more translation, add unity for defences
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@ -5,32 +5,65 @@ authors = ["Aron Petau"]
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description = "A selection of my weekly commentaries from philosophical seminars at the University of Osnabrück"
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[taxonomies]
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tags = ["alison jaggar", "elizabeth anderson", "elsa dorlin", "epistemology", "ethics", "feminism", "francois ewald", "judith butler", "josé medina", "michael foucault", "miranda fricker", "normativity", "phenomenology", "philosophy", "philosophy of emotions", "postphenomenology", "private", "university of osnabrück", "values in science"]
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tags = [
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"philosophy",
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"epistemology",
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"ethics",
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"feminism",
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"normativity",
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"phenomenology",
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"philosophy of emotions",
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"postphenomenology",
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"private",
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"university of osnabrück",
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"values in science",
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]
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[extra]
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show_copyright = true
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show_shares = true
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+++
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## Critical considerations during my studies
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I have attended a fair share of philosophical seminars in my studies and consider it a core topic connected both to science and to digital environments.
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Normative and feminist social theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, are all brought to me through seminar formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
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I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and dull term papers.
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The courses I loved most also often had a format with a weekly hand-in, where students are asked to comment on the paper they just read to identify points to carry into next week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex philosophical works, often complete books with supplicant essays surrounding the course topic. In my opinion, nearly all of the value created during these seminars is contained within the live discussions fed by reading materials and little opinion pieces in the form of forum comments. That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions. Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just skip through and read what catches your interest.
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> [!NOTE]
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> **Language Note:** This page contains only the English commentary texts. All philosophical posts are left untranslated. The
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> [German version](/de/project/philosophy/) contains different German-language texts from another
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> seminar.
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## Critical Considerations During My Studies
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## Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies
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I attended a fair share of philosophical seminars during my studies and consider philosophy a
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core topic connected both to science and to digital environments. Normative and feminist social
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theory, as well as the theory of science and phenomenology, all came to me through seminar
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formats at university and made up a good part of my education there.
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I find it hard to properly demonstrate what interests me without presenting often long-winded and
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dull term papers. The courses I loved most often had a format with weekly hand-ins, where
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students were asked to comment on the papers they just read to identify points to carry into next
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week's discussion. I am incredibly thankful for this methodology of approaching complex
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philosophical works—often complete books with supplementary essays surrounding the course topic.
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In my opinion, nearly all the value created during these seminars is contained within the live
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discussions fed by reading materials and short opinion pieces in the form of forum comments.
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That's why I decided to share here a selection of these weekly commentaries and the sources they
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are based upon. They are often unrefined and informal, but they indicate the centerpiece of the
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seminars and demonstrate many thought processes that happened within me during these sessions.
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Although I took only a small selection, in sum they are a substantial read. Feel free to just
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skip through and read what catches your interest.
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## Forum Entries from the Seminar: Critical Epistemologies
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### On Anderson: Institutions
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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Source Text: Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
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Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173,
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DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211 [Publication](https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211)
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{% end %}
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> [!NOTE]
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> **Source Text:** Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions
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> Elizabeth Anderson (2012) Epistemic Justice as a Virtue of Social Institutions, Social
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> Epistemology, 26:2, 163-173, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652211
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> [Publication](https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211)
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The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Frickers Account. On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering. That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach. I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
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But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice? I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit. I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
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The text by Anderson helped shed light on a few issues I stumbled over with Fricker's account.
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On top of the various issues I and seemingly others have with her virtue-based approach, I think a utilitarian angle is worth considering.
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That would be: okay, I accept that people can help fight injustice by realising their privilege, showing restraint, silencing themselves, and adopting the benevolent listening approach.
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I think that is a practical, virtuous, and realistic endeavour.
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But is it the effective path to alleviating structural injustice?
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I think not, and initially, that is a major reason I discarded Fricker’s approach, although I saw merit.
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I have similar concerns to Anderson in the scalability of virtues. Virtuous behavior might help my personal well-being, it gives me normative elevation and might even further the quality of relationships I have. But is it applicable to society, is it enough to counteract structural injustice?
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Well, maybe, assuming that:
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1. Everyone realizes their privilege,
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@ -45,16 +78,14 @@ Anderson also points out how locally innocent biases can create injustice on a
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I still have doubts about what to do now with my ideas, on how the world looks that I want. I lack the imagination of seeing a world that is epistemically just, and it is hard to strive for something one cannot even imagine. The system is inherently leaning toward inequality, if I try to balance something on a needle, it will only go well so long, before small imbalances create chain reactions and the object should be called unstable. Should we even succeed in “resetting” society, creating equal participation for each subject, how will it remain just? Is Justice always a conjunct of Equality? Are there ways to achieve real Justice without needing equality?
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 14. July 2020, 17:45
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{% end %}
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### On Medina, the informant and the inquirer
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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Source Text: Dr. José Medina (2012) Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities, Social Epistemology, 26:2, 201-220, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2011.652214
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[Publication](https://www.ias.edu/sites/default/files/sss/pdfs/Crisis-and-Critique-2018-19/medina_imposed_silences.pdf)
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{% end %}
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My biggest takeaway here was that, as I tried to hint at in an earlier comment,
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Whenever we talk about justice, this necessarily refers to a relational concept, where everybody has a double role to ensure successful communication. Medina calls these the inquirer and the informant. So, every individual has to make sure to act to her capacity as an epistemologically sound knowledge-acquiring agent (the inquirer). This would involve knowing when and how to falsify/qualify statements, making inferences about the theory of mind, and generally comparing different statements. The other role is the informant, where the individual should have the capacity to function as an object in an inquiry by another.
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@ -67,16 +98,14 @@ Although I was not convinced by the Fricker Text, I tend to think the strategy:
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Is a good strategy that might alleviate a lot of issues regarding functions of power, and hierarchy, but also further, it might be a good counter for things as our confirmation bias, expectation bias and many individual errors that we could minimize by constantly exposing ourselves to falsifiability through others (voluntarily). Sounds like science applied to agency to me.
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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created by Aron Petau on Thursday 09. July 2020, 11:25
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{% end %}
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### On Jaggar: Norms, Outlaw Emotions, and the Ideal Society
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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Source Text: Alison M. Jaggar (1989) Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology, Inquiry, 32:2, 151-176, DOI: 10.1080/00201748908602185
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[Publication](https://doi.org/10.1080/00201748908602185)
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{% end %}
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I found Jaggar to be a very wholesome read, it was the perfect amount of grounded argumentative structure and felt very connected as a whole. This was, together with the ideas from Lugones the best and most fruitful paper for me.
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On outlaw emotions:
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@ -96,18 +125,16 @@ This was rather helpful to me, as it reframes the “act” of oppression as the
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not saying everybody is acting unintentionally oppressive, but it is always hard to imagine for me to picture "White Men" forming a group and collectively deciding on who to hate this coming season, Conceptually separating "being oppressed" and "oppressing" into phenomena
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without necessary inherent causal relation makes sense to me here.
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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created by Aron Petau on Tuesday 23. June 2020, 18:52
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{% end %}
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## Forum entries from the Seminar: Critical Philosophy of Subjectivity 1: Michel Foucault
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### On Butler: Constituting norms =/= carrying normative responsibilities for their existence
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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Source Text: Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender (1st ed.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627>
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[Publication](https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203499627)
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{% end %}
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Citation from Butler, Page 51, citing Ewald, which is, in turn, interpreting Foucault:
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@ -130,16 +157,14 @@ The oppressed may well be as constituting of norms as the privileged, but this d
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Yes, maybe that is a good location to make the cut: The normative and ethical pressure, or better, the guilt of complicity lies with the ones thriving BECAUSE of a norm and clearly not with those thriving DESPITE OF a norm.
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I would think that Butler makes a similar argument elsewhere, but as such, I was missing it here, resulting in a very bleak and hopeless situation where any struggle to change the status quo through legislation is doomed and inevitably propagates and reinvents stable unfair relations of power.
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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created by Aron Petau on Sunday 23. January 2022, 14:23
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{% end %}
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### On Ewald: What, then, is a norm?
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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Source Text: François Ewald; Norms, Discipline, and the Law. Representations 1 April 1990; 30 138–161. doi: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449>
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[Publication](https://doi.org/10.2307/2928449)
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{% end %}
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Some tiny details about norms that stuck out to me about the norm were that: 1: they are fictional and thus, an object conforming to a norm is not more meaningful than an object not conforming to a norm. 2: the entire given set comprises the norm, the deviations play a defining role in the formation of the norm itself (or an average).
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p. 152: Under norm, 3 phenomena are subsumed: Discipline,
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@ -159,16 +184,14 @@ What, then, is a norm?
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> It is a way for a group to provide itself with a common denominator in accordance with a rigorous principle of self-referentiality, with no recourse to any kind of external reference point, either in the form of an idea or an object. The normative process can obey a variety of different logics: the panoptical logic of discipline, the probabilistic schema of insurance, or the communicative logic of the technical norm. These three logics have the same form: in each case, the rule which serves as a norm, by virtue of which everyone can measure, evaluate, and identify himself or herself, will be derived from those for whom it will serve as a standard. A strange logic, this, which forces the group to turn back in upon itself and which, from the moment it establishes itself, will let no one escape its purview.
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> <cite>p. 154</cite>
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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created by Aron Petau on Sunday 16. January 2022, 18:48
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{% end %}
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### On Foucault: The effects without effector
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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Source Text: Michael Foucault. Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977. Pantheon, New York, 1980.
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[Publication](http://freudians.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Roundtable-Confession-of-the-Flesh.pdf)
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{% end %}
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> one finds all sorts of support mechanisms [...] which invent, modify and re-adjust, according to the circumstances of the moment and the place- so that you get a coherent, rational strategy, but one for which it is no longer possible to identify a person who conceived it.
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> <cite>p. 203</cite>
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@ -182,18 +205,16 @@ I struggle to continue to find any substance to the relations of the classes. Do
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This whole ordeal and now I lack subjects to blame.
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How can this theory possibly bring about change in society? Is that even its goal? Do we undergo this analysis in order to make society better in the end?
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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created by Aron Petau on Sunday 12. December 2021, 22:01
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{% end %}
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## Forum entries from the Seminar: Is political violence justifiable? Reading Judith Butler and Elsa Dorlin
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### On Dorlin
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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Source Text: Dorlin, Elsa. Se défendre: une philosophie de la violence. Zones, 2017.
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[Publication (Not yet translated to English)](https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=MD05DwAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PT7&dq=dorlin+se+defendre+book&ots=gVZ7VSU867&sig=tMn1dRVSJDkUMBmmtMJOgT8JhcQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=dorlin%20se%20defendre%20book&f=false)
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{% end %}
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From the seventh chapter in Dorlins "Self-Defense", I found the idea that safe spaces are actually prone to be counterproductive very strong.
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I think the discussion around whether safe spaces are an effective tool that is appropriate on top is a rather current and ongoing one.
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@ -205,35 +226,5 @@ Are there limits to the self-governance of leftist groups? How can self-governan
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Does this ignore that safe spaces can sometimes be essential for survival? According to Dorlin, the alternative seems to be to instead of building sheltered, isolated safe spaces, the fight has to occur in the public, transforming the entire space without the necessity for exclusive logic. How can we argue this? Could there be an oppressed position from whence any aggressive stance towards the public forbids itself? (I think there is!) For me this seems like putting the entire burden of transformational potential on the oppressed individual, enabling a position like: "Well, the person did not object or introduce change, so the person implied consent."
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Will a public fight cause more harm being fought than it will save after introducing change? And who are we to calculate this beforehand?
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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> [!NOTE]
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created by Aron Petau on Sunday 05. December 2021, 15:52
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{% end %}
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## Weekly hand in from the Seminar: Soziale Erkenntnistheorie
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### On Fricker: Epistemic Injustice
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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Source Text: Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, 2007.
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[Publication](https://books.google.de/books?hl=de&lr=&id=lncSDAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=fricker+epistemic+injustice+2007&ots=3fJ9TIK4T2&sig=JGCMR2YYUhjRc62DPEnf2yWDnjU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=fricker%20epistemic%20injustice%202007&f=false)
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{% end %}
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1. Worin unterscheiden sich inferentialistische von nicht-inferentialistischen Theorien der testimonialen Erkenntnis (d.h. des Wissens durch das Zeugniss andere)?
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Inferentialistische Theorien gehen davon aus, dass die eigentliche Inferenz, also die Generierung eines neuen Epistems im Subjekt stattfindet. Konkret heisst dass, dass Ich die Aussage P einer dritten Person erst in irgendeiner Weise vor mir selbst rechtfertigen muss, bevor ich sie selbst verwenden kann. Ist die Aussage nun 2 + 2 = 4, muss ich also mit allen mir zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln selbst überprüfen, ob diese Aussage Wahrheits- und Kohärenzkriterien erfüllt. Ich muss also beispielsweise über darunterliegende Axiome, die mir bekannt sind, die Aussage extern (ausserhalb von Person X hat das gesagt, also kann Ich das glauben) überprüfen. Im simplen Beispiel also konkret das Ergebnis berechnen. Wenn man so will, liegt also immer die “Beweislast” für meine eigenen Episteme bei mir und ich kann diesen Beweisaufwand nur begrenzt auslagern. Eine sehr direkte Folge davon wäre, dass jeglicher Erkenntnisgewinn mit erheblicher, bewusster oder unbewusster Arbeit verbunden ist.
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Dies wäre die wahrscheinlich logisch stringentere Theorie, gegen sie spricht aber die Phänomenologie eines Erkenntisgewinns. Eine Erkenntnis kommt uns oft vor wie ein “Heureka” Moment, wir “finden” sie, plötzlich ist sie da und wir können mit ihr arbeiten.
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Eine nicht-inferentialistische Theorie legt ebendiese Beweislast nicht im Subjekt an, ich habe eine Erlaubnis, oder besser, ein Recht auf a-priori Annahme der Richtigkeit der Aussage. “Person X hat mir P gesagt, also kann ich P verwenden” ist nun valide und bedarf erstmal keiner weiteren Überprüfung auf Richtigkeit. Diese Argumentationslinie ist deutlich kompatibler mit der phänomenologischen Erfahrung einer Erkenntnis vim Alltag. Wir stoßen aber auf deutlich größere Probleme, wenn wir uns fragen, woher eigentlich unser Recht auf Wahrheitsannahme von Drittaussagen kommt. Klar, 2+2=4, weil der Prof das an die Tafel geschrieben hat, ist die “schlechtere” Begründung als zu sagen, dass das Ergebnis aus gewissen mathematischen Axiomen deduziert wurde.
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2. Formulieren Sie jeweils einen Einwand gegen beide Theorien.
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Wir befinden uns also nun in der Spannung der phänomenalistischen “Heureka” Erfahrung des Findens von Epistemen (in nicht-inferentiellen Systemen) und dem Problem der schwachen Justifizierung von Aussagen gegenüber der erhöhten Stringenz eines epistemischen Systems, dass externe (logische, probabilistische, normative etc.) Gründe für Aussagen zur Verfügung stellt, aber einen schier unüberwindbaren rechnerischen Aufwand darstellt. Auch das Problem der ersten Begründung bleibt bestehen. Angenommen, ich weiß noch nichts, habe bisher null Episteme gesammelt, wie wird das erste Epistem, das ich finde, begründbar sein?
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3. Worin besteht doxastische Verantwortung (doxastic responsibility) nach F und Ihrer eigenen Meinung nach.
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Doxastische Verantwortung ist die Verantwortung für die Begründbarkeit des eigenen Nezwerkes aus Epistemen. Wenn mich also jemand fragt: Warum glaubst du das?, ist es sozial im Allgemeinen erwartbar, dass ich darauf eine Antwort liefern kann. Und wie wir eben schon am Beispiel der Begründung für 2+2=4 gesehen haben, scheint es hier “bessere” und weniger gute Gründe zu geben, das heisst, eine Person kann zur Verantwortung gezogen werden, unzureichend begründete Episteme fallen zu lassen und eine gewisse Grenze zu ziehen, eine mindest erwartbare Begründung. Diese kann sehr wahrscheinlich nicht universell formuliert werden. Eine Regel wie: Alle Bürger dürfen nur noch Aussagen weiterverwenden, denen sie eine mindestens 90-prozentige Wahrheitswarscheinlichkeit attestieren, ist aus diversen Gründen problematisch.
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Frickers Auffassung Doxastischer Verantwortung ist insofern speziell, als dass sie eine deutliche Verbindung moralischer Verantwortung (die wir offensichtlich alle in irgendeiner Form tragen) und Doxastischer Verantwortung sieht. Sogar die Gründe sind oft überlappend. Eine Gute Moralische Begründung, die zum Beispiel der Wahrhaftigkeit, scheint ganz offensichtlich auch eine gute doxastische begründung zu sein. Diese Parallelität zieht Fricker heran, um neo-aristotelianische Moralbegründuungen auch auf epistemischer Ebene wirksam zu machen.
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Ich lasse mich da gern Überzeugen von Ihr und erache es als sinnvoll Doxastische Verantwortung in gewisser Weise moralisch bindend zu machen. Intuitiv wissen wir ja auch, dass unsere Erwartung, dass dritte wahrhaftig mit uns interagieren, auf Gegenseitigkeit beruht und das leben nicht nur normativ, sondern auch auf epistemischer Ebene “verbessert”. Dies liefert auch eine recht simplistesche Rechtfertigung, annehmen zu können, dass Dritte mir die Wahreit sagen. Ich tue ja auch immer mein Bestes, warum also die anderen nicht?
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{% alert(note=true) %}
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created by Aron Petau on 05.01.2021
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{% end %}
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