "narrative",
+ "network",
+ "power relations",
+ "radio",
+ "sound installation",
+ "speculative design",
+ "studio",
+ "University of the Arts Berlin",
+]
+
midterm-exhibition:
- url: assets/images/aethercomms/midterm_exhibit/midterm_exhibit_2.heic
@@ -236,12 +226,12 @@ From there, and from various feedback sessions, we decided to shift our focus fr
#### Semester 2
-It especially stuck out to us how the imaginaries surrounding the internet and the physical materiality are often divergent and disconnected.
+It especially stuck out to us how the imaginaries surrounding the internet and the physical materiality are often divergent and disconnected.
Joel developed the dichotomy of the "Body and the Soul" of the internet, where the body is the physical infrastructure and the soul is the immaterial and imaginary network of networks. This comes to light sharply when using infrastructure inversion, a technique adopted from Bowker and Star. Found through the research of Francis Hunger and Lisa Parks.
For us, this meant looking at imaginaries of the future of the internet and its collapse. Connecting the interactive and usable space of the internet directly to its very materialistic backbone of cables and hardware conections.
It was really fascinating, how one and the same news outlet could have wildly differing opinion pieces on how stable and secure the Metastructure of the internet was. Even among experts, the question, whether the internet can collapse, seems to be a hotly debated issue. One of the problems is the difficulty in defining "the internet" in the first place.
-What is left over in the absence of the network of networks, the internet?
+What is left over in the absence of the network of networks, the internet?
What are the Material and Immaterial Components of a metanetwork?
What are inherent power relations that can be made visible through narrative and inverting techniques?
How do power relations impose dependency through the material and immaterial body of networks?
@@ -261,7 +251,7 @@ We imagined communication in this post-collapse world relying heavily on radio.
#### Disaster Fiction / Science Fiction
Disaster fiction serves as an analytic tool that lends itself to the method of Infrastructure Inversion (Hunger, 2015).
-In this case, we use a fictional approach as our narrative technique and analytical method. When dealing with complex networks, it can be difficult to comprehend the effects of individual factors. Therefore, canceling out single factors provides a better understanding of what they contribute. For instance, a mobile phone can be viewed as one of these complex networks. Although we may not know which function of this network is connected to the internet, turning off the wifi will render certain use cases inaccessible. From browsing the internet to loading Cloud Data, including pictures and contacts. Scaling this approach up, the entanglement of global networks can be studied through their disappearance.
+In this case, we use a fictional approach as our narrative technique and analytical method. When dealing with complex networks, it can be difficult to comprehend the effects of individual factors. Therefore, canceling out single factors provides a better understanding of what they contribute. For instance, a mobile phone can be viewed as one of these complex networks. Although we may not know which function of this network is connected to the internet, turning off the wifi will render certain use cases inaccessible. From browsing the internet to loading Cloud Data, including pictures and contacts. Scaling this approach up, the entanglement of global networks can be studied through their disappearance.
#### Non-linear storytelling
@@ -291,10 +281,10 @@ The research method proposed by Bowker and Star as well as Lisa Parks and presen
### Didactics
#### Chatbot as Narrator
-The idea of using the chatbot as an interactive archive was inspired by our file organization structure with could be easily implemented as a corpus which the bot refers to.
+The idea of using the chatbot as an interactive archive was inspired by our file organization structure with could be easily implemented as a corpus which the bot refers to.
Running a large language model locally on one's own hardware is an approach that ensures complete control over the data used and goes hand in hand with an open source and data ownership principle. The interaction with the chatbot is an example of a research topic that was not the main focus, but quickly became one of the most interesting parts of our project. Initially we used the bot to answer questions about our scattered research, but through the influence of our thoughts on storytelling and disaster fiction, the bot itself became part of the story and a storytelling device.
-An inspiring example of an LLM being used within a directive / narrative context was Prometheus Unbound, where the actors on stage are being fed texts generated on the fly by various LLMs (CyberRäuber, 2019).
-Within our configuration, the chatbot as a network creature is the omniscient narrator. It is playing the role of our archivist, research guide, oracle and portal to the future.
+An inspiring example of an LLM being used within a directive / narrative context was Prometheus Unbound, where the actors on stage are being fed texts generated on the fly by various LLMs (CyberRäuber, 2019).
+Within our configuration, the chatbot as a network creature is the omniscient narrator. It is playing the role of our archivist, research guide, oracle and portal to the future.
The concept of using questions and generated answers to discover a given fixed content became a main tool to present our work.
Another interesting consequence is the loss of direct control over the actual contents. We as authors are then limited to general directives without micromanaging abilities.
Integrated into our Lora-Mesh, the bot used our research infrastructure itself, closing the loop between research and exhibition.
@@ -307,14 +297,14 @@ Integrated into our Lora-Mesh, the bot used our research infrastructure itself,
PrivateGPT integrates perfectly with edge computing and will explored further. Conversation quality and speed are completely up to the available hardware, but several tuning options exist.
Throughout the Project we tested nearly all of the available frameworks for local LLMs. We used [GPT4all](https://gpt4all.io/index.html), and latest, we started working with [Ollama](https://ollama.com).
-Ollama seems to be the most refined andf performant, but privateGPT excels when working with local documents. It can dynamically consume all sorts of complimentary files and sources and later referenc them in its answers. Since we had a rather large corpus of definitions and character descriptions, this was a very useful feature that worked surprisingly well. We see lots of artistic potential in a tool like this.
+Ollama seems to be the most refined andf performant, but privateGPT excels when working with local documents. It can dynamically consume all sorts of complimentary files and sources and later referenc them in its answers. Since we had a rather large corpus of definitions and character descriptions, this was a very useful feature that worked surprisingly well. We see lots of artistic potential in a tool like this.
Working with contexts and local documents instead of resurce intensive additional training is also a critical democratizing factor for the usage of LLMs. Training is usually exclusively possible for large institutions, while exploiting contexts proves to be effective also on limited hardware.
### Tool Choices
#### String
-The red string connecting the cards in the exhibition is a visual metaphor for the connections between the different works we have created during the project. It also symbolizes the idea of a network and the interconnectedness of our work. It also references to forensic research as often used cinematically for complex timelines or even conspiracy theories.
+The red string connecting the cards in the exhibition is a visual metaphor for the connections between the different works we have created during the project. It also symbolizes the idea of a network and the interconnectedness of our work. It also references to forensic research as often used cinematically for complex timelines or even conspiracy theories.
#### LoRa Boards
@@ -322,7 +312,7 @@ LoRaWan is a long-range, low-power wireless communication technology that is wel
#### SDR Antenna
-A software defined Radio is great for our context, since the control part of the radio, which is usually an analog twisting of knobs and physical lengthening / shortening of wires can be achieved here entirely within software, making it fully automatizable and accessible from within Touchdesigner. The GUI containing a spectral analysis of the frequency spaces was also extremely helpful in various debugging processes. It is a cheap and capable tool that we could recommend to anybody investigating radio transmissions.
+A software defined Radio is great for our context, since the control part of the radio, which is usually an analog twisting of knobs and physical lengthening / shortening of wires can be achieved here entirely within software, making it fully automatizable and accessible from within Touchdesigner. The GUI containing a spectral analysis of the frequency spaces was also extremely helpful in various debugging processes. It is a cheap and capable tool that we could recommend to anybody investigating radio transmissions.
#### Github
@@ -332,12 +322,12 @@ To write well within Github, we used Markdown, a lightweight markup language wit
#### Miro
Since Markdown and Git lack visual hierarchies, we conducted some Brainstorming and Knowledge Clustering in Miro, a virtual whiteboard. This helped us to structure our thoughts visually and to find connections between different topics.
-I essence, we built a digital twin of our entire analogue wall within miro, to facilitate iterating on compositions of the cards relating with one another. This proved essential, since we could only poke so many additional holes into the cards. Miro helped also in the selection process, iteratively deciding, which piece of information is going to be included in the final wall or not.
+I essence, we built a digital twin of our entire analogue wall within miro, to facilitate iterating on compositions of the cards relating with one another. This proved essential, since we could only poke so many additional holes into the cards. Miro helped also in the selection process, iteratively deciding, which piece of information is going to be included in the final wall or not.
#### Stable Diffusion
We used Stable diffusion for World-Building.
-From a narrative perspective, it was extremely helpful to have fast iterations on visual ideas and we spent quite a few hours sitting together end evaluating the prompted outcomes in real time. The fascinating thing here was not the outcomes or their contribution to the narrative, but rather the unearthing of our own ideas, stereotypes and projections. When used in an early ideation process, it even acted as a practical
+From a narrative perspective, it was extremely helpful to have fast iterations on visual ideas and we spent quite a few hours sitting together end evaluating the prompted outcomes in real time. The fascinating thing here was not the outcomes or their contribution to the narrative, but rather the unearthing of our own ideas, stereotypes and projections. When used in an early ideation process, it even acted as a practical
#### ChatGPT
@@ -374,8 +364,8 @@ Keep your answer short and concise.\
Your answer must be contained within 100 words.
## Final Exhibition
-
-15-18. February 2024
+
+15-18. February 2024
[Exhibition Announcement](https://www.newpractice.net/post/entangled)
The final exhibition in the studio over 4 days yielded lots of supportive feedback and motivated us to develop single ideas further into a new installation.
@@ -384,7 +374,7 @@ In the preparation and brainstorming phase towards the end of the semester, we h
Of particular interest during the presentation was whether the chatbot proves itself to be a viable narrative medium.
-Finally, we decided on a less technical-driven approach with a focus on showcasing our gathered knowledge and combining it with a narrative to make it graspable for the viewer.
+Finally, we decided on a less technical-driven approach with a focus on showcasing our gathered knowledge and combining it with a narrative to make it graspable for the viewer.
Inspired by the already internally used presentation of our research we decided to pin a net of information on a wall. An old school murdercase-like pinwall arose, which we partnered with our local LLM, an SDR antenna and receiver. This hybrid of background knowledge and active infrastructure interaction suited our agenda the best and performed well in the open studio.
{% include gallery id="final-exhibition" caption="The Final Exhibition" %}
@@ -398,10 +388,10 @@ Inspired by the already internally used presentation of our research we decided
{{ details | markdownify }}
-### Feedback
+### Feedback
-For many people, the Wall Setup with the CIA-esque aethetics was attractive, although there seemed to be a lack of instruction. Not everybody dared to touch or interact with the "hacked" smartphones. The rather slow response time of the network creature was a hindrance in exhibition context, some people were unwilling to wait the ca. 30 seconds it took for a response to arrive. Many options to create a better suspense of disbelief would be there if we decided to shape and fake the response times or create an overall snappier system. Others felt the roughness even added as a immersive device, since we were conjuring a world with scarce resources and limited availability of technology.
-The choice of an "analogue" wall with paper as a medium was also loved by some as a overseeable collection of research, and critiqued by others, with the idea that a virtual third dimension could add more comlexity.
+For many people, the Wall Setup with the CIA-esque aethetics was attractive, although there seemed to be a lack of instruction. Not everybody dared to touch or interact with the "hacked" smartphones. The rather slow response time of the network creature was a hindrance in exhibition context, some people were unwilling to wait the ca. 30 seconds it took for a response to arrive. Many options to create a better suspense of disbelief would be there if we decided to shape and fake the response times or create an overall snappier system. Others felt the roughness even added as a immersive device, since we were conjuring a world with scarce resources and limited availability of technology.
+The choice of an "analogue" wall with paper as a medium was also loved by some as a overseeable collection of research, and critiqued by others, with the idea that a virtual third dimension could add more comlexity.
Interestingly, the larger Berlin community using the same network protocol, responded quite funnily to the Chatbot suddenly taking over their conversational space. For some interations, see the screenshots in the previous section.
@@ -412,9 +402,9 @@ Interestingly, the larger Berlin community using the same network protocol, resp
The studio started with a diverse range of interests and research questions in mind. Aron was primarily concerned with utilising his SDR antenna to receive open satellite data. Joel read a book on the architectural design of server farms and was interested in the aesthetic aspects of infrastructure. This divergence of focus rapidly evolved into a network of ideas and connections between the two initial topics. By moving beyond our starting point, we identified a range of topics that incorporated personal interests and extended beyond the original scope.
-Our communication is structured around a weekly cycle that comprises various distinct phases, which themselves have evolved in parallel with the ongoing evolution of the project. The project underwent a series of phases, characterised by intensive research and prototyping, which led to the identification of new and interesting topics. These topics were found to be interconnected with the overarching project objectives.
+Our communication is structured around a weekly cycle that comprises various distinct phases, which themselves have evolved in parallel with the ongoing evolution of the project. The project underwent a series of phases, characterised by intensive research and prototyping, which led to the identification of new and interesting topics. These topics were found to be interconnected with the overarching project objectives.
-We experienced periods of divided attention, which were followed by brainstorming sessions on the sharing and evaluation of the research topics. Joining forces again to work on prototypes and visualisations.
+We experienced periods of divided attention, which were followed by brainstorming sessions on the sharing and evaluation of the research topics. Joining forces again to work on prototypes and visualisations.
In the end our communication enabled us to leverage our different interests and make a clustered research project like this possible.
#### Museum
@@ -428,7 +418,7 @@ Already armed with the idea that cables serve as a wonderful vehicle to analyze
#### Echoing Dimensions
-After the Studio Presentation, we then went on to display a continued version of this project within the Sellerie Weekend during the Berlin Art week in the Kunstraum Potsdamer Strasse.
+After the Studio Presentation, we then went on to display a continued version of this project within the Sellerie Weekend during the Berlin Art week in the Kunstraum Potsdamer Strasse.
Read all about it [**here**](/echoing_dimensions/).
@@ -437,8 +427,8 @@ Read all about it [**here**](/echoing_dimensions/).
### Aron
Within the framework of the studio project, I noticed many of the advantages of working in a team and iterating on creative ideas collectively. Artistic work is unimaginable for me as a solo project. We had a fast feedback cycle and could iterate on ideas efficiently by bouncing them back and forth.
-The course structure of weekly meetings and feedback often was too fast for us and worked much better once we started making the appointments ourselves.
-One big new thing within the project for me was the Pi Picos and microcontrollers in general. I did have some experience with Raspberry Pi before, but now being able to play with microcontrollers at a hardware level equivalent to an Arduino set was quite a new experience on the Pico hardware. I am glad to be able to have such a versatile platform for future projects. Also very new for me was the creative work in Touchdesigner. There especially a workshop with Maxime Letelier helped enormously to take away fears of a complex tool. For 5 days we learned about maximizing performance and common patterns to create movement and interesting visual patterns. I am still not confident in Touchdesigner, even though it is pythonic, but I can debug and definitely prefer Touchdesigner over all its bigger counterparts like Unreal engine and Unity. The last year for me was a focus on local and offline computing, sometiomes called edge computing, and there it is a huge advantage for software packages to have wide platform support and efficiently manage their resources. Politically, i think cloud solutions and remote computation fill fail and increase corporate dependency. Additionally, working locally and offline goes along really well with installative work where internet might be sparse, or you may simply want to eliminate another unknown from the equation.
+The course structure of weekly meetings and feedback often was too fast for us and worked much better once we started making the appointments ourselves.
+One big new thing within the project for me was the Pi Picos and microcontrollers in general. I did have some experience with Raspberry Pi before, but now being able to play with microcontrollers at a hardware level equivalent to an Arduino set was quite a new experience on the Pico hardware. I am glad to be able to have such a versatile platform for future projects. Also very new for me was the creative work in Touchdesigner. There especially a workshop with Maxime Letelier helped enormously to take away fears of a complex tool. For 5 days we learned about maximizing performance and common patterns to create movement and interesting visual patterns. I am still not confident in Touchdesigner, even though it is pythonic, but I can debug and definitely prefer Touchdesigner over all its bigger counterparts like Unreal engine and Unity. The last year for me was a focus on local and offline computing, sometiomes called edge computing, and there it is a huge advantage for software packages to have wide platform support and efficiently manage their resources. Politically, i think cloud solutions and remote computation fill fail and increase corporate dependency. Additionally, working locally and offline goes along really well with installative work where internet might be sparse, or you may simply want to eliminate another unknown from the equation.
One future project that emerged from this rationale was the [airaspi](/airaspi) build, which can do all kinds of image recognition in realtime on the fly, something which was unimaginable for consumer use just 6 years ago.
@@ -454,11 +444,11 @@ One future project that emerged from this rationale was the [airaspi](/airaspi)
**CyberRäuber**, (2019). Marcel Karnapke, Björn Lengers, Prometheus Unbound, Landestheater Linz
[Prometheus Unbound](http://wp11159761.server-he.de/vtheater/de/prometheus-unbound/)
-**Demirovic**, A. (2007). Hegemonie und die diskursive Konstruktion der Gesellschaft. Nonhoff, Martin (Hg.): Diskurs, radikale Demokratie, Hegemonie. Zum politischen Denken von Ernesto Laclau und Chantal Mouffe, Bielefeld: transcript, 55-85.
+**Demirovic**, A. (2007). Hegemonie und die diskursive Konstruktion der Gesellschaft. Nonhoff, Martin (Hg.): Diskurs, radikale Demokratie, Hegemonie. Zum politischen Denken von Ernesto Laclau und Chantal Mouffe, Bielefeld: transcript, 55-85.
[**Demirovic**, A.: Hegemonie funktioniert nicht ohne Exklusion](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h77ECXXP2n0)
-**Gramsci** on Hegemony:
+**Gramsci** on Hegemony:
[Stanford Encyclopedia](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gramsci/)
**Hunger**, F. (2015). Search Routines: Tales of Databases. D21 Kunstraum Leipzig.
@@ -489,62 +479,62 @@ One future project that emerged from this rationale was the [airaspi](/airaspi)
**Seemann**, M. (2021). Die Macht der Plattformen: Politik in Zeiten der Internetgiganten. Berlin Ch. Links Verlag.
[Podcast with Michael Seemann](https://www.futurehistories.today/episoden-blog/s01/e55-michael-seemann-zur-macht-der-plattformen-teil-1/)
-**Stäheli**, U. (1999). Die politische Theorie der Hegemonie: Ernesto Laclau und Chantal Mouffe. Politische Theorien der Gegenwart, 143-166.
+**Stäheli**, U. (1999). Die politische Theorie der Hegemonie: Ernesto Laclau und Chantal Mouffe. Politische Theorien der Gegenwart, 143-166.
[Podcast with Urs Stäheli](https://www.futurehistories.today/episoden-blog/s01/e54-urs-staeheli-zu-entnetzung/)
-A podcast explantation on The concepts by Mouffe and Laclau:
+A podcast explantation on The concepts by Mouffe and Laclau:
[Video: TLDR on Mouffe/Laclau](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62a6Dk9QmJQ)
-
+
## Sonstige Quellen
{% capture details %}
-**The SDR Antenna we used:**
+**The SDR Antenna we used:**
[NESDR Smart](https://www.nooelec.com/store/sdr/sdr-receivers/nesdr-smart-sdr.html)
-**Andere Antennenoptionen:**
+**Andere Antennenoptionen:**
[HackRF One](https://greatscottgadgets.com/hackrf/one/)
-Frequency Analyzer + Replayer
+Frequency Analyzer + Replayer
[Flipper Zero](https://shop.flipperzero.one/)
-**Hackerethik**
-[CCC Hackerethik](https://www.ccc.de/hackerethics)
+**Hackerethik**
+[CCC Hackerethik](https://www.ccc.de/hackerethics)
-**Radio freies Wendland**
+**Radio freies Wendland**
[Wikipedia: Radio Freies Wendland](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radio_Freies_Wendland)
-**Freie Radios**
+**Freie Radios**
[Wikipedia: Definition Freie Radios](https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freies_Radio)
-**Radio Dreyeckland**
+**Radio Dreyeckland**
[RDL](https://rdl.de/)
-**some news articles**
+**some news articles**
[RND Newsstory: Querdenker kapern Sendefrequenz von 1Live](https://www.rnd.de/medien/piratensender-kapert-frequenz-von-1live-fur-querdenker-thesen-MER4ZGR2VXNNXN6VZO3CVW6XTA.html)
[NDR Reportage: Westradio in der DDR](https://www.ndr.de/geschichte/ndr_retro/Empfang-westdeutscher-Funk-und-Fernsehsendungen-in-der-DDR,zonengrenze246.html)
-**SmallCells**
+**SmallCells**
[SmallCells](https://www.nokia.com/networks/mobile-networks/small-cells/)
The **Thought Emporium**:
-a Youtuber, that successfully makes visible WiFi signals:
+a Youtuber, that successfully makes visible WiFi signals:
[Thought Emporium](https://www.youtube.com/@thethoughtemporium)
[The Wifi Camera](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g3LT_b6K0Mc&t=457s)
[Catching Satellite Images](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L3ftfGag7D8)
-Was ist eigentlich **RF** (Radio Frequency):
+Was ist eigentlich **RF** (Radio Frequency):
[RF Explanation](https://pages.crfs.com/making-sense-of-radio-frequency)
-**Bundesnetzagentur**, Funknetzvergabe
+**Bundesnetzagentur**, Funknetzvergabe
[Funknetzvergabe](https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Fachthemen/Telekommunikation/Frequenzen/start.html)
-**BOS Funk**
+**BOS Funk**
[BOS](https://www.bdbos.bund.de/DE/Digitalfunk_BOS/digitalfunk_bos_node.html)
{% endcapture %}
@@ -556,7 +546,7 @@ Was ist eigentlich **RF** (Radio Frequency):
### Our documentation
-The network creature:
+The network creature:
[Github repo: privateGPT]()
diff --git a/public/404.gif b/public/404.gif
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9790faa4
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/404.gif differ
diff --git a/public/404.html b/public/404.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..93a45356
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/404.html
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+404 - Aron Petau
Page Not Found
The requested page could not be found. If you feel this is not normal, then you can create an issue on the issue tracker.
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/404.png b/public/404.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6d2255b9
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/404.png differ
diff --git a/public/apple-touch-icon.png b/public/apple-touch-icon.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c4e013ba
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/apple-touch-icon.png differ
diff --git a/public/atom.xml b/public/atom.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9eccbcb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/atom.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,715 @@
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2025-05-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/atom.xml
+
+ Contact
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+
+ https://aron.petau.net/pages/contact/
+
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+ 2025-05-01T00:00:00+00:00
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+ https://aron.petau.net/pages/privacy/
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+ <p>My website address is: <a href="https://aron.petau.net">https://aron.petau.net</a> .</p>
+<h2 id="location">Location</h2>
+<p><del>This page is hosted on <a href="https://github.com">GitHub</a> through GitHub-pages.</del>
+Not anymore! It is now proudly self-hosted from under my sofa, sometimes using solar energy. I consider you being able to read this already a win.</p>
+<p>It is protected by <a href="https://www.cloudflare.com/en-gb/">Cloudflare</a>. Not so proud of that one, but you gotta be secure, no?
+I do not proxy anything and I try using my best knowledge and consciousness to minimize my and other peoples efforts of tracking.</p>
+<p>I do not collect any data.
+This is a static website, which means there is no database attached and nothing can be tracked by me.
+I also do not collect any cookies, nor are there any third-party cookies involved.</p>
+<p><a href="https://github.com">GitHub</a>, the place where I host this website, does collect the IP address of any visitor.
+I have no influence on this and neither the financial resources to avoid this free hosting firm.</p>
+<h2 id="embedded-content-from-other-websites">Embedded content from other websites</h2>
+<p>Articles on this site may include embedded content (e.g. videos, images, articles, etc.). Embedded content from other websites behaves in the exact same way as if the visitor has visited the other website.
+These websites may collect data about you, use cookies, embed additional third-party tracking, and monitor your interaction with that embedded content, including tracking your interaction with the embedded content if you have an account and are logged in to that website.</p>
+<p>If privacy is important enough for you to check out this page, you probably know how to use a VPN service and avoid this problem altogether.</p>
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+<p>Thank you for your attention.</p>
+
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+
+
+ About
+ 2023-07-26T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2023-07-26T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/pages/about/
+
+ <h2 id="introduction">Introduction</h2>
+<p>I am Aron (pronouns: he/him), a 2022 graduate of the bachelor's program of Cognitive Science in Osnabrück.
+During my very open and broad studies, I focused mostly on Computational Linguistics, Machine Learning, and Philosophy.
+The mix of these topics you will find scattered throughout my <a href="/portfolio/">Portfolio</a>.
+Currently, I am enrolled in the Master's program <a href="https://www.newpractice.net">Design and Computation</a> @ UdK and TU Berlin.</p>
+<p>I am enthusiastic about many of the topics included there and have developed a fondness for algorithmic problems, techno-philosophical considerations, and issues of our (future) society.</p>
+<p>For the studies, I moved to Berlin and now live together with 2 awesome humans and a 3D-Printer, and am continuously repairing and restoring a very old van.</p>
+<p>I dream of one day having my own bar with cultural events and am already working on the perfect recipe for <a href="/homebrew/">homebrew</a> beer.
+I love experimenting, whether that is in the kitchen, finding a solution to a coding problem, or creating useful objects.</p>
+<p>I am also passionate about <a href="/printing/">3D Printing</a>, its curious applications, and all areas tangent to it.
+The interface of technology and the world interests me and coming up with ways for one sphere to interact with the other has now captured me for some years.</p>
+<p>I recognize a colossal environmental problem that the current and following generations face: global waste being just one tiny aspect.
+At the same time, I am frustrated that I have to pay for the plastic that goes into my printer while I throw the packaging of my food away, which is the exact same material.
+Even more frustrating are the established norms for recycling that lead to virtually none of the products that I can produce with the printer at home being recyclable.
+<a href="/plastic-recycling/">Plastic waste</a> is no joke and I consider it my personal contribution to try to help advance small-scale, decentralized recycling.
+I am currently searching for an appropriate place to further my knowledge to automatize the recycling of my own very large collection of failed prints.</p>
+<p>In the past, digitality and the social-digital as a topic has been a recurring theme, I am concerned with <a href="/chatbot/">digital inclusion</a> and also play around a lot with <a href="/airaspi-build-log/">edge computing</a>.</p>
+<p>If you are interested to hear more about a specific topic, feel free to <a href="/mailto:aron@petau.net/">contact me</a>, or simply check out the <a href="/archive/">Archive</a>.
+If you suspect that I might be able to help you with a project, please check out my <a href="/cv/">CV</a>.</p>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/auto-render.min.js b/public/auto-render.min.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cd2bb424
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/auto-render.min.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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diff --git a/public/blog/cad/index.html b/public/blog/cad/index.html
new file mode 100644
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+3D Modeling and CAD - Aron Petau
While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.
Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into. In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me. Below you will find some of my designs. The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.
By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with. I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.
Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community
Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.
Interaction with real objects and environments
In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor. Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it. See some examples here:
This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.
Perspective
What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.
I want more than designing figurines or wearables. I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging. I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by Makeways on Kickstarter, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.
I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing. I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics. Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at Kaffeform producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process. The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong. Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.
I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at Precious Plastic, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.
I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process. And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.
For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/blog/critical-epistemologies/index.html b/public/blog/critical-epistemologies/index.html
new file mode 100644
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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Critical Epistemology - Aron Petau
Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies
On Anderson: Institutions
Note
Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 Publication
The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour. But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice? Well, maybe, assuming that:
Everyone realizes their privilege,
Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,
Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.
I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed. Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance. The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices. Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved. Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.
I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?
Note
created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45
On Medina, the informant and the inquirer
Note
Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214 Publication
My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment, Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another. Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations. Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately. Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker. Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:
"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"
Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.
Note
created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25
On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society
Note
Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185 Publication
I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me. On outlaw emotions: First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it. Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change. Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner. When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic. “How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.” To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms. The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest. Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do: “Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests” til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are. Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one? But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men." This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.
Note
created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52
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Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:
The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other” (Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)
Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.
Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.
Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break. Page 56, final sentence
The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed. I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.
Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald). The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it. Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm. I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.
Note
created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23
Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average). p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline, less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance, Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization. The norm has three defining features:
positivism, as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.
relativity, they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.
polarity involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.
What, then, is a norm?
It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview. p. 154
Note
created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48
On Foucault: The effects without effector
Note
Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980. Publication
one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it. p. 203
In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.
But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.
This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect. I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements? This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame. How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?
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created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01
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+Aron's Blog - Aron Petau
Aron's Blog
Welcome to my quack'in blog, I quack about various stuff, but mostly I'm a demo.
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I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments. Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there. I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers. The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.
Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies
On Anderson: Institutions
Note
Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 Publication
The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour. But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice? Well, maybe, assuming that:
Everyone realizes their privilege,
Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,
Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.
I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed. Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance. The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices. Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved. Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.
I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?
Note
created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45
On Medina, the informant and the inquirer
Note
Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214 Publication
My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment, Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another. Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations. Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately. Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker. Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:
"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"
Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.
Note
created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25
On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society
Note
Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185 Publication
I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me. On outlaw emotions: First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it. Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change. Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner. When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic. “How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.” To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms. The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest. Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do: “Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests” til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are. Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one? But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men." This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.
Note
created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52
Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault
On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence
Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:
The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other” (Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)
Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.
Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.
Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break. Page 56, final sentence
The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed. I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.
Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald). The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it. Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm. I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.
Note
created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23
Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average). p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline, less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance, Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization. The norm has three defining features:
positivism, as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.
relativity, they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.
polarity involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.
What, then, is a norm?
It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview. p. 154
Note
created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48
On Foucault: The effects without effector
Note
Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980. Publication
one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it. p. 203
In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.
But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.
This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect. I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements? This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame. How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?
Note
created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01
Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin
From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong. I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one. In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space. Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety. Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it. I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing: Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other? Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent." Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?
Note
created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52
Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie
On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice
Note
Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007. Publication
Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?
Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist. Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten. Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.
Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.
Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?
Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.
Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch. Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen. Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?
Note
created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/blog/political-violence/index.html b/public/blog/political-violence/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..29617036
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/blog/political-violence/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Political Violence - Aron Petau
From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong. I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one. In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space. Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety. Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it. I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing: Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other? Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent." Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?
Note
created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52
Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie
On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice
Note
Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007. Publication
Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?
Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist. Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten. Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.
Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.
Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?
Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.
Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch. Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen. Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?
Note
created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/card.png b/public/card.png
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/public/closable.js b/public/closable.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..dc90c3f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/closable.js
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+const closable = document.querySelectorAll("details.closable");
+
+closable.forEach((detail) => {
+ detail.addEventListener("toggle", () => {
+ if (detail.open) setTargetDetail(detail);
+ });
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+}
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+ detail.open = false;
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diff --git a/public/comments.js b/public/comments.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8c78d614
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/comments.js
@@ -0,0 +1,406 @@
+// Taken from https://carlschwan.eu/2020/12/29/adding-comments-to-your-static-blog-with-mastodon/
+// Attachment, card, and spoiler code taken from https://github.com/cassidyjames/cassidyjames.github.io/blob/99782788a7e3ba3cc52d6803010873abd1b02b9e/_includes/comments.html#L251-L296
+
+let blogPostAuthorText = document.getElementById("blog-post-author-text").textContent;
+let boostsFromText = document.getElementById("boosts-from-text").textContent;
+let dateLocale = document.getElementById("date-locale").textContent;
+let favesFromText = document.getElementById("faves-from-text").textContent;
+let host = document.getElementById("host").textContent;
+let id = document.getElementById("id").textContent;
+let lazyAsyncImage = document.getElementById("lazy-async-image").textContent;
+let loadingText = document.getElementById("loading-text").textContent;
+let noCommentsText = document.getElementById("no-comments-text").textContent;
+let relAttributes = document.getElementById("rel-attributes").textContent;
+let reloadText = document.getElementById("reload-text").textContent;
+let sensitiveText = document.getElementById("sensitive-text").textContent;
+let user = document.getElementById("user").textContent;
+let viewCommentText = document.getElementById("view-comment-text").textContent;
+let viewProfileText = document.getElementById("view-profile-text").textContent;
+
+document.getElementById("load-comments").addEventListener("click", loadComments);
+
+function escapeHtml(unsafe) {
+ return unsafe
+ .replace(/&/g, "&")
+ .replace(//g, ">")
+ .replace(/"/g, """)
+ .replace(/'/g, "'");
+}
+function emojify(input, emojis) {
+ let output = input;
+
+ emojis.forEach((emoji) => {
+ let picture = document.createElement("picture");
+
+ let source = document.createElement("source");
+ source.setAttribute("srcset", escapeHtml(emoji.url));
+ source.setAttribute("media", "(prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference)");
+
+ let img = document.createElement("img");
+ img.className = "emoji";
+ img.setAttribute("src", escapeHtml(emoji.static_url));
+ img.setAttribute("alt", `:${emoji.shortcode}:`);
+ img.setAttribute("title", `:${emoji.shortcode}:`);
+ if (lazyAsyncImage == "true") {
+ img.setAttribute("decoding", "async");
+ img.setAttribute("loading", "lazy");
+ }
+
+ picture.appendChild(source);
+ picture.appendChild(img);
+
+ output = output.replace(`:${emoji.shortcode}:`, picture.outerHTML);
+ });
+
+ return output;
+}
+
+function loadComments() {
+ let commentsWrapper = document.getElementById("comments-wrapper");
+ commentsWrapper.innerHTML = "";
+
+ let loadCommentsButton = document.getElementById("load-comments");
+ loadCommentsButton.innerHTML = loadingText;
+ loadCommentsButton.disabled = true;
+
+ fetch(`https://${host}/api/v1/statuses/${id}/context`)
+ .then(function (response) {
+ return response.json();
+ })
+ .then(function (data) {
+ let descendants = data["descendants"];
+ if (
+ descendants &&
+ Array.isArray(descendants) &&
+ descendants.length > 0
+ ) {
+ commentsWrapper.innerHTML = "";
+
+ descendants.forEach(function (status) {
+ console.log(descendants);
+ if (status.account.display_name.length > 0) {
+ status.account.display_name = escapeHtml(
+ status.account.display_name
+ );
+ status.account.display_name = emojify(
+ status.account.display_name,
+ status.account.emojis
+ );
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+ status.account.display_name = status.account.username;
+ }
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+ } else {
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+
+ let op = false;
+ if (status.account.acct == user) {
+ op = true;
+ }
+
+ status.content = emojify(status.content, status.emojis);
+
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+ comment.id = `comment-${status.id}`;
+ comment.className = isReply ? "comment comment-reply" : "comment";
+ comment.setAttribute("itemprop", "comment");
+ comment.setAttribute("itemtype", "http://schema.org/Comment");
+
+ let avatarSource = document.createElement("source");
+ avatarSource.setAttribute(
+ "srcset",
+ escapeHtml(status.account.avatar)
+ );
+ avatarSource.setAttribute(
+ "media",
+ "(prefers-reduced-motion: no-preference)"
+ );
+
+ let avatarImg = document.createElement("img");
+ avatarImg.className = "avatar";
+ avatarImg.setAttribute(
+ "src",
+ escapeHtml(status.account.avatar_static)
+ );
+ avatarImg.setAttribute(
+ "alt",
+ `@${status.account.username}@${instance} avatar`
+ );
+ if (lazyAsyncImage == "true") {
+ avatarImg.setAttribute("decoding", "async");
+ avatarImg.setAttribute("loading", "lazy");
+ }
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+ avatarPicture.appendChild(avatarSource);
+ avatarPicture.appendChild(avatarImg);
+
+ let avatar = document.createElement("a");
+ avatar.className = "avatar-link";
+ avatar.setAttribute("href", status.account.url);
+ avatar.setAttribute("rel", relAttributes);
+ avatar.setAttribute(
+ "title",
+ `${viewProfileText} @${status.account.username}@${instance}`
+ );
+ avatar.appendChild(avatarPicture);
+ comment.appendChild(avatar);
+
+ let instanceBadge = document.createElement("a");
+ instanceBadge.className = "instance";
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+ instanceBadge.setAttribute(
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+ `@${status.account.username}@${instance}`
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+ ).toLocaleString(dateLocale, {
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+ mediaElement.classList.add("spoiler");
+ }
+
+ media.appendChild(mediaElement);
+ break;
+
+ case "gifv":
+ mediaElement = document.createElement("video");
+ mediaElement.setAttribute("src", attachment.url);
+ mediaElement.setAttribute("autoplay", "");
+ mediaElement.setAttribute("playsinline", "");
+ mediaElement.setAttribute("loop", "");
+
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+ mediaElement.setAttribute("title", attachment.description);
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+
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+ mediaElement.classList.add("spoiler");
+ }
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+ media.appendChild(mediaElement);
+ break;
+
+ case "audio":
+ mediaElement = document.createElement("audio");
+ mediaElement.setAttribute("src", attachment.url);
+ mediaElement.setAttribute("controls", "");
+
+ if (attachment.description != null) {
+ mediaElement.setAttribute("aria-title", attachment.description);
+ mediaElement.setAttribute("title", attachment.description);
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+ mediaLink.setAttribute("href", attachment.url);
+ mediaLink.setAttribute("rel", relAttributes);
+ mediaLink.appendChild(mediaElement);
+
+ media.appendChild(mediaLink);
+ }
+ });
+
+ comment.appendChild(media);
+ }
+
+ let interactions = document.createElement("footer");
+
+ let boosts = document.createElement("a");
+ boosts.className = "boosts";
+ boosts.setAttribute("href", `${status.url}/reblogs`);
+ boosts.setAttribute("title", `${boostsFromText}`.replace("$INSTANCE", instance));
+
+ let boostsIcon = document.createElement("i");
+ boostsIcon.className = "icon";
+ boosts.appendChild(boostsIcon);
+ boosts.insertAdjacentHTML('beforeend', ` ${status.reblogs_count}`);
+ interactions.appendChild(boosts);
+
+ let faves = document.createElement("a");
+ faves.className = "faves";
+ faves.setAttribute("href", `${status.url}/favourites`);
+ faves.setAttribute("title", `${favesFromText}`.replace("$INSTANCE", instance));
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+ favesIcon.className = "icon";
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+ faves.insertAdjacentHTML('beforeend', ` ${status.favourites_count}`);
+ interactions.appendChild(faves);
+ comment.appendChild(interactions);
+
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+
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+ cardImg.classList.add("no-hover");
+ cardFigure.appendChild(cardImg);
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+
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+ card.setAttribute("rel", relAttributes);
+ card.appendChild(cardFigure);
+
+ comment.appendChild(card);
+ }
+
+ if (op === true) {
+ comment.classList.add("op");
+
+ avatar.classList.add("op");
+ avatar.setAttribute(
+ "title",
+ `${blogPostAuthorText}: ` + avatar.getAttribute("title")
+ );
+
+ instanceBadge.classList.add("op");
+ instanceBadge.setAttribute(
+ "title",
+ `${blogPostAuthorText}: ` + instanceBadge.getAttribute("title")
+ );
+ }
+
+ commentsWrapper.innerHTML += comment.outerHTML;
+ });
+ }
+
+ else {
+ var statusText = document.createElement("p");
+ statusText.innerHTML = noCommentsText;
+ statusText.setAttribute("id", "comments-status");
+ commentsWrapper.appendChild(statusText);
+ }
+
+ loadCommentsButton.innerHTML = reloadText;
+ })
+ .catch(function (error) {
+ console.error('Error loading comments:', error);
+ })
+ .finally(function () {
+ loadCommentsButton.disabled = false;
+ });
+}
diff --git a/public/copy-button.js b/public/copy-button.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1dd84061
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/copy-button.js
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+// Based on https://www.roboleary.net/2022/01/13/copy-code-to-clipboard-blog.html
+document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", function () {
+ let blocks = document.querySelectorAll("pre[class^='language-']");
+
+ blocks.forEach((block) => {
+ if (navigator.clipboard) {
+ // Code block header title
+ let title = document.createElement("span");
+ let lang = block.getAttribute("data-lang");
+ title.innerHTML = lang;
+
+ // Copy button icon
+ let icon = document.createElement("i");
+ icon.classList.add("icon");
+
+ // Copy button
+ let button = document.createElement("button");
+ let copyCodeText = document.getElementById("copy-code-text").textContent;
+ button.setAttribute("title", copyCodeText)
+ button.appendChild(icon);
+
+ // Code block header
+ let header = document.createElement("div");
+ header.classList.add("header");
+ header.appendChild(title);
+ header.appendChild(button);
+
+ // Container that holds header and the code block itself
+ let container = document.createElement("div");
+ container.classList.add("pre-container");
+ container.appendChild(header);
+
+ // Move code block into the container
+ block.parentNode.insertBefore(container, block);
+ container.appendChild(block);
+
+ button.addEventListener("click", async () => {
+ await copyCode(block, header, button); // Pass the button here
+ });
+ }
+ });
+
+ async function copyCode(block, header, button) {
+ let code = block.querySelector("code");
+ let text = code.innerText;
+
+ await navigator.clipboard.writeText(text);
+
+ header.classList.add("active");
+ button.setAttribute("disabled", true);
+
+ header.addEventListener("animationend", () => {
+ header.classList.remove("active");
+ button.removeAttribute("disabled");
+ }, { once: true });
+ }
+});
diff --git a/public/count.js b/public/count.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..88c5dfbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/count.js
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+// GoatCounter: https://www.goatcounter.com
+// This file is released under the ISC license: https://opensource.org/licenses/ISC
+;(function() {
+ 'use strict';
+
+ if (window.goatcounter && window.goatcounter.vars) // Compatibility with very old version; do not use.
+ window.goatcounter = window.goatcounter.vars
+ else
+ window.goatcounter = window.goatcounter || {}
+
+ // Load settings from data-goatcounter-settings.
+ var s = document.querySelector('script[data-goatcounter]')
+ if (s && s.dataset.goatcounterSettings) {
+ try { var set = JSON.parse(s.dataset.goatcounterSettings) }
+ catch (err) { console.error('invalid JSON in data-goatcounter-settings: ' + err) }
+ for (var k in set)
+ if (['no_onload', 'no_events', 'allow_local', 'allow_frame', 'path', 'title', 'referrer', 'event'].indexOf(k) > -1)
+ window.goatcounter[k] = set[k]
+ }
+
+ var enc = encodeURIComponent
+
+ // Get all data we're going to send off to the counter endpoint.
+ var get_data = function(vars) {
+ var data = {
+ p: (vars.path === undefined ? goatcounter.path : vars.path),
+ r: (vars.referrer === undefined ? goatcounter.referrer : vars.referrer),
+ t: (vars.title === undefined ? goatcounter.title : vars.title),
+ e: !!(vars.event || goatcounter.event),
+ s: [window.screen.width, window.screen.height, (window.devicePixelRatio || 1)],
+ b: is_bot(),
+ q: location.search,
+ }
+
+ var rcb, pcb, tcb // Save callbacks to apply later.
+ if (typeof(data.r) === 'function') rcb = data.r
+ if (typeof(data.t) === 'function') tcb = data.t
+ if (typeof(data.p) === 'function') pcb = data.p
+
+ if (is_empty(data.r)) data.r = document.referrer
+ if (is_empty(data.t)) data.t = document.title
+ if (is_empty(data.p)) data.p = get_path()
+
+ if (rcb) data.r = rcb(data.r)
+ if (tcb) data.t = tcb(data.t)
+ if (pcb) data.p = pcb(data.p)
+ return data
+ }
+
+ // Check if a value is "empty" for the purpose of get_data().
+ var is_empty = function(v) { return v === null || v === undefined || typeof(v) === 'function' }
+
+ // See if this looks like a bot; there is some additional filtering on the
+ // backend, but these properties can't be fetched from there.
+ var is_bot = function() {
+ // Headless browsers are probably a bot.
+ var w = window, d = document
+ if (w.callPhantom || w._phantom || w.phantom)
+ return 150
+ if (w.__nightmare)
+ return 151
+ if (d.__selenium_unwrapped || d.__webdriver_evaluate || d.__driver_evaluate)
+ return 152
+ if (navigator.webdriver)
+ return 153
+ return 0
+ }
+
+ // Object to urlencoded string, starting with a ?.
+ var urlencode = function(obj) {
+ var p = []
+ for (var k in obj)
+ if (obj[k] !== '' && obj[k] !== null && obj[k] !== undefined && obj[k] !== false)
+ p.push(enc(k) + '=' + enc(obj[k]))
+ return '?' + p.join('&')
+ }
+
+ // Show a warning in the console.
+ var warn = function(msg) {
+ if (console && 'warn' in console)
+ console.warn('goatcounter: ' + msg)
+ }
+
+ // Get the endpoint to send requests to.
+ var get_endpoint = function() {
+ var s = document.querySelector('script[data-goatcounter]')
+ if (s && s.dataset.goatcounter)
+ return s.dataset.goatcounter
+ return (goatcounter.endpoint || window.counter) // counter is for compat; don't use.
+ }
+
+ // Get current path.
+ var get_path = function() {
+ var loc = location,
+ c = document.querySelector('link[rel="canonical"][href]')
+ if (c) { // May be relative or point to different domain.
+ var a = document.createElement('a')
+ a.href = c.href
+ if (a.hostname.replace(/^www\./, '') === location.hostname.replace(/^www\./, ''))
+ loc = a
+ }
+ return (loc.pathname + loc.search) || '/'
+ }
+
+ // Run function after DOM is loaded.
+ var on_load = function(f) {
+ if (document.body === null)
+ document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function() { f() }, false)
+ else
+ f()
+ }
+
+ // Filter some requests that we (probably) don't want to count.
+ goatcounter.filter = function() {
+ if ('visibilityState' in document && document.visibilityState === 'prerender')
+ return 'visibilityState'
+ if (!goatcounter.allow_frame && location !== parent.location)
+ return 'frame'
+ if (!goatcounter.allow_local && location.hostname.match(/(localhost$|^127\.|^10\.|^172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[0-1])\.|^192\.168\.|^0\.0\.0\.0$)/))
+ return 'localhost'
+ if (!goatcounter.allow_local && location.protocol === 'file:')
+ return 'localfile'
+ if (localStorage && localStorage.getItem('skipgc') === 't')
+ return 'disabled with #toggle-goatcounter'
+ return false
+ }
+
+ // Get URL to send to GoatCounter.
+ window.goatcounter.url = function(vars) {
+ var data = get_data(vars || {})
+ if (data.p === null) // null from user callback.
+ return
+ data.rnd = Math.random().toString(36).substr(2, 5) // Browsers don't always listen to Cache-Control.
+
+ var endpoint = get_endpoint()
+ if (!endpoint)
+ return warn('no endpoint found')
+
+ return endpoint + urlencode(data)
+ }
+
+ // Count a hit.
+ window.goatcounter.count = function(vars) {
+ var f = goatcounter.filter()
+ if (f)
+ return warn('not counting because of: ' + f)
+ var url = goatcounter.url(vars)
+ if (!url)
+ return warn('not counting because path callback returned null')
+
+ if (!navigator.sendBeacon(url)) {
+ // This mostly fails due to being blocked by CSP; try again with an
+ // image-based fallback.
+ var img = document.createElement('img')
+ img.src = url
+ img.style.position = 'absolute' // Affect layout less.
+ img.style.bottom = '0px'
+ img.style.width = '1px'
+ img.style.height = '1px'
+ img.loading = 'eager'
+ img.setAttribute('alt', '')
+ img.setAttribute('aria-hidden', 'true')
+
+ var rm = function() { if (img && img.parentNode) img.parentNode.removeChild(img) }
+ img.addEventListener('load', rm, false)
+ document.body.appendChild(img)
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Get a query parameter.
+ window.goatcounter.get_query = function(name) {
+ var s = location.search.substr(1).split('&')
+ for (var i = 0; i < s.length; i++)
+ if (s[i].toLowerCase().indexOf(name.toLowerCase() + '=') === 0)
+ return s[i].substr(name.length + 1)
+ }
+
+ // Track click events.
+ window.goatcounter.bind_events = function() {
+ if (!document.querySelectorAll) // Just in case someone uses an ancient browser.
+ return
+
+ var send = function(elem) {
+ return function() {
+ goatcounter.count({
+ event: true,
+ path: (elem.dataset.goatcounterClick || elem.name || elem.id || ''),
+ title: (elem.dataset.goatcounterTitle || elem.title || (elem.innerHTML || '').substr(0, 200) || ''),
+ referrer: (elem.dataset.goatcounterReferrer || elem.dataset.goatcounterReferral || ''),
+ })
+ }
+ }
+
+ Array.prototype.slice.call(document.querySelectorAll("*[data-goatcounter-click]")).forEach(function(elem) {
+ if (elem.dataset.goatcounterBound)
+ return
+ var f = send(elem)
+ elem.addEventListener('click', f, false)
+ elem.addEventListener('auxclick', f, false) // Middle click.
+ elem.dataset.goatcounterBound = 'true'
+ })
+ }
+
+ // Add a "visitor counter" frame or image.
+ window.goatcounter.visit_count = function(opt) {
+ on_load(function() {
+ opt = opt || {}
+ opt.type = opt.type || 'html'
+ opt.append = opt.append || 'body'
+ opt.path = opt.path || get_path()
+ opt.attr = opt.attr || {width: '200', height: (opt.no_branding ? '60' : '80')}
+
+ opt.attr['src'] = get_endpoint() + 'er/' + enc(opt.path) + '.' + enc(opt.type) + '?'
+ if (opt.no_branding) opt.attr['src'] += '&no_branding=1'
+ if (opt.style) opt.attr['src'] += '&style=' + enc(opt.style)
+ if (opt.start) opt.attr['src'] += '&start=' + enc(opt.start)
+ if (opt.end) opt.attr['src'] += '&end=' + enc(opt.end)
+
+ var tag = {png: 'img', svg: 'img', html: 'iframe'}[opt.type]
+ if (!tag)
+ return warn('visit_count: unknown type: ' + opt.type)
+
+ if (opt.type === 'html') {
+ opt.attr['frameborder'] = '0'
+ opt.attr['scrolling'] = 'no'
+ }
+
+ var d = document.createElement(tag)
+ for (var k in opt.attr)
+ d.setAttribute(k, opt.attr[k])
+
+ var p = document.querySelector(opt.append)
+ if (!p)
+ return warn('visit_count: append not found: ' + opt.append)
+ p.appendChild(d)
+ })
+ }
+
+ // Make it easy to skip your own views.
+ if (location.hash === '#toggle-goatcounter') {
+ if (localStorage.getItem('skipgc') === 't') {
+ localStorage.removeItem('skipgc', 't')
+ alert('GoatCounter tracking is now ENABLED in this browser.')
+ }
+ else {
+ localStorage.setItem('skipgc', 't')
+ alert('GoatCounter tracking is now DISABLED in this browser until ' + location + ' is loaded again.')
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!goatcounter.no_onload)
+ on_load(function() {
+ // 1. Page is visible, count request.
+ // 2. Page is not yet visible; wait until it switches to 'visible' and count.
+ // See #487
+ if (!('visibilityState' in document) || document.visibilityState === 'visible')
+ goatcounter.count()
+ else {
+ var f = function(e) {
+ if (document.visibilityState !== 'visible')
+ return
+ document.removeEventListener('visibilitychange', f)
+ goatcounter.count()
+ }
+ document.addEventListener('visibilitychange', f)
+ }
+
+ if (!goatcounter.no_events)
+ goatcounter.bind_events()
+ })
+})();
diff --git a/public/css/mermaid.css b/public/css/mermaid.css
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5c50d163
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/css/mermaid.css
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+.mermaid {
+ text-align: center;
+ margin-top: 1.5em;
+ margin-bottom: 1.5em;
+ padding: 1em;
+ border-radius: 0.5em;
+ background-color: var(--code-bg);
+ font-family: var(--code-font, monospace);
+ font-size: 0.9rem;
+ overflow-x: auto;
+ max-width: 100%;
+ box-shadow: 0 2px 10px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.08);
+}
+
+.mermaid strong {
+ font-weight: bold;
+}
+
+.mermaid svg {
+ max-width: 100%;
+ height: auto;
+}
+
+@media (prefers-color-scheme: dark) {
+ .mermaid {
+ background-color: var(--code-bg-dark, #2d2d2d);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/public/css/timeline.css b/public/css/timeline.css
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..67f5dea1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/css/timeline.css
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/* Basic Layout */
+#timeline-content {
+ position: relative;
+ margin: 2rem 0;
+ padding-left: 120px;
+}
+
+#timeline-content ul.timeline {
+ list-style: none;
+ padding: 0;
+ margin: 0;
+ position: relative;
+}
+
+#timeline-content ul.timeline::before {
+ content: '';
+ position: absolute;
+ left: -30px;
+ top: 0;
+ bottom: 0;
+ width: 2px;
+ background: var(--accent-color);
+}
+
+/* Event List Item */
+#timeline-content li.event {
+ position: relative;
+ margin-bottom: 3rem;
+}
+
+/* Event Circle */
+#timeline-content li.event::before {
+ content: '';
+ position: absolute;
+ left: -39px;
+ top: 5px;
+ width: 16px;
+ height: 16px;
+ border-radius: 50%;
+ background: var(--accent-color);
+ border: 2px solid white;
+ z-index: 1;
+}
+
+/* From + To Label — styled exactly like old date label */
+#timeline-content li.event::after {
+ content: attr(data-from) "\A" attr(data-to);
+ white-space: pre; /* ensures newline works */
+ position: absolute;
+ left: -160px;
+ width: 100px;
+ text-align: right;
+ color: #ffffff;
+ font-weight: bold;
+ font-size: 0.9rem;
+ line-height: 1.3;
+ top: 0;
+}
+
+/* Event Heading */
+#timeline-content li.event h3 {
+ margin: 0 0 0.5rem 0;
+ display: inline-block;
+}
+
+/* Event Description */
+#timeline-content li.event p {
+ margin: 0;
+}
+
+/* Timeline Icon */
+#timeline-content .timeline-icon {
+ margin-right: 0.5rem;
+ color: var(--accent-color);
+ font-size: 1.2rem;
+ vertical-align: middle;
+}
+
+/* Hover Effects */
+#timeline-content li.event:hover::before {
+ background: var(--accent-color-dark);
+}
+
+#timeline-content li.event:hover {
+ background-color: var(--accent-color-alpha);
+}
+
+/* From + To Label Hover Effect */
+#timeline-content li.event:hover::after {
+ color: var(--fg-color);
+}
diff --git a/public/documents/AronPetauBAThesis.pdf b/public/documents/AronPetauBAThesis.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..82c1091c
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/documents/AronPetauBAThesis.pdf differ
diff --git a/public/documents/Human_Waste_MA_Aron_Petau.pdf b/public/documents/Human_Waste_MA_Aron_Petau.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9ec03f21
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/documents/Human_Waste_MA_Aron_Petau.pdf differ
diff --git a/public/documents/Info_Sheet_Commoning_Cars.pdf b/public/documents/Info_Sheet_Commoning_Cars.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c9d2f4fa
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/documents/Info_Sheet_Commoning_Cars.pdf differ
diff --git a/public/favicon.png b/public/favicon.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..7c4e4676
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/favicon.png differ
diff --git a/public/fonts.css b/public/fonts.css
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..615268af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/fonts.css
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+@font-face{font-style:normal;font-weight:100 900;src:url("fonts/InterVariable.woff2") format("woff2");font-family:"Inter Variable";font-display:swap}@font-face{font-style:italic;font-weight:100 900;src:url("fonts/InterVariable-Italic.woff2") format("woff2");font-family:"Inter Variable";font-display:swap}@font-face{font-style:normal;font-weight:100 900;src:url("fonts/JetBrainsMono.woff2") format("woff2");font-family:"JetBrains Mono";font-display:swap}@font-face{font-style:italic;font-weight:100 900;src:url("fonts/JetBrainsMono-Italic.woff2") format("woff2");font-family:"JetBrains Mono";font-display:swap}body{font-family:"Inter Variable",var(--font-system-ui),var(--font-emoji)}h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6{font-weight:bold;font-family:"Inter Variable",var(--font-system-ui),var(--font-emoji)}h1{font-weight:900}pre,code,kbd,samp{font-family:"JetBrains Mono",var(--font-monospace-code)}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/fonts/InterVariable-Italic.woff2 b/public/fonts/InterVariable-Italic.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b3530f3f
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/fonts/InterVariable-Italic.woff2 differ
diff --git a/public/fonts/InterVariable.woff2 b/public/fonts/InterVariable.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5a8d3e72
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/fonts/InterVariable.woff2 differ
diff --git a/public/fonts/JetBrainsMono-Italic.woff2 b/public/fonts/JetBrainsMono-Italic.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9545a7cf
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diff --git a/public/fonts/JetBrainsMono.woff2 b/public/fonts/JetBrainsMono.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3e952405
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/fonts/JetBrainsMono.woff2 differ
diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_AMS-Regular.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_AMS-Regular.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0acaaff0
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Caligraphic-Bold.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Caligraphic-Bold.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f390922e
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Caligraphic-Bold.woff2 differ
diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Caligraphic-Regular.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Caligraphic-Regular.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..75344a1f
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Caligraphic-Regular.woff2 differ
diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Fraktur-Bold.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Fraktur-Bold.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..395f28be
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Fraktur-Regular.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Fraktur-Regular.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..735f6948
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Main-Bold.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Main-Bold.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ab2ad21d
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Main-BoldItalic.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Main-BoldItalic.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5931794d
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Main-Italic.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Main-Italic.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b50920e1
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Main-Regular.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Main-Regular.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..eb24a7ba
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Main-Regular.woff2 differ
diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Math-BoldItalic.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Math-BoldItalic.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..29657023
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Math-Italic.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Math-Italic.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..215c143f
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_SansSerif-Bold.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_SansSerif-Bold.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cfaa3bda
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_SansSerif-Italic.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_SansSerif-Italic.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..349c06dc
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_SansSerif-Regular.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_SansSerif-Regular.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a90eea85
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Script-Regular.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Script-Regular.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b3048fc1
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Size1-Regular.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Size1-Regular.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c5a8462f
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diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Size2-Regular.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Size2-Regular.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e1bccfe2
Binary files /dev/null and b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Size2-Regular.woff2 differ
diff --git a/public/fonts/KaTeX_Size3-Regular.woff2 b/public/fonts/KaTeX_Size3-Regular.woff2
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..249a2866
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--- /dev/null
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+/**
+ * Fuse.js v7.0.0 - Lightweight fuzzy-search (http://fusejs.io)
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2023 Kiro Risk (http://kiro.me)
+ * All Rights Reserved. Apache Software License 2.0
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ */
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+Aron Petau
Welcome
to the online presence of Aron Petau. This site is a collection of my thoughts and experiences. I hope you find something interesting here.
This Page is currently under construction. broken links are to be expected.
I am Aron (pronouns: he/him), a 2022 graduate of the bachelor's program of Cognitive Science in Osnabrück. During my very open and broad studies, I focused mostly on Computational Linguistics, Machine Learning, and Philosophy. The mix of these topics you will find scattered throughout my Portfolio. Currently, I am enrolled in the Master's program Design and Computation @ UdK and TU Berlin.
I am enthusiastic about many of the topics included there and have developed a fondness for algorithmic problems, techno-philosophical considerations, and issues of our (future) society.
For the studies, I moved to Berlin and now live together with 2 awesome humans and a 3D-Printer, and am continuously repairing and restoring a very old van.
I dream of one day having my own bar with cultural events and am already working on the perfect recipe for homebrew beer. I love experimenting, whether that is in the kitchen, finding a solution to a coding problem, or creating useful objects.
I am also passionate about 3D Printing, its curious applications, and all areas tangent to it. The interface of technology and the world interests me and coming up with ways for one sphere to interact with the other has now captured me for some years.
I recognize a colossal environmental problem that the current and following generations face: global waste being just one tiny aspect. At the same time, I am frustrated that I have to pay for the plastic that goes into my printer while I throw the packaging of my food away, which is the exact same material. Even more frustrating are the established norms for recycling that lead to virtually none of the products that I can produce with the printer at home being recyclable. Plastic waste is no joke and I consider it my personal contribution to try to help advance small-scale, decentralized recycling. I am currently searching for an appropriate place to further my knowledge to automatize the recycling of my own very large collection of failed prints.
In the past, digitality and the social-digital as a topic has been a recurring theme, I am concerned with digital inclusion and also play around a lot with edge computing.
If you are interested to hear more about a specific topic, feel free to contact me, or simply check out the Archive. If you suspect that I might be able to help you with a project, please check out my CV.
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+Contact - Aron Petau
Contact
For starters, mails are gold and probably still the best way to reach me. contact me
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+Curriculum vitae - Aron Petau
Curriculum vitae
Who am I?
Below you will find a chronological list of my education, my work experience and a rough overview of different softwares and machines I am familiar with. For a less formal self-description, please see the About page.
In the context of a DAAD RISE Stipend, I researched the possibilities of a decentralized electricity grid in remote regions of the Himalayas. I conducted field research, evaluation, and product simulation.
Erasmus Semester
New Bulgarian University, Sofia
I took courses in the Philosophy department and Masters’ program for Cognitive Science. I also attended the Cognitive Science Summer School.
I am currently in the fourth semester of transdisciplinary cooperation between UdK and TU Berlin with a focus on critical artistic engagement with technology.
{ "timeline": [ { "title": "Weltwärts", "location": "Lecheria de la Solidaridad", "icon": "fas fa-building", "from": "Sep '15", "to": "Aug '16", "body": "I worked in a social project in northern Buenos Aires, Argentina. I helped cooking for 150 youths daily, assisted with their homework, organized sports programmes, maintained the building and organized events.", "link": "https://lecheria.org.ar/" }, { "title": "Teamer / SportsTeamer", "location": "GO-Jugendreisen @ Spain, Croatia", "icon": "fas fa-building", "from": "Jun '17", "to": "Sep '19", "body": "I mentored and supervised groups of 12-18 year olds on their summer holiday trips. I organized entertainment, sports activities and excursions. I did two seasons of a few weeks each in Spain and one in Croatia.", "link": "https://www.go-jugendreisen.de" }, { "title": "Barkeeper / Brewing assistant", "location": "Brauerei Rampendahl", "icon": "fas fa-building", "from": "Oct '18", "to": "Mar '20", "body": "I worked in a restaurant with an in-house brewery, both on the customer-facing side and assisting in the brewery.", "link": "http://www.rampendahl.de" }, { "title": "Social Worker", "location": "Heilpädagogische Hilfe Osnabrück", "icon": "fas fa-building", "from": "Sep '20", "to": "Sep '21", "body": "I worked in a stationary care center for hearing impaired and deaf people with cognitive impairments, including autism.", "link": "https://os-hho.de/standorte/haus-10" }, { "title": "Working Student", "location": "Virtuos at Universität Osnabrück", "icon": "fas fa-building", "from": "Oct '21", "to": "May '22", "body": "I was part of the uos.dll program, a funded project to reform digital teaching practices at the University. My responsibility is the building and maintaining of the DigiLab, a FabLab/Makerspace accessible to the entire University. It features 3D printers, Laser Cutter, CNC Routers, Stitching Robots, VR, XR, Video/Audio Toolsets, and many more.", "link": "https://digitale-lehre.virtuos.uni-osnabrueck.de/uos-digilab/" }, { "title": "Software Engineer", "location": "Sommerblut Kulturverein Festival", "icon": "fas fa-building", "from": "Feb '22", "to": "Jun '23", "body": "I was part of a team researching and developing an inclusive chatbot, respecting diversity and accessibility needs. I was responsible for the entire back-end functionality.", "link": "https://chatbot.sommerblut.de" }, { "title": "Working Student", "location": "InKüLe @ UdK Berlin", "icon": "fas fa-building", "from": "Mar '23", "to": "now", "body": "InKüLe stands for 'Innovation in der künstlerischen Lehre'. The work revolves around investigating concepts for innovation and digitalization in the practice of artistic teaching. Personally, I work mostly with workshops teaching sculpting in VR and live-streaming events.", "link": "https://www.inkuele.de/landing" }, { "title": "Freelance Mentor, Educator", "location": "Junge TüftlerInnen, Berlin", "icon": "fas fa-building", "from": "Jun '24", "to": "now", "body": "The Junge TüftlerInnen is an NGO focused on educative workshops around 'making'. They offer workshops for children, young adults and also offer Workshops for adults and teachers. I am a Mentor, meaning I supervise and conduct the workshops in a team of two.", "link": "https://junge-tueftler.de" }, { "title": "Freelance Technology Educator", "location": "SOCIUS - Die Bildungspartner, Berlin", "icon": "fas fa-building", "from": "Aug '24", "to": "now", "body": "I build and curate a Makerspace at a Berlin Secondary School. We have courses and projects surrounding many digital fabrication techniques and learn about the basics of electronics and programming. We offer laser cutting, 3D printing, Textile modding, microcontrollers, robotics and more.", "link": "https://socius.diebildungspartner.de" } ] }
Microcontroller | Arduino | Raspberry Pi | ESP32 | Pi Pico
Industrial robots | Universal Robots UR5
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+Terms and Privacy Statement - Aron Petau
This page is hosted on GitHub through GitHub-pages. Not anymore! It is now proudly self-hosted from under my sofa, sometimes using solar energy. I consider you being able to read this already a win.
It is protected by Cloudflare. Not so proud of that one, but you gotta be secure, no? I do not proxy anything and I try using my best knowledge and consciousness to minimize my and other peoples efforts of tracking.
I do not collect any data. This is a static website, which means there is no database attached and nothing can be tracked by me. I also do not collect any cookies, nor are there any third-party cookies involved.
GitHub, the place where I host this website, does collect the IP address of any visitor. I have no influence on this and neither the financial resources to avoid this free hosting firm.
Embedded content from other websites
Articles on this site may include embedded content (e.g. videos, images, articles, etc.). Embedded content from other websites behaves in the exact same way as if the visitor has visited the other website. These websites may collect data about you, use cookies, embed additional third-party tracking, and monitor your interaction with that embedded content, including tracking your interaction with the embedded content if you have an account and are logged in to that website.
If privacy is important enough for you to check out this page, you probably know how to use a VPN service and avoid this problem altogether.
I have a raspberry pi and the motivation, but not the knowledge to properly self-host. If you do have constructive feedback, please feel free to contact me.
Thank you for your attention.
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+How to miet Ulli - Aron Petau
How to miet Ulli
This is a work in Progress. Informations on here are subject to change. {: .notice--danger}
The general stuff
The car is a 1991 VW T4, with a 2.0l Benzin (petrol) engine. That means roughly 80 PS. No mountains and offroading for you in there.
Propellant
The car takes either Super (95), Super Plus (98) or E10. {: .notice--danger}
The Car uses about 10-12l/100km, when never going beyond 90 km/h. Otherwise it uses about 12-15l/100km.
The tank is 85l, so you can go about 750km on one tank. The tank needle is broken, so you have to use the trip meter to know how much fuel is left. Always refill completely, otherwise you will have no clue about your range.
Please remember to reset the meter after filling up. {: .notice--danger}
The car is a manual, so you need to know how to drive stick. There is no Servolenkung (power steering), so it is a bit harder to steer. There is a trailer hitch for up to 1000 kg total. This means a standard 750kg trailer is fine, a complete rv trailer is not. The car is a 4 seater.
The car is insured for everyone over 25 years old, who has a valid drivers license. It has Teilkasko, which means that you are insured for everything, except for damage to the car itself.
Electricity
The van has it's own solar system, meaning that in summer you can usually go off-grid. There is some 12v plugs and several USB and USB-C plugs. No 230v plugs. If you need 230v, that is only possible with grid connection (Landstromanschluss). All necessary cables are on board. Please plan accordingly.
The solar system functions automatically and has an automatic shut-off, so you can't drain the battery. In case you wanna monitor the battery, you can use the Victron App to connect to the solar system via Bluetooth. Ask me for the pin. For the Analogue people, there is a battery monitor in the car, that shows the current battery voltage. It is right next to the driver seat and can read the front starter battery and the support back battery. Anything below 11.5V is considered empty and you should start the car to recharge the battery. There is a battery booster, which will charge both batteries while driving.
For increased solar capacity, take out the folded panels, plug their cable into the adapter at the rear under the exhaust pipe and place the panels in the sun. The solar system will automatically use the additional power. {: .notice--info}
Kitchen
The kitchen is equipped with a 2 flame gas stove and a sink with running water. The water is stored in a 15l tank, which is filled from the outside. Using it awarely, it can last for about 3 days (2 people).
Gas is standard 5kg grey gas bottles, which can be exchanged at any gas station. There is a bottle in the car, which is usually enough for more than a month of cooking. If you run out, you can exchange it at any gas station. {: .notice--info}
Kitchen is fully equipped for 2 People.
Always roll the top window down while driving. You will loose the window and its roughly 300 to replace. {: .notice--danger}
There is a powerful 12v fridge which holds about 30l. It is powered by the solar system and can be used while driving. With enough sun it can run 24/7.
Anything above the setting 3 will freeze your food. Level 2 works for me. {: .notice--danger}
Sleeping
The bed is in the high roof and is 1.20m wide and 1.90m long.
There is climbing involved to get up there. {: .notice--info}
Heating
The car has a gas heater, which can be used to heat the car. It is not possible to heat the car while driving. The heater is controlled by a thermostat, which is located next to the bed. To use it, the gas bottle has to be opened and the heater valve (inside the gas bottle compartment) has to be turned on. The heater will then start automatically, when the temperature drops below the set temperature.
There is also a 12v fan in the heater, which can be used to circulate air in the car. Another fan is plug and play and is usually enough in summer.
How to rent
You can rent the van by sending me an email to rent-ulli@aronpetau.me I will need the following information:
Your name
Your address
a copy of your drivers license
the dates you want to rent the car
I will then send you a contract, which you have to sign and send back to me. Then we can arrange a time for you to pick up the car.
Costs
The car costs 30€ per day, plus 0.10€ per km. This factors in my insurance and the taxes I have to pay.
Any damages to the car will be charged to you. A total damage would cost you somewhere around 10.000 Euro, so please be careful. Check your Haftpflichtversicherung (private liability insurance) to see whether it covers rented cars. {: .notice--danger}
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 01 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Contact
+ Thu, 01 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/pages/contact/
+ https://aron.petau.net/pages/contact/
+ <p>For starters, mails are gold and probably still the best way to reach me.
+<a href="/mailto:aron@petau.net/">contact me</a></p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="mailto:aron@petau.net">Email</a>
+</div>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://t.me/apetau">Telegram</a>
+</div>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://github.com/arontaupe">GitHub</a>
+</div>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">Printables</a>
+</div>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://mastodon.online/@reprintedAron">Mastodon</a>
+</div>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.newpractice.net/author/aron-petau">New Practice Network</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+ Terms and Privacy Statement
+ Thu, 01 May 2025 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/pages/privacy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/pages/privacy/
+ <p>My website address is: <a href="https://aron.petau.net">https://aron.petau.net</a> .</p>
+<h2 id="location">Location</h2>
+<p><del>This page is hosted on <a href="https://github.com">GitHub</a> through GitHub-pages.</del>
+Not anymore! It is now proudly self-hosted from under my sofa, sometimes using solar energy. I consider you being able to read this already a win.</p>
+<p>It is protected by <a href="https://www.cloudflare.com/en-gb/">Cloudflare</a>. Not so proud of that one, but you gotta be secure, no?
+I do not proxy anything and I try using my best knowledge and consciousness to minimize my and other peoples efforts of tracking.</p>
+<p>I do not collect any data.
+This is a static website, which means there is no database attached and nothing can be tracked by me.
+I also do not collect any cookies, nor are there any third-party cookies involved.</p>
+<p><a href="https://github.com">GitHub</a>, the place where I host this website, does collect the IP address of any visitor.
+I have no influence on this and neither the financial resources to avoid this free hosting firm.</p>
+<h2 id="embedded-content-from-other-websites">Embedded content from other websites</h2>
+<p>Articles on this site may include embedded content (e.g. videos, images, articles, etc.). Embedded content from other websites behaves in the exact same way as if the visitor has visited the other website.
+These websites may collect data about you, use cookies, embed additional third-party tracking, and monitor your interaction with that embedded content, including tracking your interaction with the embedded content if you have an account and are logged in to that website.</p>
+<p>If privacy is important enough for you to check out this page, you probably know how to use a VPN service and avoid this problem altogether.</p>
+<p>I have a raspberry pi and the motivation, but not the knowledge to properly self-host. If you do have constructive feedback, please feel free to contact me.</p>
+<p>Thank you for your attention.</p>
+
+
+
+ About
+ Wed, 26 Jul 2023 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/pages/about/
+ https://aron.petau.net/pages/about/
+ <h2 id="introduction">Introduction</h2>
+<p>I am Aron (pronouns: he/him), a 2022 graduate of the bachelor's program of Cognitive Science in Osnabrück.
+During my very open and broad studies, I focused mostly on Computational Linguistics, Machine Learning, and Philosophy.
+The mix of these topics you will find scattered throughout my <a href="/portfolio/">Portfolio</a>.
+Currently, I am enrolled in the Master's program <a href="https://www.newpractice.net">Design and Computation</a> @ UdK and TU Berlin.</p>
+<p>I am enthusiastic about many of the topics included there and have developed a fondness for algorithmic problems, techno-philosophical considerations, and issues of our (future) society.</p>
+<p>For the studies, I moved to Berlin and now live together with 2 awesome humans and a 3D-Printer, and am continuously repairing and restoring a very old van.</p>
+<p>I dream of one day having my own bar with cultural events and am already working on the perfect recipe for <a href="/homebrew/">homebrew</a> beer.
+I love experimenting, whether that is in the kitchen, finding a solution to a coding problem, or creating useful objects.</p>
+<p>I am also passionate about <a href="/printing/">3D Printing</a>, its curious applications, and all areas tangent to it.
+The interface of technology and the world interests me and coming up with ways for one sphere to interact with the other has now captured me for some years.</p>
+<p>I recognize a colossal environmental problem that the current and following generations face: global waste being just one tiny aspect.
+At the same time, I am frustrated that I have to pay for the plastic that goes into my printer while I throw the packaging of my food away, which is the exact same material.
+Even more frustrating are the established norms for recycling that lead to virtually none of the products that I can produce with the printer at home being recyclable.
+<a href="/plastic-recycling/">Plastic waste</a> is no joke and I consider it my personal contribution to try to help advance small-scale, decentralized recycling.
+I am currently searching for an appropriate place to further my knowledge to automatize the recycling of my own very large collection of failed prints.</p>
+<p>In the past, digitality and the social-digital as a topic has been a recurring theme, I am concerned with <a href="/chatbot/">digital inclusion</a> and also play around a lot with <a href="/airaspi-build-log/">edge computing</a>.</p>
+<p>If you are interested to hear more about a specific topic, feel free to <a href="/mailto:aron@petau.net/">contact me</a>, or simply check out the <a href="/archive/">Archive</a>.
+If you suspect that I might be able to help you with a project, please check out my <a href="/cv/">CV</a>.</p>
+
+
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/search-elasticlunr.js b/public/search-elasticlunr.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d7d3578e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/search-elasticlunr.js
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+// Based on https://github.com/getzola/zola/blob/1ac1231de1e342bbaf4d7a51a8a9a40ea152e246/docs/static/search.js
+function debounce(func, wait) {
+ var timeout;
+
+ return function () {
+ var context = this;
+ var args = arguments;
+ clearTimeout(timeout);
+
+ timeout = setTimeout(function () {
+ timeout = null;
+ func.apply(context, args);
+ }, wait);
+ };
+}
+
+// Taken from mdbook
+// The strategy is as follows:
+// First, assign a value to each word in the document:
+// Words that correspond to search terms (stemmer aware): 40
+// Normal words: 2
+// First word in a sentence: 8
+// Then use a sliding window with a constant number of words and count the
+// sum of the values of the words within the window. Then use the window that got the
+// maximum sum. If there are multiple maximas, then get the last one.
+// Enclose the terms in .
+function makeTeaser(body, terms) {
+ var TERM_WEIGHT = 40;
+ var NORMAL_WORD_WEIGHT = 2;
+ var FIRST_WORD_WEIGHT = 8;
+ var TEASER_MAX_WORDS = 30;
+
+ var stemmedTerms = terms.map(function (w) {
+ return elasticlunr.stemmer(w.toLowerCase());
+ });
+ var termFound = false;
+ var index = 0;
+ var weighted = []; // contains elements of ["word", weight, index_in_document]
+
+ // split in sentences, then words
+ var sentences = body.toLowerCase().split(". ");
+
+ for (var i in sentences) {
+ var words = sentences[i].split(" ");
+ var value = FIRST_WORD_WEIGHT;
+
+ for (var j in words) {
+ var word = words[j];
+
+ if (word.length > 0) {
+ for (var k in stemmedTerms) {
+ if (elasticlunr.stemmer(word).startsWith(stemmedTerms[k])) {
+ value = TERM_WEIGHT;
+ termFound = true;
+ }
+ }
+ weighted.push([word, value, index]);
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+[{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:1111/","title":"Home","description":null,"body":"\nWelcome\nto the online presence of Aron Petau.\nThis site is a collection of my thoughts and experiences.\nI hope you find something interesting here.\nThis Page is currently under construction.\nbroken links are to be expected.\n\n\n Do Something…\n\n","path":null},{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:1111/blog/","title":"Aron's Blog","description":null,"body":"Welcome to my quack'in blog, I quack about various stuff, but mostly I'm a demo.\n","path":null},{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:1111/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/","title":"Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity","description":null,"body":"Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault\nOn Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627\nPublication\n\n\nCitation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:\n\nThe norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”\n(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)\n\nSuch a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already\ncontained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.\nHere, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.\n\nHence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.\nPage 56, final sentence\n\nThe idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.\nI understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term \"Norms\" is related to anticipation of this argument.\nFurther, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object \"othered\" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its \"comparative\" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).\nThe oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.\nYes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.\nI would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23\n\n\nOn Ewald: What, then, is a norm?\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449\nPublication\n\n\nSome tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).\np. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,\nless as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,\nReducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.\nThe norm has three defining features:\n\npositivism,\nas reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.\nrelativity,\nthey are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.\npolarity\ninvolving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.\n\nWhat, then, is a norm?\n\nIt is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.\np. 154\n\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48\n\n\nOn Foucault: The effects without effector\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.\nPublication\n\n\n\none finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.\np. 203\n\nIn this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a \"strategy\" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.\n\nBut between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.\n\nThis was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.\nI struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?\nThis whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.\nHow can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01\n\n\n","path":null},{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:1111/blog/philosophy-copy/","title":"Philosophy","description":null,"body":"Critical considerations during my studies\nI have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.\nNormative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.\nI find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.\nThe courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.\nForum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies\nOn Anderson: Institutions\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions\nElizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,\nDOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 Publication\n\n\nThe text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.\nBut is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?\nWell, maybe, assuming that:\n\nEveryone realizes their privilege,\nEveryone concludes that justice is the right goal,\nUpon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.\n\nI think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.\nAnderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.\nThe same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.\nIs Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.\nAnderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.\nI still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45\n\n\nOn Medina, the informant and the inquirer\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214\nPublication\n\n\nMy biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,\nWhenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.\nVery roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.\nAlso argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.\nOverall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.\nAlthough I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:\n\"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility\"\nIs a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25\n\n\nOn Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185\nPublication\n\n\nI found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.\nOn outlaw emotions:\nFirst, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.\nOutlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.\nJaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.\nWhen we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.\n“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”\nTo me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.\nThe idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.\nAnother thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:\n“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”\ntil here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.\nIs an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?\nBut then, after that: \"Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men.\"\nThis was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm\nnot saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture \"White Men\" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating \"being oppressed\" and \"oppressing\" into phenomena\nwithout necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52\n\n\nForum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault\nOn Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627\nPublication\n\n\nCitation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:\n\nThe norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”\n(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)\n\nSuch a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already\ncontained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.\nHere, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.\n\nHence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.\nPage 56, final sentence\n\nThe idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.\nI understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term \"Norms\" is related to anticipation of this argument.\nFurther, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object \"othered\" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its \"comparative\" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).\nThe oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.\nYes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.\nI would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23\n\n\nOn Ewald: What, then, is a norm?\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449\nPublication\n\n\nSome tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).\np. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,\nless as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,\nReducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.\nThe norm has three defining features:\n\npositivism,\nas reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.\nrelativity,\nthey are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.\npolarity\ninvolving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.\n\nWhat, then, is a norm?\n\nIt is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.\np. 154\n\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48\n\n\nOn Foucault: The effects without effector\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.\nPublication\n\n\n\none finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.\np. 203\n\nIn this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a \"strategy\" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.\n\nBut between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.\n\nThis was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.\nI struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?\nThis whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.\nHow can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01\n\n\nForum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin\nOn Dorlin\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.\nPublication (Not yet translated to English)\n\n\nFrom the seventh chapter in Dorlins \"Self-Defense\", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.\nI think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.\nIn so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile \"outside\" or other space.\nFurther, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for \"enforcing\" safety.\nDorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.\nI think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:\nAre there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?\nDoes this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: \"Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent.\"\nWill a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52\n\n\nWeekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie\nOn Fricker: Epistemic Injustice\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.\nPublication\n\n\n\nWorin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?\n\nInferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.\nDies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.\nEine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.\n\nFormulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.\n\nWir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?\n\nWorin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.\n\nDoxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.\nFrickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.\nIch lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021\n\n\n","path":null},{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:1111/blog/political-violence/","title":"Political Violence","description":null,"body":"Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin\nOn Dorlin\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.\nPublication (Not yet translated to English)\n\n\nFrom the seventh chapter in Dorlins \"Self-Defense\", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.\nI think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.\nIn so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile \"outside\" or other space.\nFurther, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for \"enforcing\" safety.\nDorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.\nI think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:\nAre there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?\nDoes this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: \"Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent.\"\nWill a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52\n\n\nWeekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie\nOn Fricker: Epistemic Injustice\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.\nPublication\n\n\n\nWorin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?\n\nInferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.\nDies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.\nEine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.\n\nFormulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.\n\nWir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?\n\nWorin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.\n\nDoxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.\nFrickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.\nIch lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021\n\n\n","path":null},{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:1111/blog/critical-epistemologies/","title":"Critical Epistemology","description":null,"body":"Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies\nOn Anderson: Institutions\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions\nElizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,\nDOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 Publication\n\n\nThe text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.\nBut is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?\nWell, maybe, assuming that:\n\nEveryone realizes their privilege,\nEveryone concludes that justice is the right goal,\nUpon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.\n\nI think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.\nAnderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.\nThe same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.\nIs Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.\nAnderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.\nI still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45\n\n\nOn Medina, the informant and the inquirer\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214\nPublication\n\n\nMy biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,\nWhenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.\nVery roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.\nAlso argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.\nOverall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.\nAlthough I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:\n\"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility\"\nIs a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25\n\n\nOn Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tSource Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185\nPublication\n\n\nI found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.\nOn outlaw emotions:\nFirst, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.\nOutlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.\nJaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.\nWhen we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.\n“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”\nTo me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.\nThe idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.\nAnother thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:\n“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”\ntil here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.\nIs an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?\nBut then, after that: \"Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men.\"\nThis was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm\nnot saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture \"White Men\" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating \"being oppressed\" and \"oppressing\" into phenomena\nwithout necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.\n\n\t\n\t\tNote\n\tcreated by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52\n\n\n","path":null},{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:1111/blog/cad/","title":"3D Modeling and CAD","description":null,"body":"3D Modeling and CAD\nDesigning 3D Objects\nWhile learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.\nSince youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.\nIn hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.\nBelow you will find some of my designs.\nThe process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.\nBy trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.\nI want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nCheck out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community\n\n My Printables Profile\n\n3D Scanning and Photogrammetry\nBesides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.\nInteraction with real objects and environments\nIn the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.\nRecently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.\nSee some examples here:\n \n \nThis last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.\n \nPerspective\nWhat this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.\nI want more than designing figurines or wearables.\nI want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.\nI fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by Makeways on Kickstarter, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.\nI dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.\nI would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.\nOnce in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at Kaffeform producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.\nThe industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.\nStill, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.\nI also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at Precious Plastic, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.\nI find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.\nAnd I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.\nFor me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.\nSoftware that I have used and like\n\n AliceVision Meshroom\n Scaniverse\n My Sketchfab Profile\n 3D Live Scanner for Android\n\n","path":null}]
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/sitemap.xml b/public/sitemap.xml
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+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
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+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/
+
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+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ 2018-07-05
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ 2020-07-14
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+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ 2021-03-01
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+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/page/1/
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+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ 2021-03-01
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+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ 2021-03-01
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+ 2023-07-26
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+ * Duckquill v6.3.0 (https://duckquill.daudix.one)
+ * Copyright 2024-2025 David "Daudix" Lapshin
+ * Licensed under MIT (https://codeberg.org/daudix/duckquill/src/branch/main/LICENSE)
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#qrcode{float:inline-end;transform-origin:right;box-sizing:content-box;margin-inline-start:1rem;margin-block-start:3rem;margin-block-end:0;background-color:#fff;padding:.75rem;width:7.8125rem;height:7.8125rem}:root[dir*=rtl] #comments #qrcode{transform-origin:left}@media only screen and (max-width: 720px){#comments #qrcode{display:none}}#comments .buttons{justify-content:start;gap:.25rem;margin-block-start:2rem}#comments .buttons #load-comments:disabled{--shimmer: rgb( from var(--accent-color) r g b / calc(var(--color-opacity) * 2) );animation:loading-shimmer var(--transition-long) ease-in-out alternate infinite;transition:none;background-image:linear-gradient(to right, var(--fg-muted-1) 50%, var(--shimmer) 75%, var(--fg-muted-1) 100%);background-size:200%;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)}#comments .buttons #load-comments:disabled:hover{background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)}@keyframes loading-shimmer{to{background-position-x:-200%}}#comments #comments-wrapper{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:2rem;margin-block-start:2rem}#comments #comments-wrapper #comments-status{color:var(--fg-muted-4);font-weight:bold;font-size:var(--font-size-x-large);text-align:center}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment{display:grid;grid-template-columns:min-content;grid-template-areas:"avatar name " "avatar time " "avatar post " "...... media " "...... card " "...... interactions";column-gap:1rem;justify-items:start}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment.comment-reply{position:relative;border-radius:.25rem;border-inline-start:.25rem solid var(--fg-muted-2);padding-inline-start:1rem}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment.comment-reply:has(+.comment-reply){border-end-start-radius:0}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment.comment-reply+.comment-reply{margin-block-start:-2rem;border-start-start-radius:0;padding-block-start:2rem}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .avatar-link{position:relative;grid-area:avatar;width:4rem;height:4rem}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .avatar-link .avatar{transition:var(--transition);margin:0;background-size:cover;width:100%;height:100%}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .avatar-link .avatar:hover{transform:rotate(10deg) var(--hover);border-radius:var(--rounded-corner)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .avatar-link .avatar:active{transform:var(--active)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .author{display:flex;grid-area:name;align-items:center;gap:.25rem;font-weight:bold}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .author .instance{transition:var(--transition);box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);border-radius:999px;background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);padding:.375rem .75rem;color:var(--fg-muted-5);font-size:var(--font-size-small);line-height:1;text-decoration:none}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .author .instance:hover{background-color:var(--fg-muted-5);color:var(--fg-contrast);text-decoration:none}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .author .instance:active{transform:var(--active)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .author .instance.op{background-color:var(--accent-color-alpha);padding-inline-start:.4375rem;color:var(--accent-color)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .author .instance.op:hover{background-color:var(--accent-color);color:var(--contrast-color)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .author .instance.op:hover::before{background-color:var(--contrast-color)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .author .instance.op::before{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-verified);display:inline-block;vertical-align:-.1875rem;mask-image:var(--icon-verified);mask-size:cover;transition:var(--transition);margin-inline-end:.25rem;background-color:var(--accent-color);width:1rem;height:1rem;content:""}:root[dir*=rtl] #comments #comments-wrapper .comment .author .instance.op{padding:.375rem .5rem .375rem .75rem}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .mention{display:inline-block;transition:var(--transition);box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);border-radius:var(--rounded-corner-small);background-color:var(--accent-color-alpha);padding:.25rem .375rem;line-height:1;text-decoration:none}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .mention:hover{background-color:var(--accent-color);color:var(--contrast-color)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .mention:active{transform:var(--active)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .mention.hashtag{background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);color:var(--fg-muted-5)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .mention.hashtag:hover{background-color:var(--fg-muted-5);color:var(--fg-contrast)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment time{grid-area:time;margin-block-start:.5rem;font-size:var(--font-size-small)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment time a{color:var(--fg-muted-5)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment time a:after{background-color:var(--fg-muted-5)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment details[open]{border-radius:var(--rounded-corner-small);background-image:linear-gradient(to right, rgba(0,0,0,0), rgba(0,0,0,0) .5rem, var(--fg-muted-1) .5rem, var(--fg-muted-1) calc(100% - .5rem), rgba(0,0,0,0) calc(100% - .5rem), rgba(0,0,0,0)),linear-gradient(to right, rgba(0,0,0,0), rgba(0,0,0,0) .5rem, var(--bg-color) .5rem, var(--bg-color) calc(100% - .5rem), rgba(0,0,0,0) calc(100% - .5rem), rgba(0,0,0,0)),repeating-linear-gradient(45deg, var(--contrast-color), var(--contrast-color) .25rem, var(--accent-color) .25rem, var(--accent-color) .5rem)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment details[open] summary{border-radius:0;background-image:none}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment details summary{border-radius:var(--rounded-corner-small);background-image:linear-gradient(to right, rgba(0,0,0,0), rgba(0,0,0,0) .5rem, var(--fg-muted-1) .5rem, var(--fg-muted-1) calc(100% - .5rem), rgba(0,0,0,0) calc(100% - .5rem), rgba(0,0,0,0)),linear-gradient(to right, rgba(0,0,0,0), rgba(0,0,0,0) .5rem, var(--bg-color) .5rem, var(--bg-color) calc(100% - .5rem), rgba(0,0,0,0) calc(100% - .5rem), rgba(0,0,0,0)),repeating-linear-gradient(45deg, var(--contrast-color), var(--contrast-color) .25rem, var(--accent-color) .25rem, var(--accent-color) .5rem)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment main{grid-area:post;margin:1rem 0 0;width:100%}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment main :first-child{margin-block-start:0}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment main :last-child{margin-block-end:0}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .attachments{display:grid;grid-template-columns:repeat(auto-fit, minmax(16rem, 1fr));grid-area:media;gap:.5rem;margin-block-start:1rem}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .attachments img,#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .attachments video{margin:0}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .card{grid-area:card;transition:var(--transition);margin-block-start:1rem;width:min(var(--container-width)/2,100%);font-weight:normal;text-decoration:none}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .card:hover:not(:active) img{transform:var(--hover);box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight),var(--shadow-raised);border-radius:var(--rounded-corner-small)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .card:hover:not(:active) figcaption{border-radius:var(--rounded-corner);background-color:var(--fg-muted-2)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .card:active{transform:var(--active)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .card figure{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:.25rem;margin:0}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .card figure img{margin:0;border-radius:var(--rounded-corner) var(--rounded-corner) var(--rounded-corner-small) var(--rounded-corner-small);aspect-ratio:16/9;object-fit:cover}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .card figure img+figcaption{border-radius:var(--rounded-corner-small) var(--rounded-corner-small) var(--rounded-corner) var(--rounded-corner)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .card figure figcaption{display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:.25rem;transition:var(--transition);box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);border-radius:var(--rounded-corner);background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);padding:1rem;color:var(--fg-color);font-size:var(--font-size-medium);text-align:start}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment .card figure figcaption p{margin:0;color:var(--fg-muted-5);font-size:var(--font-size-small)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer{display:flex;grid-area:interactions;gap:.25rem;margin-block-start:1rem}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .boosts,#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .faves{transition:var(--transition);border-radius:999px;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);padding:.5rem .75rem;padding-inline-start:.625rem;line-height:1;font-variant-numeric:tabular-nums;text-decoration:none}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .boosts .icon,#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .faves .icon{vertical-align:-.125em;transition:var(--transition-longer);margin-inline-end:.25rem}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .boosts:hover,#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .faves:hover{box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);text-decoration:none}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .boosts:active,#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .faves:active{transform:var(--active)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .boosts{color:var(--purple-fg)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .boosts:hover{background-color:var(--purple-bg)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .boosts:hover .icon{transform:rotate(180deg)}:root[dir*=rtl] #comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .boosts:hover .icon{transform:scaleX(-1) rotate(180deg)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .boosts .icon{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-boosts);mask-image:var(--icon-boosts)}:root[dir*=rtl] #comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .boosts .icon{transform:scaleX(-1)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .faves{color:var(--yellow-fg)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .faves:hover{background-color:var(--yellow-bg)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .faves:hover .icon{transform:rotate(72deg)}:root[dir*=rtl] #comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .faves:hover .icon{transform:rotate(-72deg)}#comments #comments-wrapper .comment footer .faves .icon{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-star);mask-image:var(--icon-star)}.crt{margin:1rem 0 1rem;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight),var(--shadow-glow);border-radius:var(--rounded-corner);background-image:radial-gradient(color-mix(in srgb, var(--accent-color) 30%, #000), color-mix(in srgb, var(--accent-color) 10%, #000) 80%, color-mix(in srgb, var(--accent-color) 5%, #000))}.crt pre{--text-shadow-1: hsl(from var(--accent-color) h s l / 0.5);--text-shadow-2: hsl(from var(--accent-color) h calc(s * 2) l);animation:flicker .25s alternate infinite;margin:0;box-shadow:none;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0) !important;padding:1rem 1rem;color:var(--accent-color) !important;text-shadow:var(--text-shadow-1) 0 0 .25rem,var(--text-shadow-2) 0 0 .75rem}@keyframes flicker{25%{opacity:.95}50%{opacity:.85}75%{opacity:1}to{opacity:.9}}.scanlines{position:relative;overflow:hidden}.scanlines::before{display:block;position:absolute;z-index:1;animation:scanlines .1s linear infinite;inset:0;background-image:repeating-linear-gradient(to bottom, rgba(0,0,0,.25), rgba(0,0,0,.25) .125rem, rgba(0,0,0,0) .125rem, rgba(0,0,0,0) .25rem);pointer-events:none;content:""}@keyframes scanlines{to{background-position-y:.25rem}}.scanlines::after{--scanline-color: rgb(from var(--accent-color) r g b / 0.05);display:block;position:absolute;animation:scanline 5s linear infinite;inset:0;background-image:linear-gradient(to bottom, rgba(0,0,0,0), var(--scanline-color) 16rem);background-size:auto 16rem;background-repeat:no-repeat;background-position-y:-16rem;pointer-events:none;content:""}@keyframes scanline{to{background-position-y:calc(100% + 16rem)}}.cursor{animation:cursor-blink 1s infinite}@keyframes cursor-blink{50%{opacity:0}}.emoji{display:inline-block;vertical-align:bottom;transition:var(--transition);cursor:zoom-in;margin:0;box-shadow:none;border-radius:0;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);width:1.5em;height:1.5em}.emoji:hover{transform:scale(2)}a.external::after{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-external);display:inline-block;opacity:var(--dim-opacity);mask-image:var(--icon-external);mask-size:cover;margin-inline-start:.25rem;background-color:currentColor;width:max(.75rem,.75em);height:max(.75rem,.75em);content:""}:root[dir*=rtl] a.external::after{transform:scaleX(-1)}h1 a:has(.icon.feed){color:currentColor}h1 .icon.feed{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-feed);vertical-align:-.375rem;mask-image:var(--icon-feed);margin-inline-start:.5rem;width:1em;height:1em}#site-footer{grid-area:footer;margin-block-end:2rem;text-align:center}#site-footer nav{display:inline-block;margin:0 auto 1rem;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);border-radius:1.375rem;background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);padding:.25rem;max-width:90%}#site-footer nav ul{display:flex;flex-wrap:wrap;justify-content:center;align-items:center;gap:.25rem;margin:0;padding:0}#site-footer nav li{display:flex;margin:0;padding:0;list-style:none}@media only screen and (max-width: 480px){#site-footer nav li{flex:0 0 100%}}#site-footer nav a{flex:1;transition:var(--transition);border-radius:999px;padding:.375rem .75rem;color:var(--fg-muted-4);text-align:center;text-decoration:none}#site-footer nav a.active{box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);background-color:var(--accent-color-alpha);color:var(--accent-color)}#site-footer nav a.active:hover{background-color:var(--accent-color);color:var(--contrast-color)}#site-footer nav a:hover{box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);color:var(--fg-muted-5)}#site-footer nav a:active{transform:var(--active)}#site-footer #socials{display:flex;flex-wrap:wrap;justify-content:center;gap:.5rem;margin:1rem auto 0;padding:0}#site-footer #socials li{margin:0;padding:0;list-style:none}#site-footer #socials a{display:block;transition:var(--transition);border-radius:999px;padding:.5rem;color:var(--fg-muted-4);line-height:0}#site-footer #socials a:hover{box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);color:var(--fg-muted-5)}#site-footer #socials a:active{transform:var(--active)}#site-footer #socials a .icon{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon);mask-image:var(--icon);transition:var(--transition);width:1.5rem;height:1.5rem}#site-footer #socials a span{display:none}#site-footer p{margin:1rem auto}#site-footer .link{display:inline-block;transition:var(--transition);box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);border-radius:var(--rounded-corner-small);background-color:var(--accent-color-alpha);padding:.25rem .375rem;line-height:1;text-decoration:none}#site-footer .link:hover{background-color:var(--accent-color);color:var(--contrast-color)}#site-footer .link:active{transform:var(--active)}.footnotes-list p{margin-block-start:0;margin-block-end:0}*{box-sizing:border-box}:root{scroll-behavior:smooth;scrollbar-color:var(--accent-color) rgba(0,0,0,0);accent-color:var(--accent-color);font-size:16px}body{text-wrap:pretty;display:grid;grid-template-rows:auto minmax(auto, 1fr) auto;grid-template-areas:"nav" "main" "footer";margin:0;background-color:var(--bg-color);min-height:100vh;color:var(--fg-color);line-height:1.5;font-family:var(--font-system-ui),var(--font-emoji);overflow-wrap:break-word}body:has(#sidebar){grid-template-columns:1fr min(var(--container-width),90%) 1fr;grid-template-areas:"nav nav nav" "sidebar main ." "footer footer footer"}@media only screen and (max-width: 1200px){body:has(#sidebar){grid-template-areas:"nav nav nav" ". sidebar ." ". main ." 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auto;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight),var(--shadow);border:none;border-radius:var(--rounded-corner);background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);width:100%;max-width:100%}iframe.mastodon-embed{aspect-ratio:3/4;width:min(var(--container-width)/2,100%)}iframe.vimeo-embed,iframe.youtube-embed{aspect-ratio:16/9}iframe:fullscreen{box-shadow:none;border-radius:0}iframe:-webkit-full-screen{box-shadow:none;border-radius:0}input[type=radio],input[type=checkbox],input[type=color]{position:relative;appearance:none;transition:var(--transition);cursor:pointer;border:.15rem solid var(--fg-muted-2);background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);width:1rem;height:1rem}input[type=radio]:hover,input[type=checkbox]:hover,input[type=color]:hover{background-color:var(--fg-muted-2)}input[type=radio]:disabled,input[type=checkbox]:disabled,input[type=color]:disabled{opacity:var(--disabled-opacity);cursor:not-allowed}input[type=radio]:disabled:hover,input[type=checkbox]:disabled:hover,input[type=color]:disabled:hover{background-color:var(--fg-muted-1)}input[type=radio]:disabled:hover:checked,input[type=checkbox]:disabled:hover:checked,input[type=color]:disabled:hover:checked{background-color:var(--accent-color)}input[type=radio]::before,input[type=checkbox]::before{display:block;position:absolute;transform:scale(.5);opacity:0;transition:var(--transition);background-color:var(--contrast-color);content:""}input[type=radio]:checked,input[type=checkbox]:checked{border:.15rem solid 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left;mask-image:var(--icon-checkmark);mask-size:cover;inset-block-start:-.125rem;inset-inline-start:-.125rem;width:1rem;height:1rem}input[type=checkbox].switch{vertical-align:-.375rem;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);border:none;border-radius:999px;width:2.5rem;height:1.5rem}input[type=checkbox].switch.big{vertical-align:-.625rem;width:3rem;height:2rem}input[type=checkbox].switch.big::before{width:1.5rem;height:1.5rem}input[type=checkbox].switch::before{transform:none;transform-origin:center;opacity:1;mask-image:none;transition:var(--transition);inset-block-start:.25rem;inset-inline-start:.25rem;box-shadow:var(--shadow);border-radius:50%;background-color:#fff;width:1rem;height:1rem}input[type=checkbox].switch:checked{background-color:var(--accent-color)}input[type=checkbox].switch:checked::before{transform:translateX(1rem);background-color:var(--contrast-color)}:root[dir*=rtl] input[type=checkbox].switch:checked::before{transform:translateX(-1rem)}input[type=checkbox].switch:disabled::before{box-shadow:none}input[type=color]{vertical-align:-.375em;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);border:none;border-radius:var(--rounded-corner-small);padding:.25rem;width:3rem;height:2rem}input[type=color]::-moz-color-swatch{border:none;border-radius:calc(var(--rounded-corner-small) - .25rem)}input[type=color]::-webkit-color-swatch-wrapper{padding:0}input[type=color]::-webkit-color-swatch{border-radius:calc(var(--rounded-corner-small) - .25rem)}input[type=range]{appearance:none;transition:var(--transition);cursor:pointer;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);border-radius:999px;background:var(--accent-color);width:100%;height:.5rem}input[type=range]::-webkit-slider-thumb{appearance:none;filter:brightness(.9);transition:var(--transition);cursor:grab;box-shadow:var(--shadow);border-radius:999px;background-color:#fff;width:1.5rem;height:1.5rem}input[type=range]::-webkit-slider-thumb:active{transform:var(--active);cursor:grabbing}input[type=range]::-moz-range-thumb{appearance:none;transition:var(--transition);cursor:grab;box-shadow:var(--shadow);border:none;border-radius:999px;background-color:#fff;width:1.5rem;height:1.5rem}input[type=range]::-moz-range-thumb:active{transform:var(--active);cursor:grabbing}img,video{display:block;margin:1rem auto;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight),var(--shadow);border-radius:var(--rounded-corner);background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);max-width:100%}img.full,img[src*="#full"],video.full,video[src*="#full"]{width:100%}img.full-bleed,img[src*="#full-bleed"],video.full-bleed,video[src*="#full-bleed"]{margin-inline-start:calc((-100vw + 100%)/2);margin-inline-end:calc((-100vw + 100%)/2);width:100vw;max-width:100vw}img.start,img.end,img[src*="#start"],img[src*="#end"],video.start,video.end,video[src*="#start"],video[src*="#end"]{margin:0;width:30%}@media only screen and (max-width: 720px){img.start,img.end,img[src*="#start"],img[src*="#end"],video.start,video.end,video[src*="#start"],video[src*="#end"]{float:none;margin-inline-start:0;margin-inline-end:0;margin-block-start:1rem;margin-block-end:1rem;width:100%}}img.start,img[src*="#start"],video.start,video[src*="#start"]{float:inline-start;transform-origin:left;margin-inline-end:1rem}:root[dir*=rtl] img.start,:root[dir*=rtl] img[src*="#start"],:root[dir*=rtl] video.start,:root[dir*=rtl] video[src*="#start"]{transform-origin:right}img.end,img[src*="#end"],video.end,video[src*="#end"]{float:inline-end;transform-origin:right;margin-inline-start:1rem}:root[dir*=rtl] img.end,:root[dir*=rtl] img[src*="#end"],:root[dir*=rtl] video.end,:root[dir*=rtl] video[src*="#end"]{transform-origin:left}img.pixels,img[src*="#pixels"],video.pixels,video[src*="#pixels"]{image-rendering:pixelated}img.transparent,img.full-bleed,img[src*="#transparent"],img[src*="#full-bleed"],video.transparent,video.full-bleed,video[src*="#transparent"],video[src*="#full-bleed"]{box-shadow:none;border-radius:0;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0)}img.spoiler,img[src*="#spoiler"],video.spoiler,video[src*="#spoiler"]{opacity:var(--dim-opacity);clip-path:inset(0 0 0 0 round var(--rounded-corner));filter:blur(1rem)}img.spoiler:hover,img.spoiler:active,img[src*="#spoiler"]:hover,img[src*="#spoiler"]:active,video.spoiler:hover,video.spoiler:active,video[src*="#spoiler"]:hover,video[src*="#spoiler"]:active{opacity:1;clip-path:inset(-.75rem -.75rem -.75rem -.75rem round var(--rounded-corner-small));filter:none}img.spoiler.solid,img.spoiler[src*="#solid"],img[src*="#spoiler"].solid,img[src*="#spoiler"][src*="#solid"],video.spoiler.solid,video.spoiler[src*="#solid"],video[src*="#spoiler"].solid,video[src*="#spoiler"][src*="#solid"]{clip-path:none;filter:brightness(0) 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only screen and (max-width: 720px){img:not(.no-hover,.full-bleed,[src*="#no-hover"],[src*="#full-bleed"],.emoji).start,img:not(.no-hover,.full-bleed,[src*="#no-hover"],[src*="#full-bleed"],.emoji).end,img:not(.no-hover,.full-bleed,[src*="#no-hover"],[src*="#full-bleed"],.emoji)[src*="#start"],img:not(.no-hover,.full-bleed,[src*="#no-hover"],[src*="#full-bleed"],.emoji)[src*="#end"]{transform-origin:center}img:not(.no-hover,.full-bleed,[src*="#no-hover"],[src*="#full-bleed"],.emoji).start:hover,img:not(.no-hover,.full-bleed,[src*="#no-hover"],[src*="#full-bleed"],.emoji).end:hover,img:not(.no-hover,.full-bleed,[src*="#no-hover"],[src*="#full-bleed"],.emoji)[src*="#start"]:hover,img:not(.no-hover,.full-bleed,[src*="#no-hover"],[src*="#full-bleed"],.emoji)[src*="#end"]:hover{transform:var(--hover)}}img:not(.no-hover,.full-bleed,[src*="#no-hover"],[src*="#full-bleed"],.emoji).transparent:hover,img:not(.no-hover,.full-bleed,[src*="#no-hover"],[src*="#full-bleed"],.emoji)[src*="#transparent"]:hover{box-shadow:none}a 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scale(.5);opacity:0}#handle:hover+#site-nav,#handle+#site-nav:hover,#handle+#site-nav:has(*:focus-visible,*:focus){transform:none;opacity:1;pointer-events:auto}#handle:hover+#site-nav::before,#handle+#site-nav:hover::before,#handle+#site-nav:has(*:focus-visible,*:focus)::before{-webkit-backdrop-filter:var(--blur);backdrop-filter:var(--blur)}#handle+#site-nav{position:fixed;transform:translateY(-1rem) scale(.5);transform-origin:top;opacity:0;transition:var(--transition);margin:0 auto;width:max-content;pointer-events:none}#handle+#site-nav::before{-webkit-backdrop-filter:saturate(1) blur(0);backdrop-filter:saturate(1) blur(0);transition:var(--transition)}#site-nav{position:sticky;grid-area:nav;z-index:999;margin:1rem auto 0;inset-block-start:1rem;inset-inline-end:0;inset-inline-start:0;border-radius:1.625rem;max-width:min(var(--container-width),90%)}@media only screen and (max-width: 480px){#site-nav{position:relative;margin:0 auto}}#site-nav::before{-webkit-backdrop-filter:var(--blur);position:absolute;z-index:-1;backdrop-filter:var(--blur);inset:0;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight),var(--shadow-glass);border-radius:1.625rem;background-color:var(--glass-bg);content:""}#site-nav nav{padding:.5rem}#site-nav nav>a{-webkit-backdrop-filter:var(--blur);position:absolute;left:50%;transform:translateX(-50%);opacity:0;z-index:999;backdrop-filter:var(--blur);transition:var(--transition);inset-block-start:0;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight),var(--shadow-glass);border-radius:999px;background-color:var(--glass-bg);padding:.625rem .75rem;pointer-events:none;line-height:1;text-decoration:none}#site-nav nav>a:focus{opacity:1;inset-block-start:calc(100% + .5rem)}#site-nav nav ul{display:flex;flex-wrap:wrap;justify-content:center;align-items:center;gap:.25rem;margin:0;padding:0}#site-nav nav li{display:flex;margin:0;padding:0;list-style:none}@media only screen and (max-width: 480px){#site-nav nav li:not(:has(.circle)){flex:0 0 100%}}#site-nav nav a,#site-nav nav summary{flex:1;transition:var(--transition);box-shadow:none;border-radius:999px;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);padding:.625rem .75rem;font-weight:bold;line-height:1;list-style:none;text-align:center;text-decoration:none}#site-nav nav a.active{box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);background-color:var(--accent-color-alpha);color:var(--accent-color)}#site-nav nav a.active:hover{background-color:var(--accent-color);color:var(--contrast-color)}#site-nav nav #home a{color:var(--fg-muted-5);font-weight:800}#site-nav nav #home a:hover{color:var(--fg-color)}#site-nav nav #home a.active{color:var(--accent-color)}#site-nav nav #home a.active:hover{color:var(--contrast-color)}#site-nav nav #home a .icon{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-home);vertical-align:-.125em;mask-image:var(--icon-home);transition:var(--transition);margin-inline-end:.25rem}#site-nav nav .divider{align-self:stretch;margin:0 .25rem;background-color:var(--fg-muted-2);width:max(1px,.0625em)}@media 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.icon{vertical-align:-.125em;transition:var(--transition)}#site-nav nav button{appearance:none;transition:var(--transition);cursor:pointer;border:none;border-radius:999px;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);font-size:var(--font-size-medium)}#site-nav nav details{display:flex;position:relative;flex:1;box-shadow:none;border-radius:0;background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);padding:0}#site-nav nav details[open] ul{animation:dropdown-open var(--transition)}@keyframes dropdown-open{from{transform:scale(.5) translate(-50%, -1rem);opacity:0}}#site-nav nav details ul{-webkit-backdrop-filter:var(--blur);position:absolute;left:50%;flex-direction:column;transform:translateX(-50%);transform-origin:top left;z-index:1;backdrop-filter:var(--blur);inset-block-start:3.25rem;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight),var(--shadow-glass);border-radius:calc(var(--rounded-corner) + .25rem);background-color:var(--glass-bg);padding:.25rem}#site-nav nav details ul li{width:100%;white-space:nowrap}#site-nav nav details ul li a{border-radius:var(--rounded-corner);text-align:start}@media only screen and (max-width: 480px){#site-nav nav details:has(summary:not(.circle)) ul{inset-block-start:2.75rem}}#site-nav nav #search .icon{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-search);mask-image:var(--icon-search)}:root[dir*=rtl] #site-nav nav #search .icon{transform:scaleX(-1)}#site-nav nav #feed .icon{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-feed);mask-image:var(--icon-feed)}:root[dir*=rtl] #site-nav nav #feed .icon{transform:scaleX(-1)}#site-nav nav #repo .icon{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-git);mask-image:var(--icon-git)}#site-nav nav #language-switcher .icon{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-languages);mask-image:var(--icon-languages)}#site-nav nav #theme-switcher ul{flex-direction:row;flex-wrap:nowrap;border-radius:999px}#site-nav nav #theme-switcher .active{box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);background-color:var(--accent-color-alpha);color:var(--accent-color)}#site-nav nav #theme-switcher .active:hover{background-color:var(--accent-color);color:var(--contrast-color)}#site-nav nav #theme-switcher #theme-system .icon,#site-nav nav #theme-switcher .icon{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-theme-system);mask-image:var(--icon-theme-system)}:root[dir*=rtl] #site-nav nav #theme-switcher #theme-system .icon,:root[dir*=rtl] #site-nav nav #theme-switcher .icon{transform:scaleX(-1)}#site-nav nav #theme-switcher #theme-light .icon,#site-nav nav #theme-switcher .icon.light{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-theme-light);mask-image:var(--icon-theme-light)}#site-nav nav #theme-switcher #theme-dark .icon,#site-nav nav #theme-switcher .icon.dark{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-theme-dark);mask-image:var(--icon-theme-dark)}:root[dir*=rtl] #site-nav nav #theme-switcher #theme-dark .icon,:root[dir*=rtl] #site-nav nav #theme-switcher .icon.dark{transform:scaleX(-1)}#site-nav #search-container{transform:scale(.5) translateY(-2.75rem);opacity:0;transition:var(--transition);padding:0 .5rem 0;height:0;pointer-events:none}#site-nav #search-container.active{transform:none;opacity:1;padding:0 .5rem .5rem;height:2.75rem;pointer-events:all}#site-nav #search-bar{box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);border:none;border-radius:999px;background:var(--fg-muted-1);padding:0 .75rem;width:100%;height:2.25rem;color:inherit;font-size:var(--font-size-medium)}#site-nav #search-bar::placeholder{opacity:1;color:var(--fg-muted-4)}#site-nav #search-results-container{-webkit-backdrop-filter:var(--blur);display:flex;position:absolute;backdrop-filter:var(--blur);inset-block-start:calc(100% + .5rem);inset-inline-start:0;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight),var(--shadow-glass);border-radius:calc(var(--rounded-corner) + .5rem);background-color:var(--glass-bg);width:100%;max-height:50vh}#site-nav #search-results{--mask: linear-gradient(to bottom, transparent, black 1rem, black calc(100% - 1rem), transparent);-webkit-mask-image:var(--mask);display:none;flex:1;flex-direction:column;gap:.5rem;mask-image:var(--mask);padding:.5rem;overflow:auto}#site-nav #search-results .item{display:inline-flex;flex-direction:column;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);border-radius:var(--rounded-corner);background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);padding:.5rem}#site-nav #search-results .item a{width:fit-content}#site-nav #search-results .item a::after{content:" →"}:root[dir*=rtl] #site-nav #search-results .item a::after{content:" ←"}#site-nav #search-results .item span{color:var(--fg-muted-5)}#site-nav #search-results .item span:first-of-type,#site-nav #search-results .item span.more-matches{margin-block-start:.5rem;border-block-start:max(1px,.0625rem) solid var(--fg-muted-2);padding-block-start:.25rem}#site-nav #search-results .item span.more-matches{font-size:var(--font-size-small)}#site-nav #search-results .item span strong{color:var(--fg-color)}#not-found{width:min(var(--container-width)/5,100%)}#post-nav{display:flex;flex-direction:row;gap:.25rem}@media only screen and (max-width: 720px){#post-nav{flex-direction:column}}#post-nav .post-nav-item{flex:1;transition:var(--transition);border-radius:var(--rounded-corner);padding:1rem;padding-block-end:.75rem;min-width:0;text-decoration:none}#post-nav .post-nav-item:hover{box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);background-color:var(--accent-color-alpha)}#post-nav .post-nav-item:hover .post-title{color:var(--accent-color)}#post-nav .post-nav-item:active{transform:var(--active)}#post-nav .post-nav-item.post-nav-prev .nav-arrow::before{content:"← "}:root[dir*=rtl] #post-nav .post-nav-item.post-nav-prev .nav-arrow::before{content:"→ "}#post-nav .post-nav-item.post-nav-next{text-align:end}#post-nav .post-nav-item.post-nav-next .nav-arrow::after{content:" →"}:root[dir*=rtl] #post-nav .post-nav-item.post-nav-next .nav-arrow::after{content:" ←"}#post-nav .post-nav-item .nav-arrow{margin-block-end:.75rem;color:var(--fg-muted-5);font-weight:normal;line-height:1}#post-nav .post-nav-item .post-title{display:block;transition:var(--transition);max-width:90vw;overflow:hidden;color:var(--fg-color);text-overflow:ellipsis;white-space:nowrap}.pre-container{margin:1rem 0 1rem;box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight),var(--shadow);border-radius:var(--rounded-corner)}.pre-container .header{--shimmer: rgb( from var(--accent-color) r g b / calc(var(--color-opacity) * 2) );display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;border-radius:var(--rounded-corner) var(--rounded-corner) 0 0;background-image:linear-gradient(to right, var(--fg-muted-1) 50%, var(--shimmer) 75%, var(--fg-muted-1) 100%);background-size:200%;padding:.25rem;height:2.5rem}.pre-container .header span{margin-inline-start:.75rem;color:var(--fg-muted-5);font-weight:bold;line-height:1}.pre-container .header button{appearance:none;transition:var(--transition);cursor:pointer;border:none;border-radius:var(--rounded-corner-small);background-color:rgba(0,0,0,0);padding:.5rem;color:var(--fg-muted-4);line-height:0}.pre-container .header button:hover{box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);background-color:var(--fg-muted-1);color:var(--fg-muted-5)}.pre-container .header button:active{transform:var(--active)}.pre-container .header button:disabled{cursor:not-allowed}.pre-container .header button:disabled:active{transform:none}.pre-container .header button .icon{-webkit-mask-image:var(--icon-copy);mask-image:var(--icon-copy);transition:var(--transition)}:root[dir*=rtl] .pre-container .header button .icon{transform:scaleX(-1)}.pre-container .header.active{animation:active-shimmer var(--transition-long)}.pre-container .header.active button{box-shadow:var(--edge-highlight);background-color:var(--accent-color-alpha);color:var(--accent-color)}.pre-container .header.active button 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\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/syntax-theme-dark.css b/public/syntax-theme-dark.css
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a18f9ba7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/syntax-theme-dark.css
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/*
+ * theme "Solarized (dark)" generated by syntect
+ */
+
+.z-code {
+ color: #839496;
+ background-color: #002b36;
+}
+
+.z-comment, .z-meta.z-documentation {
+ color: #586e75;
+}
+.z-string {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-string.z-regexp {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-constant.z-character.z-escape {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-constant.z-numeric {
+ color: #6c71c4;
+}
+.z-variable {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-variable.z-function {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-variable.z-language {
+ color: #d33682;
+}
+.z-keyword {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-meta.z-import .z-keyword, .z-keyword.z-control.z-import, .z-keyword.z-control.z-import.z-from, .z-keyword.z-other.z-import, .z-keyword.z-control.z-at-rule.z-include, .z-keyword.z-control.z-at-rule.z-import {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-keyword.z-operator.z-comparison, .z-keyword.z-operator.z-assignment, .z-keyword.z-operator.z-arithmetic {
+ color: #657b83;
+}
+.z-storage {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-storage.z-modifier {
+ color: #93a1a1;
+}
+.z-keyword.z-control.z-class, .z-entity.z-name, .z-entity.z-name.z-class, .z-entity.z-name.z-type.z-class {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-entity.z-other.z-inherited-class {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-entity.z-other.z-attribute-name {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-support, .z-support.z-type, .z-support.z-class {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-entity.z-name.z-function {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-definition.z-variable {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-constant, .z-constant.z-language, .z-meta.z-preprocessor {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-entity.z-name.z-section {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-support.z-function.z-construct, .z-keyword.z-other.z-new {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-constant.z-character, .z-constant.z-other {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-entity.z-name.z-tag {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-definition.z-tag.z-html, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-tag.z-begin, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-tag.z-end {
+ color: #586e75;
+}
+.z-support.z-function {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-separator.z-continuation {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-storage.z-type {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-support.z-type.z-exception {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-keyword.z-other.z-special-method {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-invalid {
+ background-color: #6e2e32;
+}
+.z-string.z-quoted.z-double, .z-string.z-quoted.z-single {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-definition.z-string {
+ color: #839496;
+}
+.z-meta.z-brace.z-square, .z-punctuation.z-section.z-brackets {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-meta.z-brace.z-round, .z-meta.z-brace.z-curly, .z-punctuation.z-section, .z-punctuation.z-section.z-block, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-parameters, .z-punctuation.z-section.z-group {
+ color: #657b83;
+}
+.z-support.z-constant.z-color, .z-invalid.z-deprecated.z-color.z-w3c-non-standard-color-name.z-scss {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-meta.z-selector.z-css {
+ color: #657b83;
+}
+.z-entity.z-name.z-tag.z-css, .z-entity.z-name.z-tag.z-scss, .z-source.z-less .z-keyword.z-control.z-html.z-elements, .z-source.z-sass .z-keyword.z-control.z-untitled {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-entity.z-other.z-attribute-name.z-class {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-entity.z-other.z-attribute-name.z-id {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-entity.z-other.z-attribute-name.z-pseudo-element, .z-entity.z-other.z-attribute-name.z-tag.z-pseudo-element, .z-entity.z-other.z-attribute-name.z-pseudo-class, .z-entity.z-other.z-attribute-name.z-tag.z-pseudo-class {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-text.z-html.z-basic .z-meta.z-tag.z-other.z-html, .z-text.z-html.z-basic .z-meta.z-tag.z-any.z-html, .z-text.z-html.z-basic .z-meta.z-tag.z-block.z-any, .z-text.z-html.z-basic .z-meta.z-tag.z-inline.z-any, .z-text.z-html.z-basic .z-meta.z-tag.z-structure.z-any.z-html, .z-text.z-html.z-basic .z-source.z-js.z-embedded.z-html, .z-punctuation.z-separator.z-key-value.z-html {
+ color: #657b83;
+}
+.z-text.z-html.z-basic .z-entity.z-other.z-attribute-name.z-html, .z-meta.z-tag.z-xml .z-entity.z-other.z-attribute-name {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-keyword.z-other.z-special-method.z-ruby {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-variable.z-other.z-constant.z-ruby {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-constant.z-other.z-symbol.z-ruby {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-keyword.z-other.z-special-method.z-ruby {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-meta.z-array .z-support.z-function.z-construct.z-php {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-entity.z-name.z-function.z-preprocessor.z-c, .z-meta.z-preprocessor.z-c.z-include, .z-meta.z-preprocessor.z-macro.z-c {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-meta.z-preprocessor.z-c.z-include .z-string.z-quoted.z-other.z-lt-gt.z-include.z-c, .z-meta.z-preprocessor.z-c.z-include .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-string.z-begin.z-c, .z-meta.z-preprocessor.z-c.z-include .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-string.z-end.z-c {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-other.z-package.z-exclude, .z-other.z-remove {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-other.z-add {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-section.z-group.z-tex, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-arguments.z-begin.z-latex, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-arguments.z-end.z-latex, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-arguments.z-latex {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-meta.z-group.z-braces.z-tex {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-string.z-other.z-math.z-tex {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-variable.z-parameter.z-function.z-latex {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-definition.z-constant.z-math.z-tex {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-text.z-tex.z-latex .z-constant.z-other.z-math.z-tex, .z-constant.z-other.z-general.z-math.z-tex, .z-constant.z-other.z-general.z-math.z-tex, .z-constant.z-character.z-math.z-tex {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-string.z-other.z-math.z-tex {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-definition.z-string.z-begin.z-tex, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-string.z-end.z-tex {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-keyword.z-control.z-label.z-latex, .z-text.z-tex.z-latex .z-constant.z-other.z-general.z-math.z-tex {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-variable.z-parameter.z-definition.z-label.z-latex {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-support.z-function.z-be.z-latex {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-support.z-function.z-section.z-latex {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-support.z-function.z-general.z-tex {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-keyword.z-control.z-ref.z-latex {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-storage.z-type.z-class.z-python, .z-storage.z-type.z-function.z-python, .z-storage.z-modifier.z-global.z-python {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-support.z-type.z-exception.z-python {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-meta.z-scope.z-for-in-loop.z-shell, .z-variable.z-other.z-loop.z-shell {
+ color: #93a1a1;
+}
+.z-meta.z-scope.z-case-block.z-shell, .z-meta.z-scope.z-case-body.z-shell {
+ color: #93a1a1;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-definition.z-logical-expression.z-shell {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-storage.z-modifier.z-c++ {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-support.z-function.z-perl {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-meta.z-diff, .z-meta.z-diff.z-header {
+ color: #586e75;
+}
+.z-meta.z-diff.z-range {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-markup.z-deleted {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-markup.z-changed {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-markup.z-inserted {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-markup.z-warning {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-markup.z-error {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-markup.z-heading, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-heading.z-markdown {
+ color: #b58900;
+font-weight: bold;
+}
+.z-markup.z-quote {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-markup.z-italic {
+font-style: italic;
+}
+.z-markup.z-bold {
+font-weight: bold;
+}
+.z-markup.z-underline.z-link.z-markdown, .z-meta.z-link.z-reference .z-constant.z-other.z-reference.z-link.z-markdown {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-constant.z-other.z-reference.z-link.z-markdown {
+ color: #6c71c4;
+}
+.z-meta.z-paragraph.z-markdown .z-meta.z-dummy.z-line-break {
+ background-color: #586e75;
+}
+.z-brackethighlighter.z-all {
+ color: #586e75;
+}
+.z-entity.z-name.z-filename.z-find-in-files {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-constant.z-numeric.z-line-number.z-find-in-files {
+ color: #586e75;
+}
+.z-variable.z-other.z-readwrite.z-js, .z-variable.z-other.z-object.z-js, .z-variable.z-other.z-constant.z-js {
+ color: #839496;
+}
diff --git a/public/syntax-theme-light.css b/public/syntax-theme-light.css
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..40ea69e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/syntax-theme-light.css
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/*
+ * theme "Solarized (light)" generated by syntect
+ */
+
+.z-code {
+ color: #657b83;
+ background-color: #fdf6e3;
+}
+
+.z-comment, .z-meta.z-documentation {
+ color: #93a1a1;
+}
+.z-string {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-string.z-regexp {
+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-constant.z-character.z-escape {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-constant.z-numeric {
+ color: #6c71c4;
+}
+.z-variable {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-variable.z-function {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-variable.z-language {
+ color: #d33682;
+}
+.z-keyword {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-meta.z-import .z-keyword, .z-keyword.z-control.z-import, .z-keyword.z-control.z-import.z-from, .z-keyword.z-other.z-import, .z-keyword.z-control.z-at-rule.z-include, .z-keyword.z-control.z-at-rule.z-import {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-keyword.z-operator.z-comparison, .z-keyword.z-operator.z-assignment, .z-keyword.z-operator.z-arithmetic {
+ color: #657b83;
+}
+.z-storage {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-storage.z-modifier {
+ color: #586e75;
+}
+.z-keyword.z-control.z-class, .z-entity.z-name, .z-entity.z-name.z-class, .z-entity.z-name.z-type.z-class {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-entity.z-other.z-inherited-class {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-entity.z-other.z-attribute-name {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-support, .z-support.z-type, .z-support.z-class {
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+}
+.z-entity.z-name.z-function {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-definition.z-variable {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-constant, .z-constant.z-language, .z-meta.z-preprocessor {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-entity.z-name.z-section {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-support.z-function.z-construct, .z-keyword.z-other.z-new {
+ color: #dc322f;
+}
+.z-constant.z-character, .z-constant.z-other {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-entity.z-name.z-tag {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-definition.z-tag.z-html, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-tag.z-begin, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-tag.z-end {
+ color: #93a1a1;
+}
+.z-support.z-function {
+ color: #859900;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-separator.z-continuation {
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+}
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+ color: #268bd2;
+}
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+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
+.z-keyword.z-other.z-special-method {
+ color: #cb4b16;
+}
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+ background-color: #ec9489;
+}
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+ color: #2aa198;
+}
+.z-punctuation.z-definition.z-string {
+ color: #839496;
+}
+.z-meta.z-brace.z-square, .z-punctuation.z-section.z-brackets {
+ color: #268bd2;
+}
+.z-meta.z-brace.z-round, .z-meta.z-brace.z-curly, .z-punctuation.z-section, .z-punctuation.z-section.z-block, .z-punctuation.z-definition.z-parameters, .z-punctuation.z-section.z-group {
+ color: #657b83;
+}
+.z-support.z-constant.z-color, .z-invalid.z-deprecated.z-color.z-w3c-non-standard-color-name.z-scss {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
+.z-meta.z-selector.z-css {
+ color: #657b83;
+}
+.z-entity.z-name.z-tag.z-css, .z-entity.z-name.z-tag.z-scss, .z-source.z-less .z-keyword.z-control.z-html.z-elements, .z-source.z-sass .z-keyword.z-control.z-untitled {
+ color: #b58900;
+}
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diff --git a/public/tags/3d-printing/atom.xml b/public/tags/3d-printing/atom.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a5a1b91f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/3d-printing/atom.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+
+
+ Aron Petau - 3D printing
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/3d-printing/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/3d-printing/index.html b/public/tags/3d-printing/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ea392bc7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/3d-printing/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+3D printing - Aron Petau
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new file mode 100644
index 00000000..894a4365
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new file mode 100644
index 00000000..623418e2
--- /dev/null
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@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - 3D printing
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - alison jaggar
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/alison-jaggar/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - alison jaggar
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/design-for-printing/atom.xml b/public/tags/design-for-printing/atom.xml
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - design for printing
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/design-for-printing/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - design for printing
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
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+ Aron Petau - elizabeth anderson
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/elizabeth-anderson/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - elizabeth anderson
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - elsa dorlin
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/elsa-dorlin/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - elsa dorlin
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - epistemology
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/epistemology/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - epistemology
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - ethics
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/ethics/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - ethics
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - feminism
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/feminism/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+ Aron Petau - feminism
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+ Aron Petau - francois ewald
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/francois-ewald/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - francois ewald
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/functional-design/atom.xml b/public/tags/functional-design/atom.xml
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - functional design
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/functional-design/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - functional design
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/fusion360/atom.xml b/public/tags/fusion360/atom.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b349e94c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/fusion360/atom.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+
+
+ Aron Petau - fusion360
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/fusion360/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/fusion360/index.html b/public/tags/fusion360/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..884adfba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/fusion360/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/tags/fusion360/page/1/index.html b/public/tags/fusion360/page/1/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..66e2ef16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/fusion360/page/1/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Redirect
Click here to be redirected.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/tags/fusion360/rss.xml b/public/tags/fusion360/rss.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..eb1ff3da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/fusion360/rss.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - fusion360
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+ Aron Petau - josé medina
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/jose-medina/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - josé medina
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - judith butler
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/judith-butler/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - judith butler
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - michael foucault
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/michael-foucault/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - michael foucault
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - miranda fricker
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/miranda-fricker/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - miranda fricker
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/normativity/atom.xml b/public/tags/normativity/atom.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..fc345656
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/normativity/atom.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,540 @@
+
+
+ Aron Petau - normativity
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/normativity/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - normativity
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/parametric-modelling/atom.xml b/public/tags/parametric-modelling/atom.xml
new file mode 100644
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - parametric modelling
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/parametric-modelling/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - parametric modelling
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/phenomenology/atom.xml b/public/tags/phenomenology/atom.xml
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/phenomenology/atom.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,540 @@
+
+
+ Aron Petau - phenomenology
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/phenomenology/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - phenomenology
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+ Aron Petau - philosophy of emotions
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/philosophy-of-emotions/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - philosophy of emotions
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - philosophy
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/philosophy/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - philosophy
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/photogrammetry/atom.xml b/public/tags/photogrammetry/atom.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4ea7ea66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/photogrammetry/atom.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+
+
+ Aron Petau - photogrammetry
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/photogrammetry/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/photogrammetry/index.html b/public/tags/photogrammetry/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..411d1fde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/photogrammetry/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/tags/photogrammetry/page/1/index.html b/public/tags/photogrammetry/page/1/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0303c54d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/photogrammetry/page/1/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Redirect
Click here to be redirected.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/tags/photogrammetry/rss.xml b/public/tags/photogrammetry/rss.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b5568353
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/photogrammetry/rss.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - photogrammetry
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/polycam/atom.xml b/public/tags/polycam/atom.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..28fbc5e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/polycam/atom.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+
+
+ Aron Petau - polycam
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/polycam/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+ Aron Petau - polycam
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - postphenomenology
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/postphenomenology/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+ Aron Petau - postphenomenology
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - private
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/private/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
+ Aron Petau - scaniverse
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/scaniverse/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/scaniverse/index.html b/public/tags/scaniverse/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ba6185b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/scaniverse/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/tags/scaniverse/page/1/index.html b/public/tags/scaniverse/page/1/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..82ec1c19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/scaniverse/page/1/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Redirect
Click here to be redirected.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/tags/scaniverse/rss.xml b/public/tags/scaniverse/rss.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..be8dab1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/scaniverse/rss.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - scaniverse
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/sketchfab/atom.xml b/public/tags/sketchfab/atom.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f97a743a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/sketchfab/atom.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+
+
+ Aron Petau - sketchfab
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/sketchfab/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - sketchfab
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - university of osnabrück
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/university-of-osnabruck/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - university of osnabrück
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - values in science
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/values-in-science/atom.xml
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2021-03-01T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2020-07-14T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - values in science
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-philosophy-subjectivity/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Philosophy
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/philosophy-copy/
+ <h2 id="critical-considerations-during-my-studies">Critical considerations during my studies</h2>
+<p>I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
+Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
+I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
+The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.</p>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-philosophy-of-subjectivity-1-michel-foucault">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault</h2>
+<h3 id="on-butler-constituting-norms-carrying-normative-responsibilities-for-their-existence">On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>The norm integrates anything which might attempt to go beyond it—nothing, nobody, whatever difference it might display, can ever claim to be exterior, or claim to possess an otherness which would actually make it other”
+<cite><a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">(Norms, Discipline, and the Law, P.173)</a></cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>Such a view suggests that any opposition to the norm is already
+contained within the norm, and is crucial to its functioning.</p>
+<p>Here, for me, the entire futility of the approach later identified and described is condensed into a few sentences.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>Hence, regulations that seek merely to curb certain specified activities (sexual harassment, welfare fraud, sexual speech) perform another activity that, for the most part, remains unmarked: the production of the parameters of personhood, that is, making persons according to abstract norms that at once condition and exceed the lives they make—and break.
+<cite>Page 56, final sentence</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>The idea that it is impossible to legislatively regulate norms without propelling, propagating, and carving them out deeper resonates with me, but at the same time, it has left me undecided on how to proceed.
+I understand the first citation to clearly be Ewald's interpretation of things and am not sure whether Foucault's careful circumvention of the term "Norms" is related to anticipation of this argument.</p>
+<p>Further, I am not sure I share Ewald's interpretation; I see that the object "othered" by a norm is a constituent and necessary object for the norm, simply due to its "comparative" nature (p. 51, citation from Ewald).
+The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this does not translate to a normative responsibility nor a pang of guilt in my opinion. The dangerous argument that the oppressed bear responsibility for their situation is too close for my taste. I would like to emphasize a clear cut between constituting and reinforcing a norm and thriving on it.
+Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
+I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-ewald-what-then-is-a-norm">On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449</a>
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
+p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
+less as a constraint, but more as a regulatory mechanism insurance,
+Reducing objects to their relative occurrence, distributing risk. and standardization.
+The norm has three defining features:</p>
+<ul>
+<li>positivism,
+as reliant on facts, which have an aura of objectivity around them.</li>
+<li>relativity,
+they are neither absolute nor universal, they have a scope, both in definition as a certain temporal extension.</li>
+<li>polarity
+involving a classification between the normal and the abnormal, where the abnormal is to be some handicap, not attaining something that the normal does attain.</li>
+</ul>
+<p>What, then, is a norm?</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
+<cite>p. 154</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-foucault-the-effects-without-effector">On Foucault: The effects without effector</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
+<a href="http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<blockquote>
+<p>one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
+<cite>p. 203</cite></p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>In this passage, and the one following it, I think Foucault pinpoints as one of the central attributes of the apparatus (or dispositif) the arbitrariness of the order of power relations. There is no identity having to undergo some sort of inventive process to start off a collective change, a "strategy" just happens to meet the criteria for deployment.</p>
+<blockquote>
+<p>But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralising the working class is that of the bourgeoisie. One can even say that it's the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination. But what I don't think one can say is that it's the bourgeois class on the level of its ideology or its economic project which, as a sort of at once real and fictive subject, invented and forcibly imposed this strategy on the working class.</p>
+</blockquote>
+<p>This was for me the most powerful grasp of what an apparatus is. A complicated removal of the effector from the effect.
+I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Does reciprocal mean anything more than both are constitutive of each other? One produces the means of reproduction of the other, but where exactly can I apply moral judgements?
+This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
+How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Political Violence
+ Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/political-violence/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-is-political-violence-justifiable-reading-judith-butler-and-elsa-dorlin">Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin</h2>
+<h3 id="on-dorlin">On Dorlin</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false">Publication (Not yet translated to English)</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
+I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
+In so many other words, Dorlin here opens up the idea that the creation of a safe space always implies a hostile "outside" or other space.
+Further, Dorling sees as problematic that safe spaces will often experience problematic situations when trying to self-govern. The line of thought here is that safe spaces often explicitly reject the authority of traditional state bodies, since those exactly are identified as the oppressive force. This is problematic because then the community inside the safe space has to recreate social norms from scratch and qua definition of a safe space end up being much more restrictive and monitoring, tapping also into potentially extreme measurements for "enforcing" safety.
+Dorlin notes that by doing this, societal oppressive norms can end up becoming reproduced through the very instance created to shelter from it.
+I think this opens up 2 points worth discussing:
+Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governance be made possible without recreating some hierarchy or other?
+Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
+Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h2 id="weekly-hand-in-from-the-seminar-soziale-erkenntnistheorie">Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie</h2>
+<h3 id="on-fricker-epistemic-injustice">On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
+<a href="https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<ol>
+<li>Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
+Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
+Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.</p>
+<ol start="2">
+<li>Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?</p>
+<ol start="3">
+<li>Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
+Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
+Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+ Critical Epistemology
+ Tue, 14 Jul 2020 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/critical-epistemologies/
+ <h2 id="forum-entries-from-the-seminar-critical-epistemologies">Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies</h2>
+<h3 id="on-anderson-institutions">On Anderson: Institutions</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
+Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
+DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 <a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
+But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
+Well, maybe, assuming that:</p>
+<ol>
+<li>Everyone realizes their privilege,</li>
+<li>Everyone concludes that justice is the right goal,</li>
+<li>Upon deciding to adopt a virtuous stance, everyone at least moderately succeeds in practicing what they preach.</li>
+</ol>
+<p>I think, for society, the same society that came up with patriarchy in the first place, external pressure, some measure independent of the convictedness of the subjects is needed.
+Anderson made the powerful point of: “Anything that works, goes”, which took me some time to appreciate. I am always angry when I get told to keep my shower to a minimum or stop using plastic straws when I know exactly that my using less water is nothing compared to the institutionalized practice of Coca-Cola putting water into bottles. I feel like it is unjustified to ask me to save water while others triple their output, for performance.
+The same thing applies to Epistemic injustices. It strikes me how much energy it costs to keep up virtuous behavior individually and how little effect there is to show for it. I do not believe in “trickling up” where institutions will eventually adopt individual practices.
+Is Fricker thereby less right in her point? No, it adds up, as an entire population showering shorter adds up to lots of water saved.
+Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a “macro” scale. Another indicator for me is that local virtue is not the sole solution, as it can still feed and sustain a system enforcing epistemic injustice.</p>
+<p>I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-medina-the-informant-and-the-inquirer">On Medina, the informant and the inquirer</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
+<a href="https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
+Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
+Very roughly this can, I think, be compared to any good communication model, where there are a listener and a speaker, and both have to function. What was new here, or at least came out more clear is that it not only depends on the capacity of both of these roles on the subject, but it is also directly dependent on the “other”, the agent opposite of the subject. We may call this other society later but it helps me to visualize the other as an individual nonetheless. Where the analogy to communication now fails, in my opinion, is this cross-dependence, where an agent does not fully determine her capacity to act both as an inquirer and as an informant, it is co-determined by the “other”. So, if I, as an “other”, listen to someone's statements, and I fail or refuse to understand the epistemic content of the message, I am not only impairing my epistemic agency, but I also hurt the epistemic agency of the subject. Maybe obvious to most, but this thought struck me as being exactly the point of leverage for dysfunctionalities in power relations.
+Also argued convincingly in the paper was that these are distinct and independent agencies, which can be impairing an individual separately.
+Overall, the Medina text was incredibly helpful after the somewhat confusing Fricker text that felt incomplete and left a lot of questions for me. The medina text picked up all my initial doubts, that I couldn't properly formulate, and many more, while still holding to the general framework of Fricker.
+Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:</p>
+<p>"When in doubt, give the subject full epistemic credibility"</p>
+<p>Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<h3 id="on-jaggar-norms-outlaw-emotions-and-the-ideal-society">On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society</h3>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
+<a href="https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185">Publication</a></p>
+
+</blockquote>
+<p>I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
+On outlaw emotions:
+First, I hate the term, I think it’s placative and fails to frame the (actually nice) idea behind it.
+Outlaw Emotions are all those emotions incompatible with the dominant norms. That’s a huge field to cover, among feminist emotions they would also encompass emotions that are irrational or “faulty”. So, Jaggar does the term Justice by saying, some, but not all Outlaw Emotions are Feminist emotions. To make this evident, just think of a murderer's joy for killing, it is of no feminist interest to dissect, yet it is against dominant values. So, experiencing Outlaw emotions is a (probably) necessary, but not sufficient condition for feminism. The incompatible emotion serves to create discourse and change.
+Jaggar convincingly shows how emotions have a direct influence on beliefs and can validly constitute evidence, while simultaneously validly influencing values in a similar manner.
+When we talk about dominant/alternative norms, we already endorse hierarchy in society. We acknowledge its existence, simply by identifying the dominant norm. I am not quite sure what exactly Jaggar proposes we should do with the hierarchy structures in society. Explicitly I can read: Subcultures rejecting dominant norms should be formed, to create counterbalances and a somewhat fair discourse over the topic.
+“How can we determine which outlaw emotions are to be endorsed or encouraged and which rejected? In what sense can we say that some emotional responses are more appropriate than others? What reason is there for supposing that certain alternative perceptions of the world, perceptions informed by outlaw emotions, are to be preferred to perceptions informed by conventional emotions? Here I can indicate only the general direction of an answer, whose full elaboration must await another occasion. I suggest that emotions are appropriate if they are characteristic of a society in which all Human Life (and perhaps some nonhuman life, too) thrive, or if they are conducive to establishing such a society.”
+To me this passage sounds sketchy at best, there is no indication of how to successfully separate appropriate from inappropriate emotions. Roughly, I read this part as: emotions are warranted iff they increase the balance of power. (equivalent to minimizing the height of the hierarchy) I would love to get to read this “other occasion” because it seems indefensible to me to formulate a norm that states: Accept only emotions which eliminate/diminish norms.
+The idea roughly resembles Rawls's Minimax Principle, where a policy should be implemented iff the benefit for the most disadvantaged is highest.
+Another thing I found helpful is her reformulation of what norms do:
+“Dominant Norms tend to serve dominant interests”
+til here nothing new, this is a tautology for me, I understand norms as identical to dominant interests, that’s literally what norms are.
+Is an alternative, suppressed norm even thinkable? Isn't it inherent in a norm that it be the dominant one?
+But then, after that: "Whatever our color / gender / class / sexual orientation, we are likely to adopt the dominant value of racist, classist, homophobe, misogynistic white men."
+This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the “likelihood of value distribution” being skewed in your favor, making everybody’s values more likely to be similar to yours. This nicely illustrates how a system can be hierarchical and oppressive, without anybody actively, intentionally “acting oppressive”, while still perpetuating oppression. I'm
+not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
+without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.</p>
+<blockquote class="note">
+ <p class="alert-title">
+ <i class="icon"></i>Note</p>
+ <p>created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52</p>
+
+</blockquote>
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Aron Petau - virtual reality
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/virtual-reality/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/virtual-reality/index.html b/public/tags/virtual-reality/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..48598539
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/virtual-reality/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/tags/virtual-reality/page/1/index.html b/public/tags/virtual-reality/page/1/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..990bd3ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/virtual-reality/page/1/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Redirect
Click here to be redirected.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/tags/virtual-reality/rss.xml b/public/tags/virtual-reality/rss.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..67f2005f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/virtual-reality/rss.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - virtual reality
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/work/atom.xml b/public/tags/work/atom.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c52601ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/work/atom.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+
+
+ Aron Petau - work
+
+
+ Zola
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ https://aron.petau.net/tags/work/atom.xml
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+ 2018-07-05T00:00:00+00:00
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau
+
+
+
+
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/tags/work/index.html b/public/tags/work/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..55d18042
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/work/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+
Copy Codehttps://aron.petau.net/search_index.en.json$MATCHES more matches
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/tags/work/page/1/index.html b/public/tags/work/page/1/index.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8e5cf8d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/work/page/1/index.html
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Redirect
Click here to be redirected.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/public/tags/work/rss.xml b/public/tags/work/rss.xml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..670ed3e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/tags/work/rss.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+
+
+
+ Aron Petau - work
+ https://aron.petau.net/
+
+ Zola
+ en
+
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+
+ 3D Modeling and CAD
+ Thu, 05 Jul 2018 00:00:00 +0000
+ Aron Petau
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ https://aron.petau.net/blog/cad/
+ <h2 id="3d-modeling-and-cad">3D Modeling and CAD</h2>
+<h3 id="designing-3d-objects">Designing 3D Objects</h3>
+<p>While learning about 3D Printing, I was most intrigued by the possibility to modify and repair existing products. While there is an amazing community with lots of good and free models around, naturally I came to a point where I did not find what I was looking for readily designed. I realized this is an essential skill for effectively operating not just 3D Printers, but any productive machine really.</p>
+<p>Since youtube was the place I was learning all about 3D Printing, and all the people that I looked up to there were using Fusion 360 as their CAD Program that’s what I got into.
+In hindsight, that was a pretty good choice and I am in love with the abilities parametric design gives me.
+Below you will find some of my designs.
+The process is something that I enjoy a lot and wish to dive into deeper.</p>
+<p>By trial and error, I already learned a lot about designing specifically for 3D Printing, but I often feel that there are many aesthetic considerations in design that I am not familiar with.
+I want to broaden my general ability to design physical objects, which is something I hope to gain during my master’s.</p>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539feb2bfae6da3d872?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c53974bf27fea6ee1a20?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539ed795f9645d8b981?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539bc7225ced67e5e92?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c5397f64c69f2093b1b5?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://myhub.autodesk360.com/ue2cf184b/shares/public/SH9285eQTcf875d3c539e8166aea2f430aed?mode=embed" width="100%" height="600" allowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" mozallowfullscreen="true" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle made of a 3D scan, found on <https://hiddenbeauty.ch/>"src="/images/breast_candle.jpg"/>
+<p>Check out more of my finished designs in the Prusaprinters (now Printables) Community</p>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://www.printables.com/social/97957-arontaupe/models">My Printables Profile</a>
+</div>
+<img class="start pixels"alt="A candle created with a 3D printed mold made in Fusion360"src="/images/vulva_candle.jpg"/><h2 id="3d-scanning-and-photogrammetry">3D Scanning and Photogrammetry</h2>
+<p>Besides coming up with new objects, incorporating the real world is also an interest of mine.</p>
+<h3 id="interaction-with-real-objects-and-environments">Interaction with real objects and environments</h3>
+<p>In the last few years I have played around with a few smartphone cameras and was always quite sad, that my scans were never quite accurate enough to do cool stuff with them. I could not really afford real 3D scanner and had already started cobbling together a raspberry Pi camera with a cheap TOF sensor, which is a simple, but not quite as good replacement for a laser or a lidar sensor, but then Apple came out with the first phones with accessible Lidar sensor.
+Recently, through work at the university I got access to a device with a lidar sensor and started having fun with it.
+See some examples here:</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="DigiLab Main Room" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/c880892c6b4746bc80717be1f81bf169/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="VR Room DigiLab" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/144b63002d004fb8ab478316e573da2e/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<p>This last one was scanned with just my smartphone camera. You can see that the quality is notably worse, but considering is was created with just a single, run-of-the-mill smartphone sensor, I think it is still pretty impressive and will certainly do something towards democratizing such technologies and abilities.</p>
+<div class="sketchfab-embed-wrapper"> <iframe title="Digitallabor UOS" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen mozallowfullscreen="true" webkitallowfullscreen="true" allow="autoplay; fullscreen; xr-spatial-tracking" xr-spatial-tracking execution-while-out-of-viewport execution-while-not-rendered web-share width="800" height="600" src="https://sketchfab.com/models/2f5cff5b08d243f2b2ceb94d788b9cd6/embed?ui_theme=dark&dnt=1"> </iframe> </div>
+<h2 id="perspective">Perspective</h2>
+<p>What this section is supposed to deliver is the message that I am currently not where I want to be navigating the vast possibilities of CAD. I feel confident enough to approach small repairs around the flat with a new perspective, but I still lack technical expertise when approaching a collection composite parts, having to function together. I still have lots of projects halfdone or half-thought and one major reason is that there is no real critical exchange within my field of study.</p>
+<p>I want more than designing figurines or wearables.
+I want to incorporate 3D printing as a method to extend the abilities of other tools, have mechanical and electrical purposes, be foodsafe and engaging.
+I fell in love with the idea of designing a toy system, inspired by <a href="https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/makeway/makeway-create-intricate-courses-watch-your-marbles-soar">Makeways on Kickstarter</a>, I have already started adding my own parts to their set.</p>
+<p>I dream of my very own 3D printed coffeecup, one that is both foodsafe and dishwasher-surviving. For that, I would have to do quite a bit of material research, but that just makes the idea so much more appealing.
+I would love finding a material composition incorporating waste to stop relying on plastics, or at least on fossile plastics.
+Once in Berlin, I would want to talk to the people at <a href="https://www.kaffeeform.com/en/">Kaffeform</a> producing largely compostable Coffee Cups incorporating a significant amount of old ground espresso, albeit using injection molding for their process.
+The industry selling composite filaments is much more conservative with the percentage of non-plastic additives, because with a nozzle extrusion process there is much more to go wrong.
+Still, I would love to explore that avenue further and think there is a lot to be gained from looking at pellet printers.</p>
+<p>I also credit huge parts of my exploration process into local recycling to the awesome people at <a href="https://preciousplastic.com">Precious Plastic</a>, who I will join over the summer to learn more about their system.</p>
+<p>I find it hard to write anything about CAD without connecting it directly to a manufacturing process.
+And I believe that's a good thing. Always tying a design process to its realization, grounds the process and attaches to it some immediacy.</p>
+<p>For me to become more confident in this process, I am still missing more expertise in organic shapes, so I would be happy to dig more into Blender, an awesome tool that in my mind is far too powerful to dive into it with just youtube lessons.</p>
+<h2 id="software-that-i-have-used-and-like">Software that I have used and like</h2>
+<div class="buttons">
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://alicevision.org/#meshroom">AliceVision Meshroom</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://scaniverse.com/">Scaniverse</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://sketchfab.com/arontaupe">My Sketchfab Profile</a>
+ <a class="colored external" href="https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.lvonasek.arcore3dscanner&hl=en&gl=US">3D Live Scanner for Android</a>
+</div>
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/public/theme-switcher.js b/public/theme-switcher.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5632d6f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/theme-switcher.js
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+// Theme Initialization
+(function () {
+ // Get the default theme from the HTML data-theme attribute.
+ const defaultTheme = document.documentElement.getAttribute("data-theme");
+
+ // Set the data-default-theme attribute only if defaultTheme is not null.
+ if (defaultTheme) {
+ document.documentElement.setAttribute("data-default-theme", defaultTheme);
+ }
+
+ // Attempt to retrieve the current theme from the browser's local storage.
+ const storedTheme = localStorage.getItem("theme");
+
+ if (storedTheme && storedTheme !== "system") {
+ document.documentElement.setAttribute("data-theme", storedTheme);
+ } else if (defaultTheme && storedTheme !== "system") {
+ document.documentElement.setAttribute("data-theme", defaultTheme);
+ } else {
+ // If no theme is found in local storage and no default theme is set, hand over control to the CSS.
+ document.documentElement.removeAttribute("data-theme");
+ }
+
+ // Expose defaultTheme to the outer scope.
+ window.defaultTheme = defaultTheme;
+})();
+
+// Icon Update and Theme Switching
+function setTheme(theme, saveToLocalStorage = false) {
+ if (theme === "system") {
+ document.documentElement.removeAttribute("data-theme");
+ } else {
+ document.documentElement.setAttribute("data-theme", theme);
+ }
+
+ if (saveToLocalStorage) {
+ localStorage.setItem("theme", theme);
+ } else {
+ localStorage.removeItem("theme");
+ }
+
+ // Update icon class based on the selected theme.
+ updateIconClass(theme);
+
+ // Update the active button based on the selected theme.
+ updateActiveButton(theme);
+}
+
+function resetTheme() {
+ // Reset the theme to the default or system preference if no default is set.
+ setTheme(window.defaultTheme || "system");
+}
+
+function switchTheme(theme) {
+ if (theme === "system") {
+ resetTheme();
+ } else {
+ setTheme(theme, true);
+ }
+}
+
+function updateIconClass(theme) {
+ const iconElement = document.querySelector("#theme-switcher summary .icon");
+
+ // Remove any existing theme classes
+ iconElement.classList.remove("light", "dark");
+
+ // Add the appropriate class based on the selected theme
+ if (theme === "light") {
+ iconElement.classList.add("light");
+ } else if (theme === "dark") {
+ iconElement.classList.add("dark");
+ }
+}
+
+function updateActiveButton(theme) {
+ // Remove .active class from all buttons
+ document.querySelectorAll('#theme-switcher button').forEach(button => {
+ button.classList.remove('active');
+ });
+
+ // Add .active class to the button corresponding to the current theme
+ const activeButton = document.querySelector(`#theme-${theme}`);
+ if (activeButton) {
+ activeButton.classList.add('active');
+ }
+}
+
+document.getElementById("theme-light").addEventListener("click", function () {
+ switchTheme("light");
+});
+document.getElementById("theme-dark").addEventListener("click", function () {
+ switchTheme("dark");
+});
+document.getElementById("theme-system").addEventListener("click", function () {
+ switchTheme("system");
+});
+
+// Update icon class on page load based on current theme
+const currentTheme = localStorage.getItem("theme") || window.defaultTheme || "system";
+updateIconClass(currentTheme);
+updateActiveButton(currentTheme);
+
+// Make the switchTheme function accessible globally
+window.switchTheme = switchTheme;
diff --git a/static/css/mermaid.css b/static/css/mermaid.css
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..5c50d163
--- /dev/null
+++ b/static/css/mermaid.css
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+.mermaid {
+ text-align: center;
+ margin-top: 1.5em;
+ margin-bottom: 1.5em;
+ padding: 1em;
+ border-radius: 0.5em;
+ background-color: var(--code-bg);
+ font-family: var(--code-font, monospace);
+ font-size: 0.9rem;
+ overflow-x: auto;
+ max-width: 100%;
+ box-shadow: 0 2px 10px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.08);
+}
+
+.mermaid strong {
+ font-weight: bold;
+}
+
+.mermaid svg {
+ max-width: 100%;
+ height: auto;
+}
+
+@media (prefers-color-scheme: dark) {
+ .mermaid {
+ background-color: var(--code-bg-dark, #2d2d2d);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/static/css/timeline.css b/static/css/timeline.css
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..67f5dea1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/static/css/timeline.css
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/* Basic Layout */
+#timeline-content {
+ position: relative;
+ margin: 2rem 0;
+ padding-left: 120px;
+}
+
+#timeline-content ul.timeline {
+ list-style: none;
+ padding: 0;
+ margin: 0;
+ position: relative;
+}
+
+#timeline-content ul.timeline::before {
+ content: '';
+ position: absolute;
+ left: -30px;
+ top: 0;
+ bottom: 0;
+ width: 2px;
+ background: var(--accent-color);
+}
+
+/* Event List Item */
+#timeline-content li.event {
+ position: relative;
+ margin-bottom: 3rem;
+}
+
+/* Event Circle */
+#timeline-content li.event::before {
+ content: '';
+ position: absolute;
+ left: -39px;
+ top: 5px;
+ width: 16px;
+ height: 16px;
+ border-radius: 50%;
+ background: var(--accent-color);
+ border: 2px solid white;
+ z-index: 1;
+}
+
+/* From + To Label — styled exactly like old date label */
+#timeline-content li.event::after {
+ content: attr(data-from) "\A" attr(data-to);
+ white-space: pre; /* ensures newline works */
+ position: absolute;
+ left: -160px;
+ width: 100px;
+ text-align: right;
+ color: #ffffff;
+ font-weight: bold;
+ font-size: 0.9rem;
+ line-height: 1.3;
+ top: 0;
+}
+
+/* Event Heading */
+#timeline-content li.event h3 {
+ margin: 0 0 0.5rem 0;
+ display: inline-block;
+}
+
+/* Event Description */
+#timeline-content li.event p {
+ margin: 0;
+}
+
+/* Timeline Icon */
+#timeline-content .timeline-icon {
+ margin-right: 0.5rem;
+ color: var(--accent-color);
+ font-size: 1.2rem;
+ vertical-align: middle;
+}
+
+/* Hover Effects */
+#timeline-content li.event:hover::before {
+ background: var(--accent-color-dark);
+}
+
+#timeline-content li.event:hover {
+ background-color: var(--accent-color-alpha);
+}
+
+/* From + To Label Hover Effect */
+#timeline-content li.event:hover::after {
+ color: var(--fg-color);
+}
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diff --git a/static/images/iron_smelting_graph.png b/static/images/iron_smelting_graph.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..de2d4bd8
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/iron_smelting_graph.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/isd_drone.jpg b/static/images/isd_drone.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..44593e66
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/isd_drone.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/joel_tenenberg.jpeg b/static/images/joel_tenenberg.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..766cf887
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/joel_tenenberg.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/käsewerkstatt/cheese.jpeg b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/cheese.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4d6ebe4c
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/cheese.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/käsewerkstatt/combo_serve.jpeg b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/combo_serve.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e9b265d9
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/combo_serve.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/käsewerkstatt/logo.jpeg b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/logo.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3f92cdfc
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/logo.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/käsewerkstatt/product.jpeg b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/product.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..533b6657
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/product.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/käsewerkstatt/trailer.jpeg b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/trailer.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8d10fef4
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/trailer.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/käsewerkstatt/welcome.jpeg b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/welcome.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a6a13939
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/käsewerkstatt/welcome.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/lamp.jpg b/static/images/lamp.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b4bd3799
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lamp.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/lampshades/gh_lampshade_flow.png b/static/images/lampshades/gh_lampshade_flow.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..addc8f9d
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lampshades/gh_lampshade_flow.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/lampshades/grasshopper_lampshade_flow.png b/static/images/lampshades/grasshopper_lampshade_flow.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..76fe7ab1
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lampshades/grasshopper_lampshade_flow.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/lampshades/lampshade1.heic b/static/images/lampshades/lampshade1.heic
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2be0bb28
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lampshades/lampshade1.heic differ
diff --git a/static/images/lampshades/lampshade2.jpeg b/static/images/lampshades/lampshade2.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6300108d
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lampshades/lampshade2.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/lampshades/lampshade3.heic b/static/images/lampshades/lampshade3.heic
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..388e8f14
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lampshades/lampshade3.heic differ
diff --git a/static/images/lampshades/lampshade4.heic b/static/images/lampshades/lampshade4.heic
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a6141dcc
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lampshades/lampshade4.heic differ
diff --git a/static/images/lampshades/lampshade5.jpeg b/static/images/lampshades/lampshade5.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c1511882
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lampshades/lampshade5.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/lampshades/result_rhino.png b/static/images/lampshades/result_rhino.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..88841d50
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lampshades/result_rhino.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/leaves.jpg b/static/images/leaves.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..967e15ea
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/leaves.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/lithophane.jpg b/static/images/lithophane.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..644c253c
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lithophane.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/local-diffusion/local-diffusion.png b/static/images/local-diffusion/local-diffusion.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..4df58c40
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/local-diffusion/local-diffusion.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/logo.png b/static/images/logo.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c98a4ad6
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/logo.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/lusatia/lusatia_excavator.jpg b/static/images/lusatia/lusatia_excavator.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..84ff2947
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/lusatia/lusatia_excavator.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/masterthesis/puzzle.jpeg b/static/images/masterthesis/puzzle.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2daec699
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/masterthesis/puzzle.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/open_studio_banner.mp4 b/static/images/open_studio_banner.mp4
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..afabf583
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/open_studio_banner.mp4 differ
diff --git a/static/images/pinecil.jpg b/static/images/pinecil.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b6e948be
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/pinecil.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/prusa.jpg b/static/images/prusa.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b1a1eb3e
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/prusa.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/prusa_enclosure.jpg b/static/images/prusa_enclosure.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..00769c80
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/prusa_enclosure.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/radio/gqrx.png b/static/images/radio/gqrx.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e760929d
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/radio/gqrx.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/recycling_graphic.jpg b/static/images/recycling_graphic.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0df56aa1
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/recycling_graphic.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/recycling_graphic.png b/static/images/recycling_graphic.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9cd1b0f0
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/recycling_graphic.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/recycling_graphic.svg b/static/images/recycling_graphic.svg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..25e8fc42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/static/images/recycling_graphic.svg
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/static/images/recycling_variables.png b/static/images/recycling_variables.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9a3ba651
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/recycling_variables.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/render_bike_holder.png b/static/images/render_bike_holder.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b7c61ae5
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/render_bike_holder.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/rt_choice_corr_by_condition.png b/static/images/rt_choice_corr_by_condition.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..95826da6
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/rt_choice_corr_by_condition.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/ruminations/ruminations1.jpeg b/static/images/ruminations/ruminations1.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3c531d7f
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/ruminations/ruminations1.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/ruminations/ruminations2.jpeg b/static/images/ruminations/ruminations2.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..050a8186
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/ruminations/ruminations2.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/ruminations/ruminations3.jpeg b/static/images/ruminations/ruminations3.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..16cac4da
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/ruminations/ruminations3.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/sam_sim.png b/static/images/sam_sim.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..20d05713
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/sam_sim.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/sam_sim_opt.png b/static/images/sam_sim_opt.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d8112ef7
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/sam_sim_opt.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/sample_cos_sim.png b/static/images/sample_cos_sim.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..929ecce5
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/sample_cos_sim.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/sample_hr.png b/static/images/sample_hr.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..77144afa
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/sample_hr.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/sample_loss.png b/static/images/sample_loss.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bef253c1
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/sample_loss.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/sample_lr.png b/static/images/sample_lr.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2c5b8e7d
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/sample_lr.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/sample_sr.png b/static/images/sample_sr.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0e44e864
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/sample_sr.png differ
diff --git a/static/images/sferics/20240614_drachenberg_Juyeong_04.jpg b/static/images/sferics/20240614_drachenberg_Juyeong_04.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..35f93ea2
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/sferics/20240614_drachenberg_Juyeong_04.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/sferics/20240614_drachenberg_ZouZou_04.jpg b/static/images/sferics/20240614_drachenberg_ZouZou_04.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..09bcdb47
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/sferics/20240614_drachenberg_ZouZou_04.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/sferics/20240614_drachenberg_aWe+juyeong_7110.jpg b/static/images/sferics/20240614_drachenberg_aWe+juyeong_7110.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b4c26af8
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/sferics/20240614_drachenberg_aWe+juyeong_7110.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/shredder.jpg b/static/images/shredder.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..73c846d4
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/shredder.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/shredderbox.jpg b/static/images/shredderbox.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..91716e8d
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/shredderbox.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/shredderbox_sieve.jpg b/static/images/shredderbox_sieve.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e3a3f21e
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/shredderbox_sieve.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-1.jpg b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-1.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bad339cf
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-1.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-2.jpg b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-2.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..570d8e88
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-2.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-3.jpg b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-3.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a2e23588
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-3.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-4.jpg b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-4.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..3f1f0754
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-4.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-5.jpg b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-5.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..6eb986b5
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-5.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-6.jpg b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-6.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..35e36061
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-6.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-7.jpg b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-7.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d21a4dfe
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/suv/Dreams_of_Cars-7.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/suv/suv_door-1.jpg b/static/images/suv/suv_door-1.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..180ade11
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/suv/suv_door-1.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/suv_door-1.jpg b/static/images/suv_door-1.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..180ade11
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/suv_door-1.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/tanzania_giraffe_landscape.jpg b/static/images/tanzania_giraffe_landscape.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..57046c5e
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/tanzania_giraffe_landscape.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/tashi_gang.jpg b/static/images/tashi_gang.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1ee9150c
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/tashi_gang.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/ulli.jpeg b/static/images/ulli.jpeg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..03c7ad13
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/ulli.jpeg differ
diff --git a/static/images/ulli.jpg b/static/images/ulli.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..03c7ad13
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/ulli.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/vulva_candle.jpg b/static/images/vulva_candle.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e7170fda
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/vulva_candle.jpg differ
diff --git a/static/images/water_grass.jpg b/static/images/water_grass.jpg
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ea7a6e50
Binary files /dev/null and b/static/images/water_grass.jpg differ
diff --git a/templates/partials/head.html b/templates/partials/head.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..db73a899
--- /dev/null
+++ b/templates/partials/head.html
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ {%- if config.extra.accent_color_dark %}
+
+ {%- endif %}
+ {%- if config.extra.csp %}
+ {%- include "partials/csp.html" %}
+ {%- endif %}
+ {% include "partials/title.html" %}
+
+
+ {%- if config.extra.comments %}
+
+
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- include "partials/favicon.html" %}
+
+
+
+ {%- if config.generate_feeds and config.feed_filenames %}
+ {% for feed in config.feed_filenames %}
+ {% if feed == "atom.xml" %}
+
+ {% elif feed == "rss.xml" %}
+
+ {% else %}
+
+ {% endif %}
+ {% endfor %}
+ {% endif %}
+
+ {%- include "partials/variables.html" %}
+
+ {%- set styles = [ "style.css" ] %}
+
+ {%- if config.extra.bundled_fonts %}
+ {%- set styles = styles | concat(with=["fonts.css"]) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if page.extra.katex or section.extra.katex or config.extra.katex %}
+ {%- set styles = styles | concat(with=["katex.css"]) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if config.extra.styles %}
+ {%- set styles = styles | concat(with=config.extra.styles) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if page.extra.styles %}
+ {%- set styles = styles | concat(with=page.extra.styles) %}
+ {%- elif section.extra.styles %}
+ {%- set styles = styles | concat(with=section.extra.styles) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if not config.extra.debug.no_styles %}
+ {%- for style in styles %}
+
+ {%- endfor %}
+
+ {%- if config.markdown.highlight_code and config.markdown.highlight_theme == "css" %}
+ {%- if config.markdown.highlight_themes_css | length > 0 %}
+
+
+ {%- else %}
+
+ {%- endif %}
+ {%- endif %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- set scripts = ["closable.js"] %}
+
+ {%- if config.extra.show_copy_button %}
+ {%- set scripts = scripts | concat(with=["copy-button.js"]) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if config.extra.goatcounter %}
+ {%- set scripts = scripts | concat(with=["count.js"]) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if page.extra.katex or section.extra.katex or config.extra.katex %}
+ {%- set scripts = scripts | concat(with=["katex.min.js", "auto-render.min.js", "katex-init.js"]) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if config.build_search_index %}
+ {%- if config.search.index_format == "elasticlunr_json" -%}
+ {%- set scripts = scripts | concat(with=["elasticlunr.min.js", "search-elasticlunr.js"]) %}
+ {%- elif config.search.index_format == "fuse_json" -%}
+ {%- set scripts = scripts | concat(with=["fuse.js", "search-fuse.js"]) %}
+ {%- endif -%}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if config.extra.nav.show_theme_switcher %}
+ {%- set scripts = scripts | concat(with=["theme-switcher.js"]) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if page.extra.comments.id %}
+ {%- set scripts = scripts | concat(with=["comments.js"]) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if config.extra.scripts %}
+ {%- set scripts = scripts | concat(with=config.extra.scripts) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if page.extra.scripts %}
+ {%- set scripts = scripts | concat(with=page.extra.scripts) %}
+ {%- elif section.extra.scripts %}
+ {%- set scripts = scripts | concat(with=section.extra.scripts) %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+ {%- if scripts | length > 0 %}
+ {%- for script in scripts %}
+
+ {%- endfor %}
+ {%- endif %}
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ {%- if config.extra.card is not defined or config.extra.card != false -%}
+
+ {%- endif -%}
+
+
diff --git a/templates/shortcodes/gallery.html b/templates/shortcodes/gallery.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d31f8a42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/templates/shortcodes/gallery.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+
+{% for asset in page.assets -%}
+ {%- if asset is matching("[.](jpg|png)$") -%}
+ {% set image = resize_image(path=asset, width=240, height=180) %}
+
+
+
+ {%- endif %}
+{%- endfor %}
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/templates/shortcodes/mermaid.html b/templates/shortcodes/mermaid.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0d4964a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/templates/shortcodes/mermaid.html
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+
+{{ body | safe }}
+
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/templates/shortcodes/timeline.html b/templates/shortcodes/timeline.html
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2015b056
--- /dev/null
+++ b/templates/shortcodes/timeline.html
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+{% set dt = load_data(literal = body, format="json") %}
+
